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“The Impact of Corporate Reputation on Earnings Management 
Decisions” Lu, Xiangyun 2013 
Abstract 
This thesis consists of empirical tests and theoretical works exploring how the 
corporate reputation influences manager’s earnings management decisions. Building 
and protecting corporate reputation is one of the challenges to CEOs today. Some 
researchers suggest that corporate reputation is one important factor when investors 
evaluate a firm. The other scholars indicate that corporate reputation has an impact 
on manager’s information disclosure and strategies making. Earnings management 
occurs when managers bias financial reporting or construct transactions strategically 
to impact the cash flow. I am curious whether the corporate reputation has an effect 
in earnings management behaviour to mislead investors. Firstly, I test how the 
corporate reputation affects manager’s earnings management behaviour in both 
accruals manipulation and real manipulations. I find that firms with worse reputation 
use more increasing discretionary accruals and intend to manipulate sales. Then, I 
study the reputation effect on discretionary accruals in a repeated cheap-talk game. I 
find that for managers in firms without prior good reputation among investors, 
smoothing earnings is an effective way to alter the investors’ opinion.   
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
According to the results of a CEO survey, NYSE Euronext reports that 
“Succession Planning, Corporate Reputation and Investor Confidence are Top 
Challenges for Today’s CEOs”. From the investor’s perspective, researchers suggest 
that corporate reputation is one of the most important quality coefficients when 
investors evaluate a firm (Graham and Dodd, 2008). Since corporate reputation is 
important to both managers and investors, several groups publish corporate 
reputation rankings, either for specific regions, or globally, with focus on different 
stakeholders. Meanwhile, scholars examine how corporate reputation influences 
stakeholders’ decision-making process and how the stakeholders’ decisions impact 
corporate reputation according to the reputation rankings. Recent empirical studies 
have found positive correlations between corporate reputation and the firm’s 
earnings quality. Specifically, academics note that firms with better reputation are 
associated with fewer upward discretionary accruals and smaller magnitude of 
discretionary accruals. However, these empirical works do not explain how the 
corporate reputation affects managers’ accruals decisions. Moreover, no empirical 
work has tested how concern for reputation influences managers’ decisions in real 
manipulation through transactions. Further, there is no theoretical work that analyses 
how reputation impacts managers’ earnings management decisions through both 
discretionary accruals and real transactions. 
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In their seminal paper of 1982, in which they analyse a chain store game with 
imperfect information, Kreps and Wilson (1982) suggest that uncertainty about the 
other player’s payoff may lead the first player to take actions to build a reputation. 
Following their study, some researchers have used the repeated cheap-talk game 
between information sender and receiver to examine how reputation works. 
According to Sobel (1985), Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Morris (2001), the 
information sender will manipulate information when the manipulation cost is low. 
However, Kim (1996) and Stocken (2000) demonstrate that if the information sender 
has good prior reputation or is sufficiently patient, he will disclose truthful 
information to the receiver. 
Another stream of economists have studied how corporate reputation could 
impact managers’ behaviour. Fama (1980) suggests that the manager’s incentive 
problem could be solved by the competition in the labour market, as the manager 
would work hard for his reputation, which may influence his future payoffs. Meyer 
and Vickers (1997) demonstrate that either comparative performance information or 
career concern could motivate managers to work hard. However, Holmström (1999) 
argues that the reputation effect decreases with the manager’s increasing age and 
career development. He believes that reputation effect alone could not provide 
sufficient incentive for managers to increase their efforts when the market is 
imperfect. Earnings management has been a popular topic since the 1980s. Several 
theoretical works utilise game theory to examine the managerial incentives to 
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manage earnings (Lambert, 1983, 1984; Dye, 1988; Trueman and Titman, 1988; 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 
2005). These incentives include compensation plan, debt contract, and concern to 
stay in the job. Meanwhile, a number of empirical works respond to the positive 
accounting theory proposed by Watts and Zimmerman (1986) by testing the 
incentives and consequences of earnings management. However, among these 
empirical research, very few investigate the relation between corporate reputation 
and earnings quality. Specifically, only two empirical papers report how corporate 
reputation relates to earnings management, and these do not explain the role of 
corporate reputation in managers’ earnings management decisions. 
The present research will test how corporate reputation affects managers’ 
earnings management behaviour in both discretionary accruals and real 
manipulations. Following empirical study, I will propose theoretical models to 
analyse how managers make earnings management decisions with consideration of 
corporate reputation.   
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. In the second chapter, I review 
the literature on earnings management and corporate reputation. The review 
encompasses literature on definitions, incentives, measurement of earnings 
management and corporate reputation and how they are linked together. I identify 
the gaps in the literature and propose my hypothesis. Chapter three introduces 
methodology, data selection and data analysis. The fourth chapter discusses the 
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findings from the empirical work.  In the fifth chapter, I review the theoretical 
literature, using the game theory to explain earnings management and reputation. 
Then I analyse how managers and investors interact in a simple game and in more 
complicated games with different assumptions. Later, I develop the formal models to 
explore the manager’s choice regarding discretionary accruals and real earnings 
management. I consider the manager’s accruals manipulation decision in a repeated 
cheap-talk game with investors, and his real manipulation decision in a repeated 
two-period game. Finally, I summarise my work and findings in Chapter six.  
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Chapter 2:  Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Earnings management has captured the attention of academics since the 
1980s. While economists have developed theoretical models to explain why 
managers engage in this behaviour, empirical researchers have tested this 
phenomenon to find out the causes and consequences of earnings management 
behaviour. By reviewing the relevant literature, this chapter provides a general 
understanding on what is meant by earnings management, why managers engage in 
this behaviour, and how to estimate it. In addition, this chapter discusses the 
theoretical framework of earnings management. Finally, corporate reputation is 
reviewed and linked to earnings management. 
2.2 DEFINITIONS OF EARNING MANAGEMENT 
There is no single accepted definition for the term “earnings management”. 
Researchers’ definitions of earnings management can be categorised into three 
groups: beneficial earnings management, pernicious earnings management and 
earnings manipulation, which could be either opportunistic or efficiency enhancing. 
With regard to the first group, scholars consider that earnings management can 
increase the transparency of reports by taking advantage of the flexibility in account 
choice to signal the manager’s private information on future cash flows (Demski, 
1998, Sankar and Subramanyam, 2001). In contrast, researchers who focus on 
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pernicious earnings management argue that earnings management is harmful, as it 
misrepresents reports and reduces the report transparency (Schipper, 1989, Levitt Jr, 
1998, Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Finally, some researchers suggest that earnings 
management is the use of accounting choices, and can be either opportunistic or 
economically efficient. This kind of manipulation is within the boundaries of 
compliance with bright-line standards (Fields et al., 2001, Scott, 2009). 
Studies among the three groups, it is pernicious earnings management that is 
most widely accepted in recent research. Although there is no consensus among 
researchers in defining earnings management, practitioners and regulators consider 
this practice to be common and problematical.  
The definitions proposed by Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
are the most frequently cited. According to Schipper (1989), earnings management 
is “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the 
intent of obtaining some private gain”, and is “accomplished by timing investment 
or financing decisions to alter reported earnings or some subset of it” (p.92).  Healy 
and Wahlen (1999) are more precise in their definition, providing both the methods 
and the incentives of earnings management. They suggest that: “Earnings 
management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
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contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999, p.368). 
This definition has two notable features. First, it indicates how earnings can 
be managed. Managers can use 1) discretionary accruals by adopting the flexible 
accounting choices allowed in Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures to make 
up reported earnings without changing the underlying cash flows; and/or 2) real 
earnings management by constructing economic activities to influence cash flow. 
Second, it suggests why managers engage in earnings management behaviour. 
Earnings are managed when managers intend either to mislead stakeholders or to 
influence earnings-based contracts. 
This study employs Healy and Wahlen (1999), since it accurately defines 
earnings management and is the most accepted definition in the previous earnings 
management literature. 
2.3 INCENTIVES FOR EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
The reasons for earnings management can be explained in terms of its 
incentives. According to Healy and Wahlen (1999) definition, managers manage 
earnings either to misguide stakeholders or to impact contractual outcome. This 
section will demonstrate why managers engage in earnings management, which 
groups of stakeholders they want to mislead and what kind of contract they want to 
influence. Watts and Zimmerman (1986), who develop positive accounting theory, 
propose testable hypotheses with regard to three essential earnings management 
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incentives: (1) compensation plans; (2) debt contracts; and (3) political costs. Other 
theoretical studies have pointed to incentives related to the capital market, 
production market, job-security concern and other implicit contract. Most of these 
studies investigate these incentives using game theory, which analyses the conflicts 
and the interaction between rational decision makers (Myerson, 1991). These 
incentives have also been tested empirically. 
In this section, the first three parts explain the three incentive hypotheses 
proposed in positive accounting theory. Subsequent parts introduce the incentives 
from capital market, production market, job-security concern and other implicit 
contract. 
2.3.1 Compensation Plan Hypothesis 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) explain that compensation plans can drive 
earnings management, mainly due to interest conflicts between managers and firm 
owners. Managers can manipulate earnings to augment their compensation through 
their bonus plan associated with reported accounting numbers. This behaviour 
damages the interest of firm owners.  
Two theoretical studies using game theory show how compensation plans 
encourage managers to smooth income, under the assumption that managers have no 
access to the capital market. Lambert (1984) models a two-person game between a 
principal and a risk-averse manager. He illustrates that, in a two-period moral hazard 
setting, a compensation contract offered by a principal as his optimal decision 
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motivates the manager to smooth income through economic activities (such as 
making production and investment decisions) in order to influence operation cash 
flow. Dye (1988) uses an “overlapping generations” model to study earnings 
management and suggests that both internal and external demands motivate 
managers to manipulate earnings. The internal demand derives from the expected 
optimal compensation plan, while the external demand arises from the need of 
current shareholders to influence the potential investors’ perceptions of firm value. 
Varies empirical studies on earnings management and compensation plan 
report conflicting results. Healy (1985) explores managers’ accounting choice when 
their bonuses are earnings-based. He finds that managers do choose income-
increasing accounting procedures to increase their compensation, and explains that, 
in a typical bonus scheme, bonus only increases between bogey and cap of targeted 
net income. If the reported net income is lower than bogey, managers prefer to shift 
income from the current period to the next period in order to increase the possibility 
of receiving a bonus in the next period. If net income is between bogey and cap, 
managers would rather shift income from the future period to the current period to 
maximise the current period bonus. If net income is higher than cap, managers prefer 
to shift the excess income from the current period to the future one to enhance the 
bonus in the following period. These findings are supported by a number of studies 
(Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979, Bowen et al., 1981, Holthausen, 1981, Healy, 
1985, Skinner, 1993, Gaver et al., 1995, Holthausen et al., 1995, Guidry et al., 
10 
 
1999). Similarly, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that option-based 
compensation plans also provide incentives for managers to use discretion to 
manipulate earnings. They find that the closer the manager’s compensation is tied to 
the stock and option, the more distinct the discretionary accruals manipulation. 
Some other studies report similar results for equity-based bonus plans (Baker et al., 
2003; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Coles et al., 2006; Erickson et al., 2006; Efendi et al., 
2007; McAnally et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2009; Armstrong et al., 2010).  
2.3.2 Debt Contract Hypothesis 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), debt contract can also induce 
earnings management. Lenders put restraints in debt covenants to protect their 
interest, and these restraints are defined by accounting numbers. There are two types 
of debt covenants using accounting numbers: affirmative covenants and negative 
covenants. With the affirmative covenants, firms are required to maintain the 
accounting-based ratios to a specified level. Under the negative covenants, certain 
investment and financing behaviours are constrained (Smith, 1993). For example, 
negative covenants can protect lenders by means of restricting managers’ actions 
such as paying dividends if working capital falls below a specific level (Scott, 2009). 
Any breach of covenants will lead to a default, which enables lenders to take actions 
such as increasing interest rate or even claiming repayment of the loan. Although 
some defaults are negotiable, they are costly. The greater the debt/equity ratio of a 
firm, the higher the possibility the firm may breach a covenant. Consequently, if a 
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firm has higher debt/equity ratio, its managers will desire to increase reported 
accounting numbers related to the covenants, such as earnings, for the purpose of 
avoiding defaults. 
Healy and Palepu (1990) investigate whether managers use discretion in 
accounting decisions to avoid breaking dividend constraints in debt covenants. They 
do not find evidence that managers use flexibility in accounting decisions when the 
tightness of dividend constraints increases. However, they find that firms cut and 
even omit dividends when they are approaching dividend constraints. DeAngelo et 
al. (1994) examine the accounting choice of firms in trouble by employing a sample 
of firms with persistent loss and dividend reduction. They find that these firms select 
accounting procedures that reflect their finance difficulties rather than increase 
income. They suggest that managers in these firms have an incentive to reduce 
income and negotiate with lenders, unions and government. DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) investigate the abnormal accruals of firms that have violated debt covenants. 
They find positive abnormal total and working capital accruals for these companies 
in the year prior to the violation. Sweeney (1994) finds that managers switch to 
income-increasing accounting procedures when the firm is close to violating debt 
covenants. She believes that both the cost of defaulting on the debt covenant and the 
discretion in accounting choices determine the managers’ earnings management 
behaviour. Later studies also provide evidence that managers are motivated to 
increase income through accounting flexibility for the purpose of debt-contracting 
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(Beatty and Weber, 2003; Beatty and Weber, 2006; Ball et al., 2008; Bharath, 2008; 
Zhang, 2008; Nikolaev, 2010). 
2.3.3 Political Cost Hypothesis 
Political cost is a main concern of managers in large firms when 
manipulating earnings. According to Watts and Zimmerman (1978), larger firms 
tend to lower reported earnings through accounting methods in order to gain benefits 
in terms of political and regulatory considerations.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that, according to the economic theory 
of regulations, politicians aim to maximise their utility, which indicates that the 
political process is a competition for wealth transfer. By virtue of protective tariffs, 
government services, and government-created monopolies, politicians transfer 
wealth from firms to individuals. In this competition to transfer wealth, politicians 
may use accounting numbers to facilitate their decision making and policy making, 
which may disadvantage firms. For example, they may regard large reported 
earnings as an indication of monopoly, even though such earnings might be due to 
other reasons. In response to this, managers in large firms have an incentive to adopt 
accounting choices to prevent potential wealth transfers and consequent losses. 
Recent studies provide evidence of earnings management during periods of 
increased political exposure. Wong (1988) documents that larger firms prefer credit 
sales to benefit from low tax rates. Jones (1991) notes that managers tend to lower 
accruals during years of import relief investigation more than in other years. Cahan 
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et al. (1992) study the impact of political cost on earnings management of chemical 
firms, and find that the firms concerned decreased discretionary accruals when US 
Congress was considering the legislation that led to the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Recovery Act of 1980. Hall (1993) 
examines the oil refining industry and suggests that oil refining firms tend to take 
income-deceasing accruals when the oil price is high and take income-increasing 
accruals when the oil price is low. Key’s (1997) investigation of political costs in the 
cable television industry during periods of Congressional scrutiny shows that firms 
which expect regulations to be more harmful have greater income-decreasing 
accruals. Hall and Stammerjohan (1997) find that oil firms reduce accruals to avoid 
potential political cost. Han and Wang (1998) investigate the earnings management 
in oil companies in the period of rapid gasoline price increases during the 1990 
Persian Gulf crisis. Their study indicates that petroleum refining companies took 
income-reducing discretionary accruals to avoid political cost during this politically 
sensitive period, while crude oil and natural gas companies did not report decreasing 
accruals. Monem (2003) provides evidence of significant downward earnings 
management by Australian gold-mining firms, consistent with their attempts to 
mitigate political costs during a period of intense political scrutiny of the industry. 
Then, the firms are found to have engaged in upward earnings management to 
maximise earnings before the introduction of income tax on gold mining. Patten and 
Trompeter (2003) examine the relation between the level of pre-event environmental 
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disclosure and the extent of earnings management in response to regulatory threat. 
Their analysis finds that a sample of 40 US chemical firms exhibited significant 
negative discretionary accruals for 1984. Furthermore, companies with higher levels 
of pre-event environmental disclosures in their 10-K reports tended to take less 
negative discretionary accruals. 
2.3.4 Capital Market Incentives 
In addition to the attention paid to the managerial incentives to engage in 
earnings management, Dechow and Skinner (2000) propose that academics should 
focus on incentives from the capital market, where firms use earnings to signal to 
investors about their financial performance. Firms are motivated to mislead investors 
on the value of firm, in order to affect market price. This section introduces the 
influence of capital market incentives for managers’ earnings management 
behaviour. 
2.3.4.1 Incentives when Firms Raise Capital 
Dechow et al. (2010) suggest that incentives to influence equity market 
valuations affect firms’ accounting choices, especially their accrual choices. 
(1) IPO 
The initial public offering (IPO) is the first occasion upon which a private 
company sells its stock to the public. Both small and large firms can raise capital 
and become publicly traded firms through IPO. IPOs provide firms with 
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opportunities to finance current operations and future growth (Ritter and Welch, 
2002). As long as there exists information asymmetry between managers and 
investors, managers have an opportunity to affect the initial offering price of the 
firm’s stock through earnings management (Aharony et al., 1993). 
Different purposes of IPO generate different implications of earnings 
management for the firm (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). When a firm aims to finance its 
current operations, IPO is considered as a “cash in” tool, and the firm may amplify 
earnings to maximise its stock price. Aharony et al. (1993) examine pre-IPO 
earnings management using the total accruals model. They find weak evidence to 
support the hypothesis that firms maximise their earnings before IPO, and show that 
prestigious underwriters and auditors help constrain earnings management. 
However, they note that small firms and firms with higher leverage ratio appear to 
be more “aggressive” than average. Friedlan (1994) also investigates the pre-IPO 
earnings management. Different from Aharony et al. (1993), he employs a simple 
discretionary method to capture earnings management. He argues that the use of 
prospectuses by investors to evaluate the issuing firm provides managers with 
incentives to increase earnings, as managers reasonably expect that both 
underwriters and investors are not able to detect earnings management. He finds 
evidence that firms do use income-increasing discretionary accruals before IPO to 
influence offer prices in order to maximise wealth.  
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In the case that the firm aims for future growth, IPO is considered as a first 
step of raising capital from the public, and the manager may prefer to be 
conservative and cautious. Teoh et al. (1998a) test the accruals in the IPO year and 
compare stock performance in the following years. They observe poor post-IPO 
stock performance over a three-year holding period for the firms with abnormal high 
accruals in the IPO year. Specifically, firms in the first quartile of discretionary 
accruals experience about 20 percent less post-IPO stock returns than the firms in 
the last quartile. Furthermore, these most “conservative” firms in the bottom quartile 
show an enhanced ability to raise capital in the future, as they are more likely to 
return for a seasoned equity offering. Teoh et al. (1998a) also suggest that IPO firms 
face unusual legal and possibly reputational scrutiny after IPO, and these firms are 
under pressure to protect their reputation for reliability. Thus, the consideration of 
corporate reputation somehow constrains earnings management. 
(2) SEO 
A seasoned equity offering (SEO) occurs when an existing publicly-traded 
firm issues new equity. A seasoned offerings may involve shares being sold by 
existing shareholders (non-dilutive) and/or new shares (dilutive). 
Similar to IPOs, researchers document that earnings management can also 
explain firms’ post-SEO underperformance. Rangan (1998) investigates the earnings 
management around SEO and finds that earnings management during the SEO year 
can predict both changes in earnings and market-adjusted returns in the next year. 
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He suggests that the market is not able to predict the issuing firm’s earnings 
management and therefore overvalues the firm.  Teoh et al. (1998b) test the pre-
SEO discretionary accruals and the post-SEO stock returns. They find that firms 
which use earnings-increasing accruals before SEO appear to have lower long-term 
abnormal returns and lower net income afterwards.  Consistent with Rangan, they 
suggest that investors are not aware of the pre-SEO earnings management and do not 
adjust for the potential earnings manipulation. 
Shivakumar (2000) also examines the earnings management around SEO. In 
line with Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998b), his findings provide evidence of 
earnings management around SEO. However, compared to the previous findings that 
the market and investors’ are not able to infer earnings management before SEO, he 
demonstrates that investors can perceive pre-offering earnings management and 
adjust their expectation accordingly. He implies that the findings of Rangan and 
Teoh et al. on naïve investors might be caused by test misspecification. He also 
suggests that management of earnings around SEO is just a rational response by 
managers to the forecasted market reactions, but is not aimed at misleading 
investors. 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) study both accruals management and real 
earnings management around SEO. They show that both methods of earnings 
management drive the SEO firms’ poor post-event performance, and that real 
earnings management plays a more important role than discretionary accruals. Their 
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finding is important since this is the first piece of work to examine earnings 
management through both accounting choices and real economic activities around 
SEO. They also illustrate that a firm’s choice on earnings management methods 
depends on its ability and the cost of managing accruals. 
2.3.4.2 Incentives from Earnings-Based Target 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) suggest that earnings benchmarks are a strong 
capital market incentive for earnings management activities. 
Graham et al. (2005) survey more than 400 financial executives from public 
companies. From 312 responses, they find that earnings benchmarks such as 
earnings level, analyst forecast and earnings improvement are important to most 
executives. Among the respondents, more than eighty percent agree that meeting 
earnings benchmarks helps them to ‘build credibility with the capital market’ and 
‘maintain or increase stock price’. Jiang (2008) finds that the reduction in the cost of 
debt measured by credit ratings is attenuated for those firms that are likely to have 
used earnings management to beat earnings benchmarks. Habib and Hansen (2008) 
document firms’ earnings management behaviour around three earnings 
benchmarks: earnings level, earnings improvement and analyst forecast benchmark, 
and find that both market incentives and compensation incentives drive such 
earnings management behaviour. 
Dechow et al. (2003) examine whether firms with small profits and firms 
with small losses (loss-avoidance benchmark) have differing levels of discretionary 
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accruals. They find that firms just above the loss-avoidance benchmark do not have 
discretionary accruals that are significantly different from those of firms just below 
the benchmark. Ayers et al. (2006) use a different time period than Dechow et al. 
(2003), and find that firms do not appear to be managing earnings to meet or beat the 
earnings improvement (earnings changes) benchmark. They report that forward-
looking discretionary accruals are higher for firms just above the loss-avoidance 
benchmark than for firms just below, and that these results are more pronounced 
than pseudo-benchmarks along the earnings level distribution. Hansen (2010) 
investigates differences in abnormal accruals between two different time periods and 
finds that in the period from 2001 to 2002, discretionary accruals appear to be more 
pronounced just above the loss-avoidance benchmark. He also finds that over the 
same period, it appears that firms just below the benchmark were not responding to 
opportunities to meet alternative benchmarks in the same way they did from 1988 to 
2000. 
2.3.5 Other Incentives 
2.3.5.1 Incentives from Production Market 
Bagnoli and Watts (2010) adopt a Cournot duopoly model with incomplete 
information to investigate the interaction between earnings management decisions 
and product market competition. They suggest that in product market competition, 
both production costs and the cost of misreporting are private information. Firm A 
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may bias its report to make its competitor believe that its production costs are low. 
This biased report causes its competitor to evaluate firm A’s production as being 
high and therefore to reduce its own production. However, the rational competitor 
can realise that the report is biased and adjust its perception of firm A’s production 
costs upward accordingly. Even if the competitor adjusts the perception, firm A’s 
production costs are still undervalued. Similarly, the competitor also misreports its 
production costs and as a result firm A underestimates its rival’s costs. Eventually, 
without full information, all firms cut their production, which causes the prices of 
products to increase. Consequently, all firms’ profits increase, which provides 
incentives for firms to misreport. Bagnoli and Watts (2010) also indicate that the 
levels of bias are higher in more profitable industries. 
2.3.5.2 Incentives from Job-security Concern 
Concern about job security creates an incentive for managers to manipulate 
earnings. 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) generate a game-theoretic model to assume that 
managers derive ‘incumbency rents’, a non-monetary private benefit, from running 
firms, and that they are under risk of being fired when current earnings are low. To 
secure their jobs, managers whose current performance is poor may use both 
accounting techniques and operating decisions to “borrow” earnings from the future 
period. In addition, current earnings are assumed to be more informative than 
previous earnings in managers’ performance evaluation. Similarly, good 
21 
 
performance today could not compensate poor performance tomorrow. Thus, when 
current earnings are relatively high and expected future earnings are relatively low, 
managers have a desire to “save” current earnings for the future. 
2.3.5.3 Incentives from Implicit Contract 
Earnings management can also be triggered by the desire to maintain 
corporate reputation with regard to implicit contract.  
Implicit contract arises from the repeated relationships between firms and 
their stakeholders (shareholders, lenders, suppliers, etc.) and indicates expected 
behaviour based on previous performance. Scott (2009) argues that if firms develop 
a corporate reputation for meeting formal contract commitments all the time, they 
will obtain better terms from suppliers, and lower interest rate from lenders. 
Bowen et al. (1995) argue that, since a firm’s stakeholders are likely to use 
the reported accounting numbers to help assess the firm’s reputation on the 
fulfilment of implicit contract (e.g. timely payment to suppliers and creditors, 
continuing demand for product or service, funds from suppliers/creditors), managers 
have incentives to increase income in the long run to enhance the stakeholders’ 
confidence in their ability to meet commitments. Moreover, the incentive strength 
hinges on the intensity of the firm’s need for a favourable reputation. 
Accordingly, corporate reputation represents another incentive for earnings 
management. I investigate the issues between corporate reputation and earnings 
management in the fourth part. 
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2.4 MEASUREMENTS OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
Due to the fact that earnings management cannot be measured directly, 
researchers in this area have developed a variety of models to detect possible 
earnings management. Two types of models are investigated in this study: (1) 
accruals-based models and (2) real earnings management models. 
In accruals-based models, the total accruals are divided into discretionary 
accruals and non-discretionary accruals. The non-discretionary accrual is usually 
considered as the estimation of total accruals, and the difference between total 
accruals and non-discretionary accrual is regarded as the discretionary accrual. 
Discretionary accrual is used to detect the value of earnings management.  Most 
studies adopt accruals-based models to detect earnings manipulation (Healy, 1985; 
Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005). 
As a benchmark model, Jones (1991) developed a new and effective method 
to estimate non-discretionary accruals in order to detect earnings management 
during import relief (e.g. tariff increases and quota reductions). The model employs 
a variable such as plant, property and equipment to control for the effect of changes 
in firms’ business activities caused by depreciation charge on the non-discretionary 
accruals, and a variable of the sales revenue to control for the changes of non-
discretionary accruals caused by changes in the companies’ economic environment. 
Jones (1991) contributes to the academic research by embedding into the model the 
dependence of accruals on sales revenue and fixed assets. 
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Dechow et al. (1995) compare the efficiency of five different models, those 
by Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986) and Jones (1991), a modified Jones model and 
the industry model. They find that the modified Jones model is best for detecting 
earnings manipulation due to the fact that it can “eliminate the conjectured tendency 
of the Jones Model to measure discretionary accruals with error when discretion is 
exercised over revenues” (Dechow et al., 1995) by introducing a variable of changes 
in receivables into the non-discretionary function. Although both the Jones model 
and the modified Jones model are widely applied to earnings management study, 
they have been shown to be severely mis-specified when applied to stratified-
random samples of firms (Dechow et al., 1995; Guay et al., 1996). 
Kothari et al. (2005) improve the Jones model to emphasise the non-linear 
relationship between normal accruals and performance through the introduction of a 
control variable of return-on-assets. When the tested hypothesis does not suggest 
that earnings management will differ with performance, or where the control firms 
are not thought to manage earnings, this performance-matched model increases the 
reliability of the conclusion from earnings management research. 
Although most studies detect earnings manipulation through accounting 
techniques, over the last decade real earnings management through economic 
decisions has been drawing an increasing amount of attention (Roychowdhury, 
2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012). 
Compared to the accrual-based earnings management, the real earnings management 
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approaches are more costly and harder to reveal (Bagnoli and Watts, 2000), and 
have direct effects on cash flows (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010).  
In a study employing surveys and interviews with more than 400 executives, 
Graham et al. (2005) suggest that managers prefer to take economic actions (e.g. 
decreasing discretionary expenditure or capital investment) rather than using 
accounting choices (e.g. discretionary accruals) to manipulate earnings. 
Roychowdhury (2006) develops a more comprehensive method to measure 
earnings management through sales manipulation, overproduction and discretionary 
expenditure. Using this method, Cohen et al. (2008) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
suggest that their empirical results are consistent with Graham et al. (2005), which 
indicates that manipulation through real activities is even more common than that 
through accounting techniques. 
2.5 GAME THEORY 
In the theoretical literature on earnings management, researchers establish 
models to explain why managers engage in earnings management. Most of these 
models are built according to game theory, which focuses on the interest conflicts 
among players. This section introduces the theoretical framework for game theory 
and discusses how earnings management and corporate reputation interact under this 
framework. 
In a game with information asymmetry, a player’s type (payoff) is unknown 
and his potential action is unpredictable to others. When this game is repeated 
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several times, other players can perceive this player’s type based on his previous 
actions, estimate the probability of his possible actions, and respond accordingly. 
The other players’ perceptions of this player’s type shape this player’s reputation 
among other players. Considering the impact of reputation on the reactions of others, 
this player may take action to influence others’ perceptions of his true type to 
receive higher payoffs. For example, if there are two types of player - A and B, this 
player receives higher payoffs when the others believe that he is type A than when 
they believe he is type B. If the game is repeated several times and the player is 
patient, he will act as if he is type A even if his actual type is B, in order to make 
others believe his type is A, so that he gets higher payoffs. In other words, he 
attempts to establish a reputation for being type A. Therefore, all players’ actions 
appear to be affected by this consideration of reputation, which is referred to as 
“reputation effect” (Kreps et al., 1982; Kreps and Wilson, 1982). 
Since Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) seminal paper on reputation in repeated 
games, economists have shown great interest in using economic theory to explain 
reputation. Kreps (1990) first interprets how reputation can become a tradable asset 
using a repeated game model. He assumes that there are unforeseen contingencies in 
various transactions, and argues that the agent can earn reputation rents only if he 
acquires good reputation from his predecessor; and can sell his own ‘good name’ 
only if he honours others’ trust. The agent is motivated to honour others’ trust, as the 
costs of losing reputation exceed the benefits of maintaining reputation. Even the 
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short-lived agent in this model does not act myopically. Although Kreps admits that 
his theory is problematic due to multiple equilibria, he provides new insight in 
business study through the penetration of game-theory tools.  
Put simply, co-operation between players in a game can add value and 
transform a zero-sum game into a positive-sum game. In order to maximise the total 
utility over the length of the game, players must be able to predict the other players’ 
actions. One solution to predict the target player’s behaviour is reputation (Weigelt 
and Camerer, 1988). Where the target player has good reputation, other players infer 
that he will not defect and therefore lower the collective payoffs. A good reputation 
also encourages future game playing. However, if an alliance player chooses to 
defect for a short-term gain, his reputation for future games and co-operation will be 
tarnished.   
Tadelis (1999) develops a model of adverse selection to expound how brand 
name reputation can be traded in the market under the assumption that reputation is 
the only asset of a firm and clients cannot observe such trading of brand name. 
Tadelis (2002) extends his previous model by considering moral hazard, and in a 
later study (Tadelis, 2003) he further develops the model by introducing overlapping 
generations of the agent. He summarises that reputation as an asset increases after 
success and decreases after failure. 
Other economists show how a firm’s reputation affects capital markets. 
Diamond (1989) demonstrates how firms acquire good reputation in the debt market 
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by repaying their short-term loans. In his model, reputation plays a role in protecting 
creditors by preventing managers from not paying back. He also indicates that 
borrowers with good reputation enjoy lower interest rates. 
The influence of reputation on players’ behaviour is called “reputation 
effect”. According to Mailath (2007, p.4), “reputation effects describe the impact 
upon the set of equilibria of the introduction of small amounts of incomplete 
information of a particular form into repeated games (and other dynamic games).” 
2.6 OVERALL VIEW OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 
A review of the literature on corporate reputation could help to improve our 
understanding of the importance of positive reputation to a firm. By reviewing 
relevant literature, this section discusses what corporate reputation is, why it is 
important to a firm and how to measure it. 
2.6.1 Corporate Reputation – Definitions 
The definition of corporate reputation is still a primary problem in the 
literature (Wartick, 2002). In the recent literature, there are 13 different definitions 
on corporate reputation (Walker, 2010), among which the four most widely used are 
introduced here. Weigelt and Camerer (1988) suggest that a corporate reputation is a 
set of attributes ascribed to a firm, inferred from the firm's past actions. Fombrun 
and Shanley (1990, p.234), within the framework of signalling theory, interpret 
corporate reputation as “the outcome of a competitive process in which firms signal 
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their key characteristics to constituents to maximize their social status”. Fombrun 
(1996, p.72) defines corporate reputation as the “perceptual representation of a 
company’s past actions and future prospects that describes the firm’s overall appeal 
to all of its key constituents when compared with other leading rivals”. Barnett et al. 
(2006, p.34) base their definition on a survey of previous studies on this concept, 
and emphasise assessment but not awareness, whereby corporate reputation can be 
referred to as “observers’ collective judgments of a corporation based on 
assessments of the financial, social, and environmental impacts attributed to the 
corporation over time”.  
Based on the above definitions, Walker (2010) summarises that there are five 
attributes to corporate reputation. First, corporate reputation is based on perceptions. 
Second, it is the collective perception of stakeholders. Third, the reputation is 
comparative. Fourth, the corporate reputation can be either positive or negative. 
Finally, it is temporal. Similarly, Barnett et al. (2006) define corporate reputation as 
"collective judgements over time", and emphasise that it is perceptional, aggregate, 
comparable and contemporary. In addition, since a judgement can be evaluated, this 
definition takes into account the assessment of corporate reputation. Therefore, 
Barnett et al.'s (2006) definition of corporate reputation is more precise than other 
definitions, and for that reason it will be employed by this paper. 
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2.6.2 Importance of Corporate Reputation 
There are many reasons why academic researchers and managers consider 
corporate reputation to be vital. In terms of the literature, it is generally 
acknowledged that corporate reputation is an essential intangible and strategic asset 
(Fearnley, 1993; Hall, 1993; Fombrun, 1996; Suh and Amine, 2007). Like most 
assets, it is subject to risk, obsolescence, and depreciation and it can be enhanced by 
innovation and investment (Preston, 2004). Reputational capital includes creation of 
market barriers, customer retention, and strengthened competitive advantages 
(Schwaiger, 2004). Good reputation gives a company a competitive edge by 
attracting customers to the company’s products and services, investors to its 
securities, high quality employees to its jobs, suppliers’ and distributors’ offer of 
excellent contract terms, and favourable capital access, among other benefits 
(Fombrun, 1996; Srivastava et al., 1997; Deephouse, 2000; Schwaiger, 2004; 
Rindova et al., 2005; Dowling, 2006; Suh and Amine, 2007). Therefore, companies 
with negative reputation may suffer in financial performance, while companies with 
positive reputation may boost their bottom-line.  
Although many top managers agree that reputation has value as a component 
of intangible and long-term assets, those that are obsessed with short-term profits 
have essentially lost sight of their reputation by engaging in accounting deceptions. 
Others tend to compromise ethical and professional standards to accomplish 
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personal or corporate goals (Shaub et al., 2005). In the process of living for today, 
they lose their most valuable long-term asset, that is, positive reputation. 
2.6.3 Measurement of Corporate Reputation 
In recent empirical studies, several measures are applied to investigate 
corporate reputation. Reputation rankings by professional third parties are widely 
used in research as a proxy for corporate reputation. Other proxies for corporate 
reputation include content analysis of media data, market share, winning contests, 
rankings by recruiters, and rankings by students. 
There are four main rankings on corporate reputation in the US: the Harris 
Poll Reputation Quotient (hereafter RQ) by Harris Interactive; America's Most 
Reputable Companies (hereafter AMRC) by Forbes; America's (World's) Most 
Admired Companies (hereafter AMAC) by Fortune; and the RepTrak by the 
Reputation Institute.  
The foundation of the RQ is that corporate reputation is based on 
stakeholders’ perceptions. Harris Interactive assess stakeholders’ perceptions across 
six dimensions: products and services, financial performance, workplace 
environment, social responsibility, vision and leadership and emotional appeal. This 
survey is based on the perceptions of members of the American general public. 
Forbes publishes the AMRC ranking every April with their partner the 
Reputation Institute. The Reputation Institute conducts online surveys among 
consumers, aimed at evaluating perceptions towards the 150 largest US companies. 
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Consumers express their perceptions of four emotional indicators - trust, esteem, 
admiration and good feeling - for the companies with which they are “somewhat” or 
“very” familiar. Each company gets a score between 0 and 100 derived from 
consumers’ perceptions, and this score, known as a “RepTrak Pulse”, denotes an 
average degree of consumers’ feelings for a company. The Reputation Institute 
considers this feeling as the reputation of a company. 
Besides the RepTrak Pulse ranking, the Reputation Institute also conducts an 
annual RepTrak survey in 15 countries. The RepTrak is an online-based survey that 
collects and analyses perceptions from the general public. It employs the RepTrak 
Pulse indicators, and seven further dimensions of corporate reputation: 
product/services, innovation, workplace, governance, citizenship, leadership and 
performance. Although the Reputation Institute claims that their RepTrak System 
represents the “stakeholders’ feel for a company or organisation”, the system mainly 
focuses on the perceptions of consumers, not the whole stakeholder group. 
Fortune publishes the AMAC ranking every March with their partner Hay 
Group. This ranking is based on a survey of about 4,000 business executives, 
directors and analysts. The 10 largest companies in each industry receive a score 
based on nine criteria: innovation, people management, use of assets, social 
responsibility, management quality, financial soundness, long-term investment, 
product quality and global competitiveness. Most empirical research on corporate 
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reputation use this ranking as a measure of corporate reputation. Walker (2010) 
suggests that it is the most common reputation measure in research. 
Some scholars develop their own variables to estimate corporate reputation. 
In his study of the automobile industry, Rao (1994) uses winning contests as a proxy 
for corporate reputation. When a product is awarded the first prize in an event, the 
organisation develops this first prize product with its definition as a winner. The 
reputations variable in Rao’s (1994) research is the lagged natural logarithm of 
cumulative winners plus unity. Cable and Graham (2000) examine job seekers’ 
perceptions on corporate reputation. They interview a sample of undergraduates 
from two universities to investigate the factors that the students (job seekers) take 
into account when assessing the firm’s reputation. Deephouse and Carter (2005) 
analyse the difference between legitimacy and reputation with a sample of US 
commercial banks, using media data to capture the general public’s perceptions 
towards a company. Fang (2005) uses market share to capture the corporate 
reputation for an investment bank when she examines the underwriter’s role in bond 
issuance. Rindova et al. (2005) study organisational reputation using a sample of US 
business schools with full-time MBA programs. They evaluate the business school 
reputation by surveying recruiters. 
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2.7 REPUTATION EFFECT AND EARNINGS QUALITY 
2.7.1 Intermediates’ Reputation and Issuers’ Earnings Management 
When a firm goes public for the first time, its value is unknown by the 
investors due to information asymmetry. If the firm is undervalued, investors may 
discount the security and the firm’s informational cost of capital may increase; if the 
firm is overvalued, investors may pay extra for their misunderstanding and the 
firm’s informational cost of capital may decrease (Carter and Manaster, 1990). 
Intermediates such as auditors and underwriters, who stand between the issuers and 
investors, reduce this information asymmetry to some degree. This implies that a 
reputable underwriter might influence the investors’ perceptions of the issuer’s stock 
price. 
According to signalling theory, when investors do not have perfect 
information about the issuer’s true value, the quality of intermediates selected by the 
issuer provides this information to the market. Several earlier studies report that 
intermediates’ reputation has a positive impact on stock performance, as their 
quality informs the market about the issuer’s true value. In their theoretical study, 
Titman and Trueman (1986) suggest that a firm with favourable information about 
its value chooses a more prestigious auditor and underwriter than a firm with less 
advantageous information. Therefore, higher quality of auditor and underwriter 
indicates the higher value of the issuer. Empirical work by Carter and Manaster 
(1990) shows that stocks of initial public offering (hereafter IPO) with reputed 
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underwriters are associated with less under-pricing in the short term and less 
underperformance in the long term. 
However, it has been argued that underperformance after IPO is the result of 
pre-IPO earnings management. As underwriters can earn economic rents from 
reputation, their decision making is informed by reputation concern (Fang, 2005), 
and therefore mitigates the issuer’s earnings manipulation (Chen et al., 2013). As a 
result, the issuers with prestigious underwriters show better post-IPO performance 
(Sun et al., 2010) and the issuers with less reputable underwriters exhibit higher 
underperformance (Chang et al., 2010). 
2.7.2 Management Reputation and Earnings Quality 
There is a debate over the relationship between managerial reputation and 
earnings quality. Given consideration of reputation, the notion of “efficient contract” 
suggests that CEOs with favourable reputation have less incentive to engage in 
earnings management that results in poor earnings quality, as they will suffer from 
greater loss in their own human capital, and this behaviour will also increase the 
firm’s cost of capital. Conversely, the idea of “rent extraction” suggests that 
reputable CEOs are more aggressive in earnings management in order to enhance 
their careers; hence they may use discretion, which gives rise to worse earnings 
quality (Francis et al., 2008). 
Francis et al. (2008) investigate the association of CEO reputation measured 
by media coverage with earnings quality measured by both a five-year rolling 
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standard deviation of discretionary accruals from the Jones model and the absolute 
value of abnormal accruals from the performance-matched modified Jones model. 
They find that prestigious CEOs do manipulate earnings to alter the perceptions of 
labour and stock markets. Furthermore, they suggest that firms with inherent poor 
earnings quality always hire reputable CEOs, which may go some way towards 
explaining why reputable CEOs are associated with poor earnings quality. 
However, Lafond (2008) criticises the work of Francis et al. (2008) with 
regard to how reputable CEOs make accounting decisions, and the proxy used to 
measure CEO reputation. Demerjian et al. (2013) employ a decile rank of 
managerial efficiency to approximate managerial ability, and four different methods 
to assess earnings quality. Consistent with the efficient contract hypothesis, they 
conclude that managerial ability positively affects the firm’s choices, such as 
mergers and acquisitions or R&D expenditures. 
2.8 CORPORATE REPUTATION AND EARNINGS QUALITY 
According to the definition put forward by Dechow et al. (2010, 344): 
“Higher quality earnings provide more information about the features of a firm’s 
financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision made by a specific 
decision-maker.” They suggest that a variety of measures are used as proxy for 
earnings quality, and that one such proxy, earnings management, is assumed to 
weaken earnings quality. 
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2.8.1 Corporate Reputation Impact on Earnings Management / Earnings 
Quality 
Among the studies that investigate the impact of corporate reputation on 
earnings management/earnings equality, Riahi-Belkaoui (2001) uses a total accruals 
model and suggests that multinational firms with high reputation use income-
decreasing accruals to avoid the potential political cost. Specifically, he hypothesises 
that managers in high reputation firms use more income-decreasing accruals 
compared to managers in low reputation firms. This hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that highly reputed firms are always highly profitable firms, which 
attract more public attention and face high probability of being regulated. He uses a 
sample of all the firms included in Forbes’ 100 “Most International” American 
manufacturing and service firms from 1987 to 1990. Then he uses Fortune’s 
“American Most Admired Companies” to distinguish the high-reputation firms from 
low-reputation firms. Similar to Jones (1991), in the first model Riahi-Belkaoui 
(2001) regresses total accruals on the change in sales and the total accruals balance. 
Then, to test reputation effect, an indicator variable is added to form the second 
model. This variable is assigned to 1 for the high-reputation firms and to 0 for low-
reputation firms. Firm size is controlled in the second model and a time indicator is 
also included. In the results, the reputation variable obtains a negative sign, 
indicating that high reputation firms use less accruals. He infers that reputed firms 
use income-decreasing accruals to reduce the possible political cost. In this study, 
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the reputation variable is regressed on total accruals directly. The discretionary 
accruals are not separated from the non-discretionary accruals. However, the total 
accruals model could lead to estimation error for discretionary accruals and is not 
able to measure the earnings management for firms with extreme performance 
(Dechow et al., 1995).  
Tan (2007) investigates the impact of corporate reputation on earnings 
quality in the Chinese market. He measures earnings quality by persistent 
profitability compared to the average level of the related industry. He finds positive 
impact of corporate reputation on earnings quality. However, he does not find 
evidence that good reputation engenders superior earnings quality. Since enhancing 
and maintaining reputation is costly, firms with good reputation may experience 
short-term loss. He also suggests that reputation and firm’s financial performance 
should be interactive, although his empirical work is on the one-way effect. 
Luchs et al. (2009) argue that a firm’s reputation positively associates with 
its earnings quality. They assume that the “America’s Most Admired Companies” 
(AMAC) have integrity in accounting practice, and hypothesise that firms with 
higher reputation have higher earnings quality. In their research earnings quality is 
measured by the absolute discretionary accruals, and the modified Jones model is 
employed to detect discretionary accruals. Their sample contains the firms from the 
2006 AMAC list. For each sample firm a matching firm from the same industry with 
closest total assets is picked from outside the AMAC list. A dummy variable is 
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introduced to indicate the firm’s reputation category. Sample firms are coded 1, 
while matching firms are coded 0. Luchs et al. (2009) use this dummy variable as 
dependent variable together with other control variables to explain the absolute 
discretionary accruals for the year 2005. They find that AMAC firms have lower 
absolute discretionary accruals on average than the non-AMAC firms. Therefore, 
there is a positive association between corporate reputation and earnings quality. 
However, the survey for AMAC 2006 is conducted from the Autumn of 2005, when 
the 2005 financial data for most companies had not been reported, and the list for 
AMAC 2006 was published in Feb/Mar 2006, after the release of most annual 
reports. Their findings cannot support the hypothesis that corporate reputation 
contributes to discretionary accruals level. 
While Luchs et al. (2009) use earnings management as a proxy of earnings 
quality, Cao et al. (2012) investigate the impact of corporate reputation on earnings 
quality using an external indicator, i.e. restatements. As reputation is both time-
consuming and complicated to build, and costly to rebuild when it is damaged, firms 
with different reputation levels may act in diverse ways when considering whether 
to build or protect their reputation. Hence, Cao et al. (2012) assume that reputable 
firms are less likely to misstate their financial statements, in order to protect their 
reputation from sustaining huge damage due to the greater public scrutiny. After 
controlling for audit fees, corporate governance and potential effects of CEO 
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reputation, they find that firms with high reputation are less likely to restate both 
their audited and unaudited financial reports. 
Olagbemi (2011) investigates whether corporate reputation can mitigate 
accounting fraud. She employs a qualitative test by surveying accounting 
professionals. In her research, nearly half of the accounting professionals surveyed 
think that accounting fraud can be prevented or reduced in reputable companies. 
Olagbemi argues that since accounting fraud can sully the corporate reputation, 
earnings and profits gained at the cost of corporate reputation are short-lived. 
2.8.2 Earnings Quality Impact on Corporate Reputation 
Among those studies that investigate the impact of earnings quality on 
corporate reputation, Karpoff and Lott (1993) argue that financial reporting fraud 
leads to reputational penalties.  They demonstrate that firms accused of such fraud 
suffer from significant market-value decline, and suggest that this may be a result of 
reputation loss as investors adjust their expectation of cost of capital to a higher 
level due to their expectation of future fraud.  
While Karpoff and Lott’s (1993) study focuses only on the corporate 
reputation damage driven by the violation of GAAP, several researchers investigate 
the corporate reputation damage caused by poor financial quality under GAAP. For 
example, Riahi-Belkaoui (2001) documents a negative relationship between 
corporate reputation and total accruals, and concludes that corporate audience might 
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assign lower reputation to firms with higher total accruals when considering 
earnings management through accruals. 
Another group of studies on reputational penalties triggered by poor earnings 
quality focuses on the managerial reputation penalty. Earnings management may 
bring short-term benefits to firms and managers, but in the long-run, it seems that 
managers need to pay more for this behaviour. 
Kaplan and Ravenscroft (2004) suggest that earnings management is costly 
for managers since this behaviour tends to affect their reputation for high ethics, and 
this in turn can restrict their future career opportunities. Similarly, Kaplan et al. 
(2007) interview more than 100 MBA students and suggest that managers engaging 
in earnings management may suffer from potential reputation loss, which has a 
negative impact on their career. After the trade-off between the short-term benefits 
and long-term impact on career, personal reputation may be a disincentive for 
earnings management. 
Desai et al. (2006) provide evidence that managers’ reputation is damaged by 
misstating financial reports. They investigate the management turnover and the re-
hiring of displaced managers after firms’ earnings restatement announcement. They 
find a higher management turnover rate in firms with restatement, compared to the 
firms of similar age, size and industry without restatement. Furthermore, more than 
two thirds of displaced managers are subsequently unable to get a comparable job. 
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2.9 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This section investigates whether corporate reputation could affect 
managers’ accounting choice with regard to different incentives that encourage 
earnings management behaviour. Earnings management incentives can be generated 
from considerations of capital market or political cost, among others. In the sub-
sections below, each incentive is considered separately, and the impact of corporate 
reputation on earnings management behaviour is discussed. 
2.9.1 Incentives from Capital Market 
Dechow et al. (2010) note that managers’ incentives to affect market 
valuations have an effect on firms’ accounting choices. Chaney and Lewis (1995) 
theoretically prove that earnings management has an effect on firm value under the 
information asymmetry between managers and investors. In their equilibrium, the 
opportunistic accounting choices can influence investors’ assessments of the firm 
stock's market value. A large body of empirical research documents earnings 
management behaviour when firms raise capital and beat earnings benchmarks. 
Friedlan (1994) argues that managers increase earnings before IPO offering to adjust 
investors' valuation and influence the offering prices in order to maximise wealth. 
Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998) also suggest that firms can be overvalued by 
the pre-SEO earnings manipulations. Dietrich et al. (2000) indicate that managers 
employ income-increasing tools before raising new debt. Bagnoli and Watts (2000) 
also argue that the managers’ incentives for earnings management can be driven by 
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the firm’s relative performance comparison within an industry. In a game with 
information asymmetry, investors and creditors compare a target firm with its 
competitors’ reported accounting numbers to evaluate the target firm’s relative 
performance when they make their funds allocation decisions. The target firm may 
engage in earnings management if it supposes that its rivals also use this method to 
enhance reported accounting numbers, and if it believes this would be beneficial. In 
other words, in the game of firm(s) and investors, the purpose of earnings 
management behaviour is to influence investors' and creditors' perceptions about the 
firm's value.  
Studies on reputation suggest that corporate reputation affects investors’ and 
creditors’ perceptions towards a firm when they assess firm value and risk. Diamond 
(1989) shows that when a firm acquires good reputation in the debt market, the 
interest rate decreases and the present value of rents in the future generated from 
good reputation increases. In addition, Srivastava et al. (1997) document that good 
reputation can positively impact firm value by altering investors’ perceptions of the 
firm’s riskiness measured by Beta. They indicate that under the same return level, 
investors are willing to accept higher risk for firms with better reputation. According 
to Diamond (1989) and Srivastava et al. (1997), firms which already have good 
reputation enjoy lower interest rate from creditors and lower risk perceptions from 
investors. 
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In summary, in the capital market, a major incentive for managers' earnings 
management behaviour is the desire to influence the investors' and debtors' 
perceptions towards the firm. However, firms with good reputation could enjoy 
lower interest rates from creditors and lower risk perceptions from investors. Hence, 
firms which have already established a favourable reputation among investors and 
creditors have less desire to enhance accounting numbers than do those without 
favourable reputation. Thus, managers in reputed firms engage less in earnings 
management. 
H1: Higher reputation firms engage less (amount) in earnings-increasing 
management than do lower reputation firms. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section presents the methodology used to test the hypotheses in the 
previous section. First, I explain and justify the sample selection and the time period 
of the investigation. Then, I outline the definitions and measurements of variables, 
model specifications, data source and data analysis procedures. Finally, I present a 
brief summary. 
3.2 SAMPLE SELECTION AND PERIOD OF STUDY 
The sample population for this study is the Fortune America’s Most Admired 
Companies. Since the study aims to verify whether corporate reputation impacts 
managers’ earnings management behaviour, a sample where there is a reputation 
proxy available is needed. Wartick (2002) implies that corporate reputation should 
be measured as stakeholders’ perception rather than factual representation. 
Similarly, Walker (2010) suggests that perception-based survey is more appropriate 
as a measure of corporate reputation than objective measures such as market share or 
winning contests. Among the perception surveys worldwide, Fortune’s America’s 
Most Admired Companies (AMAC) is one of the most famous reputation rankings. 
It has been copied in several countries, including the UK and Germany. Because 
Hay Group, which conducts the AMAC survey, describes the process in detail, 
therefore whose perceptions this survey represents is known, while the UK survey 
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provides only selection criteria. Moreover, the US reputation survey offers the 
largest sample size per year compared to surveys in other countries.  
American’s Most Admired Companies is an annual ranking of corporate 
reputation conducted by Hay Group and published by Fortune Magazine. This 
ranking is selected since it comprises a broader range of industries and more firms, 
and has a longer period of available data compared to other reputation rankings used 
in recent reputation literature. The designation starts with the largest US and global 
companies (measured by revenue). Hay Group sorts the companies by industry and 
selects between 10 and 15 of the largest companies from each industry. About 4,000 
executives, directors, and security analysts are interviewed to rank companies in 
their own industry. The companies rated in the top half of each industry are 
categorised as the Most Admired Companies. 
The initial sample from the AMAC includes 2,639 firm-year observations for 
the period 2006 to 2010. From this initial sample, 1,430 firm-year observations are 
most admired companies and the other observations are contenders. 126 firm-years 
are excluded because the companies could not be found in Compustat. Since the 
results may be affected by specific regulations and the unique characteristics of 
firms from regulated industries and the financial sector, 348 firm-year observations 
in regulated industries and 283 firm-year observations in the financial sector are 
excluded from the study. A further 583 firm-year observations are eliminated due to 
information missing from Compustat. After elimination, the final sample consists of 
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1,299 firm-year observations. The sample selection procedure and the industry 
distribution are summarised in Table 3.1. 
 
3.3 SOURCES OF DATA 
There are two main sources of data relevant to the study, namely Compustat 
and Fortune Magazine. Data for reputation variables are collected from the Fortune 
Magazine website and all the original financial data (un-restated) are downloaded 
from WRDS Compustat. 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Most Admired Companies 302 306 317 273 232 1430
Contenders 281 281 279 191 177 1209
Firms not Found in Compustat -56 -37 -31 -2 0 -126
Firms in Regulated Industries (SIC 4400-5000) -74 -79 -68 -68 -59 -348
Financial Institutions (SIC 6000-6500) -50 -60 -66 -59 -48 -283
Financial Information Missing from Compustat (_merge==2) -110 -130 -133 -110 -100 -583
Final Sample 293 281 298 225 202 1299
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Agricultural Industries (SIC 1-7) 2 2 1 1 1 7
Mineral Industries (SIC 10-19) 17 21 19 9 7 73
Manufacturing Industries (SIC 20-39) 172 157 174 114 107 724
Transportation, Communication and Utilities (SIC 40-43) 13 11 13 11 7 55
Wholesale (SIC 50-51) 10 8 9 9 9 45
Retail (SIC 52-59) 36 37 36 39 31 179
Service (SIC 70-89) 41 43 44 41 39 208
Non-Operating Establishments (SIC 99) 2 2 2 1 1 8
Total 293 281 298 225 202 1299
Table 3.1 Sample Selection and Industry Distribution
Panel A: Sample Selection
Panel B: Industry Distribution
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3.4 LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL 
The object of this research is to test the hypothetical relationship between 
corporate reputation and earnings management. In order to test this relationship, a 
linear regression model is proposed as follows: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑈_𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the earnings management of firm i in year t after the reputation score 
is published; both accruals and real activity approaches of earnings management will 
be measured and tested; 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the reputation score published each March for firm i in year 
t; 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the size of firm i in year t; 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the leverage ratio of firm i in year t; 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is return on assets of firm i in year t; 
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 is market-to-book ratio of firm i in year t; 
𝐴𝑈_𝐷𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable for the auditor of firm i in year t; 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 is the dummy variable for year; 
𝜀 is the error term. 
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3.5 DEFINING AND MEASURING VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
3.5.1 Reputation Variables 
The independent variable in this empirical analysis is corporate reputation, 
measured by the Fortune list of America's (World's) Most Admired Companies. 
Previous studies define corporate finance with different emphasis (Fearnley, 
1993; Fombrun, 1996; Dowling, 2004; Hannington, 2004). Barnett et al. (2006) 
point out that it is necessary to reach a consensus on the definition of corporate 
reputation. They analyse and summarise the prior definitions to provide a definition 
with more theoretical clarity (Olagbemi, 2011). According to their definition, 
corporate reputation is "observers’ collective judgements of the financial, social, and 
environmental impacts attributed to the corporation over time" (Barnett et al., 2006, 
p.34). They claim that this definition is comprehensive as it comprehends the 
"judgement" which indicates "estimation", "evaluation" or "assessment". 
As noted previously, there are four main rankings on corporate reputation in 
the US. The Harris Interactive US Reputation Quotient (RQ) surveys members of 
the American general public; the Forbes America's Most Reputable Companies 
(AMRC) invites consumers to participate in the survey; the Reputation Institute 
RepTrak collects and analyses perceptions from different stakeholder groups, while 
Fortune's America's (World's) Most Admired Companies (AMAC) surveys 
executives, directors, and security analysts within each industry. When discussing 
how corporate reputation may impact managers’ earnings management behaviour, 
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the investors, creditors and competitors are consider as stakeholders. Therefore, this 
study cares more about the opinions of investors, creditors and competitors. AMAC 
provides a better fit for this research since it focuses on the judgement of executives, 
directors, and security analysts from the same industry, while the other three 
rankings focus on consumers' perceptions. 
The AMAC list is based on a survey of about 4,000 business executives, 
directors and analysts. They score the 10 largest companies in the same industry on 
nine criteria: innovation, people management, use of assets, social responsibility, 
management quality, financial soundness, long-term investment, product quality and 
global competitiveness. Most empirical research on corporate reputation also use 
this ranking as a measure of corporate reputation.  
3.5.2 Earnings Management Variables 
Earnings management is the dependent variable in this empirical analysis. It 
is measured by both the discretionary accruals and the real activities. 
3.5.2.1 Discretionary accruals 
Discretionary accruals refer to the use of managers’ own discretion in 
accounting choice to affect accruals level. Managers can use either upward earnings 
management to increase income or downward earnings management to decrease 
income. The absolute value of discretionary accruals measures the level of 
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opportunistic earnings management activities and extreme reporting decisions 
exercised by the managers (Becker et al., 1998). 
In order to estimate the discretionary accruals, the total accruals are 
identified first. There are two methods used to compute the total accruals: the 
traditional balance sheet approach (e.g. Healy, 1985; Dechow et al., 1995), and the 
cash flow approach (e.g. Becker et al., 1998; Subramanyam, 1996; Xie et al., 2003). 
Both approaches are extensively used in the prior literature. However, Hribar and 
Collins (2002) suggest that the cash flow approach is better than the balance sheet 
approach when estimating the accruals for earnings management. They claim that 
the balance sheet approach contains measurement error, which can lead to erroneous 
conclusion of the existence of earnings management when no such earnings 
management is detected. Following the argument of Hribar and Collins (2002), the 
present study employs the cash flow approach in computing the total accruals. 
The discretionary accruals are estimated using a cross-sectional variation of 
the Jones model (1991), the modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995) and the 
performance-adjusted model by Kothari et al (2005). Following DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994), the cross-sectional version is employed as it is more specific than 
the time version model due to the small sample observations (Subramanyam, 1996). 
All data are sourced from Compustat. 
In the Jones model: 
TA𝑖𝑡 = β0 +β1 (
1
Assets𝑖𝑡−1
) +β
2
(
∆Sales𝑖𝑡
Assets𝑖𝑡−1
) +β
3
(
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Assets𝑖𝑡−1
) + u𝑖𝑡 
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where (with reference to COMPUSTAT) 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = total accruals of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
= (∆Data4 - ∆Data1 - ∆Data5 + ∆Data34 - Data14) / lagged Data6 
∆Sales𝑖𝑡= sales (Data12) of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 less sales in year 𝑡 − 1; 
PPEit = gross property, plant, and equipment (Data7) of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡; 
Assets𝑖𝑡−1= total assets (Data 6) of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 − 1. 
In the modified Jones model: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where (with reference to COMPUSTAT) 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = total accruals of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
= (∆Data4 - ∆Data1 - ∆Data5 + ∆Data34 - Data14) / lagged Data6 
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡= sales (Data12) of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 less sales in year 𝑡 − 1; 
∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡= receivables (Data2) of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 less receivables in year 
𝑡 − 1; 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 = gross property, plant, and equipment (Data7) of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡; 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1= total assets (Data 6) of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 − 1. 
In the performance-adjusted Jones model: 
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52 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = total accruals of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
= (∆Data4 - ∆Data1 - ∆Data5 + ∆Data34 - Data14) / lagged Data6 
∆Sales𝑖𝑡= sales (Data12) of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 less sales in year 𝑡 − 1; 
PPEit = gross property, plant, and equipment (Data7) of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡; 
Assets𝑖𝑡−1= total assets (Data 6) of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 − 1; 
ROAit−1= return on assets (net income divided by total assets (Data6)) of 
firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 − 1. 
3.5.2.2 Real earnings management 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), three methods are used to measure the 
level of real earnings management: the abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO), 
production costs, and discretionary expenses. Gunny (2005) and Zang (2012) 
demonstrate the construct validity of these methods. 
(1) Sales manipulation 
Managers accelerate sales from the next fiscal year into the current year 
and/or make extra unsustainable sales by offering “limited-time” price discounts or 
providing more attractive credit terms. Although such price discounts and relaxed 
credit terms would boost sales temporarily, the increase in sales volume tends to 
disappear when the prices and terms revert to what they were before. The 
temporarily boosted sales will increase the earnings in the current period under the 
assumption that the margins are positive. However, cash flow in the current period 
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will be lowered as the sales margins decline due to price discounts, and suppliers do 
not offer relaxed terms (e.g., discounts) to match those the firms offer to customers. 
Roychowdhury (2006) suggests that normal cash flow from operations is a 
linear function of sales and change in sales in the current period. He provides a 
cross-sectional model to estimate the normal cash flow as follows: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡=cash flow from operations (Compustat data item 308) of firm 𝑖 in 
year t; 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1= the lagged total asset (Compustat data item 6) of firm 𝑖; 
 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡= the sales (Compustat data item 12) of current period for firm 𝑖; 
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡= the change in sales of firm 𝑖. 
To capture the abnormal cash flow for each firm for every year, the model 
should be run for every year and industry. Then the abnormal cash flow is the actual 
CFO minus the estimated normal CFO using the coefficients from the industry-year 
model and the firm-year’s variables. 
(2) Overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold 
Managers can also increase earnings by producing more than necessary. 
When managers increase production, they can lower the fixed cost per unit as the 
fixed overhead costs are spread over a larger number of units. If the reduction in 
average fixed costs is not offset by any increase in average marginal cost, the 
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average total cost falls off. Thus, the cost of goods sold (COGS) declines and the 
reported operating margins increase. On the other hand, other production costs and 
inventory holding costs incurred will contribute to higher annual production costs 
relative to sales and lower cash flows from operations, given sales levels. 
Roychowdhury (2006) defines production costs as PROD = COGS + ∆INV. 
To estimate the production cost, he first models the normal COGS and ∆INV 
respectively and then estimates the production cost by both industry and year: 
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where 
COGSit=cost of goods sold (Compustat data item 44) of firm 𝑖 in year t; 
∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡= change in inventory (Compustat data item 3) of firm 𝑖 in year t; 
 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡= the sum of cost of goods sold and changes in inventory of firm 𝑖 
in year t. 
55 
 
(3) Reduction of discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins 
Decreasing advertising, R&D, and SG&A expenses will increase earnings in 
the current period. This will also cause higher cash flows in the current period if the 
firms normally pay for such expenses in cash, in return for taking the risk of lower 
future cash flows. 
Like COGS, discretionary expenses should also be a linear function of 
contemporaneous sales: 
DISEXPit
Assetsit−1
= β
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) +β
2
(
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) + uit 
But if managers manipulate sales upward to increase earnings, the residuals 
of the above regression will be unusually low, even if they do not reduce 
discretionary expenses. Therefore, Roychowdhury (2006) expresses the 
discretionary expenses as a function of lagged sales and runs the following 
regression by both industry and year: 
DISEXPit
Assetsit−1
= β
0
+β
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) +β
2
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where 
DISEXPit=the sum of R&D expense (Compustat data item 46), Advertising 
expense (Compustat data item 45) and Selling, General and Administrative expenses 
(Compustat data item 189)1.  
                                                 
1 As long as General and Administrative expenses are available, if R&D and Advertising expenses 
are missing they are set to zero. 
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3.6 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND RELATED CONTROL VARIABLES 
Another concern of managers of large firms with regard to manipulating 
earnings is the political cost. Larger firms tend to lower reported earnings by 
choosing accounting methods to gain benefits from the perspective of political and 
regulatory considerations (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). For that reason, the larger 
the firm, the more likely it is that the managers will diminish reported earnings. 
Zimmerman (1983) studies the hypothesis that larger firms are more politically 
sensitive than smaller firms and finds that larger firms have large capital transfer due 
to political cost. Wong (1988) documents that larger firms prefer credit sales to 
benefit from low tax rate. Jones (1991) suggests that managers tend to lower 
accruals during years of import relief investigation compared to other years. Several 
studies on political cost and earnings management obtain similar results (Cahan, 
1992; Cahan et al., 1997; Han and Shiing-Wu, 1998; Monem, 2003; Patten and 
Trompeter, 2003). In our study, firm size (SIZE) is controlled by natural logarithm 
of total assets (Compustat data item 6). 
Debt contracts hypothesis suggests that firms which breach or tend to breach 
covenant in debt contracts have motivation to adjust earnings to diminish or avoid 
the constraints of debt covenant contracts (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). DeFond 
and Jiambalvo (1994), Sweeney (1994), Dichev and Skinner (2002) and Beatty and 
Weber (2003) find a positive relationship between earnings management and firm 
leverage or debt defaults. Jelinek (2007) finds that both the changes and the levels of 
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leverage affect earnings management, which gives support to the debt covenant 
hypothesis that growth in leverage associates with reduction in earnings 
management. However, Healy and Palepu (1990), DeAngelo et al. (1994), and 
Dechow et al. (2008) find no evidence of a relationship between leverage or debt 
defaults and earnings manipulation. Dechow et al. (1996) indicate that debt default 
is associated with earnings management only when corporate governance is weak. In 
my study, leverage (LEV) is calculated as long-term debt scaled by total assets 
((Compustat data item 9 + Compustat data item 34) / Compustat data item 6). 
Based on the recent literature discussing earnings management, return on 
assets and market-to-book ratio are also included to control for profitability and 
growth. Return on assets (ROA) is measured by net income divided by total assets 
(Compustat data item 172 / Compustat data item 6).  Market-to-book ratio (MTB) 
is calculated as the common share outstanding times the closing price of the fiscal 
year scaled by booked equity ((Compustat data item 25 * item 199) / Compustat data 
item 60). Both auditor and year indicators will also be included to control the auditor 
and year effect. Auditor indicator (AU_D) is coded 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 
6 auditor firm, or 0 otherwise. 
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Chapter 4: Findings and Discussion 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses the descriptive statistics, the correlation matrix and the 
regression results for reputation effect on earnings management with regard to both 
discretionary accruals and real manipulation. Additional diagnostic tests are also 
performed in this chapter. 
4.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 4.1 gives the descriptive statistics of different measures of dependent 
variable, independent variable and control variables. The measures of earnings 
management are the discretionary accruals methods of JONES, MJONES, and 
PJONES; and the real earnings management methods of R_CFO, R_PROD, 
R_DISEXP, and REM. The independent variable reputation is REP and the control 
variables include SIZE, LEV, ROA, MTB, and AU_D. The table of descriptive 
statistics contains the sample mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, 
maximum, skewness, kurtosis, first quartile and third quartile of the variables stated 
above. The important descriptive statistics are highlighted below. 
The mean (median) of discretionary accruals measured by the Jones model is 
$0.0078 million ($-0.0008 million) for the full sample, $0.0107 million ($0.0007 
million) for the admired companies and $0.0041 million ($-0.0033) for the 
contenders. When estimated by the Jones model the admired firms have higher 
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average discretionary accruals. The same is true when discretionary accruals are 
measured by the modified Jones model. As measured by both the Jones model and 
the modified Jones model, until the 75th percentile the contenders have higher 
discretionary accruals than the admired firms. In contrast, the performance-adjusted 
Jones model shows that contenders generally exercise more discretionary accruals 
than the admired firms in the mean, median and 75th percentile. 
Admired companies have an average reputation score of 6.8100, while the 
contenders’ average reputation score is 5.3716. The average score of admired firms 
is 26.78% higher than that for the contender firms. With regard to the firm size 
measured by firm’s market value, admired companies are larger in size compared to 
the contenders. The average size for the admired firms is 9.4217, which is 15.06% 
higher than the contender firms’ average size of 8.1885. For the leverage situation, 
admired companies have an average leverage ratio of 0.2499, 11.92% lower than 
that of contender firms. In addition, admired companies maintain higher return on 
assets and higher market-to-book ratio compared to the contenders. The return on 
assets is 0.0666 for admired companies, more than twice that of contender 
companies. The market-to-book ratio is 3.3777 for admired companies, 76.74% 
higher than that for the contenders. Finally, most of these admired firms and 
contenders are audited by the Big 6 audit firms, with percentages of 99.72% and 
98.43% respectively. 
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Variable Mean SD Min 25% Median 75% Max Skewness Kurtosis
JONES 0.0078 0.1157 -0.3869 -0.0392 -0.0008 0.0450 0.4440 0.5521 6.7700
MJONES 0.0072 0.1114 -0.3795 -0.0380 -0.0019 0.0416 0.4422 0.5103 6.9762
PJONES -0.0075 0.1030 -0.3170 -0.0538 -0.0114 0.0268 0.4387 0.8694 7.6858
R_CFO 0.0555 0.1141 -0.2120 -0.0094 0.0410 0.1007 0.5748 1.5040 8.0767
R_PROD -0.0121 0.2131 -0.5506 -0.1400 -0.0304 0.0870 0.7492 0.7538 4.7162
R_DISX -0.0252 0.2972 -0.8047 -0.1875 -0.0554 0.1004 1.2030 1.0577 6.5938
REM 1.4041 2.0158 0.0610 0.5712 0.8687 1.3750 12.5048 4.2870 22.1559
REP 6.1755 0.9970 3.5800 5.4700 6.2100 6.8800 8.2300 -0.2099 2.6390
SIZE 8.8777 1.6314 4.2600 7.8013 8.9424 10.0358 12.1910 -0.2686 2.9451
LEV 0.2648 0.1610 0.0020 0.1480 0.2440 0.3573 0.7496 0.6668 3.2025
ROA 0.0506 0.0766 -0.2926 0.0260 0.0562 0.0920 0.2071 -1.5984 8.2247
MTB 2.7308 4.2191 -23.2088 1.4086 2.2537 3.7128 18.4747 -1.6803 20.3893
AU_D 0.9915 0.0917 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 -10.7284 116.0994
Variable Mean SD Min 25% Median 75% Max Skewness Kurtosis
JONES 0.0107 0.1111 -0.3869 -0.0343 0.0007 0.0388 0.4440 0.9007 7.9173
MJONES 0.0112 0.1109 -0.3795 -0.0318 -0.0002 0.0399 0.4422 0.6906 7.7446
PJONES -0.0093 0.0998 -0.3170 -0.0522 -0.0128 0.0214 0.4387 1.1506 8.9280
R_CFO 0.0627 0.1132 -0.2120 -0.0003 0.0517 0.1092 0.5748 1.5536 8.7152
R_PROD -0.0386 0.2077 -0.5506 -0.1628 -0.0472 0.0598 0.7492 0.6398 4.7939
R_DISX -0.0303 0.2910 -0.8047 -0.1901 -0.0635 0.1062 1.2030 0.9317 6.1262
REM 1.3464 1.9641 0.0610 0.5631 0.8410 1.2157 12.5048 4.4223 23.4871
REP 6.8100 0.6799 4.4500 6.3500 6.7900 7.2800 8.2300 -0.0420 2.7703
SIZE 9.4217 1.4484 4.2600 8.4081 9.5531 10.4449 12.1910 -0.2649 2.9247
LEV 0.2499 0.1470 0.0020 0.1424 0.2402 0.3418 0.7496 0.4913 3.0188
ROA 0.0666 0.0642 -0.2926 0.0396 0.0660 0.0998 0.2071 -1.4387 9.5823
MTB 3.3777 3.6349 -23.2088 1.7444 2.7368 4.2532 18.4747 -0.5244 21.8982
AU_D 0.9972 0.0525 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 -18.9737 361.0028
Variable Mean SD Min 25% Median 75% Max Skewness Kurtosis
JONES 0.0041 0.1213 -0.3869 -0.0456 -0.0033 0.0536 0.4440 0.2259 5.6036
MJONES 0.0020 0.1120 -0.3795 -0.0473 -0.0042 0.0444 0.4422 0.2933 5.9958
PJONES -0.0052 0.1070 -0.3170 -0.0547 -0.0102 0.0371 0.4387 0.5696 6.4589
R_CFO 0.0463 0.1147 -0.2120 -0.0175 0.0280 0.0894 0.5748 1.4753 7.4150
R_PROD 0.0215 0.2153 -0.5506 -0.1132 -0.0123 0.1157 0.7492 0.8976 4.5615
R_DISX -0.0187 0.3051 -0.8047 -0.1842 -0.0478 0.0854 1.2030 1.1900 7.0283
REM 1.4772 2.0788 0.0610 0.5912 0.9111 1.5224 12.5048 4.1342 20.6921
REP 5.3716 0.7151 3.5800 4.9200 5.4300 5.8900 6.9400 -0.3850 2.7994
SIZE 8.1885 1.5903 4.2600 7.2024 8.2308 9.1968 12.1910 -0.1522 3.0189
LEV 0.2837 0.1754 0.0020 0.1549 0.2539 0.3903 0.7496 0.7067 2.9822
ROA 0.0302 0.0858 -0.2926 0.0060 0.0418 0.0731 0.2071 -1.5043 6.7376
MTB 1.9111 4.7374 -23.2088 1.0459 1.7873 2.9286 18.4747 -2.1789 17.9019
AU_D 0.9843 0.1244 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 -7.7899 61.6826
Panel C: The Contenders N=573
Panel A: The Full Sample N=1299 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Panel B: The Admired Companies N=726
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4.3 CORRELATION MATRIX 
Table 4.2 presents the correlation matrix for all the variables. The high 
correlations among the discretionary accruals estimated by the Jones model, 
modified Jones model and performance-adjusted Jones model are expected, since 
they all use similar methods to approximate discretionary accruals. However, the 
high correlation between overproduction and reduction in discretionary expenditures 
is unexpected. 
Reputation score is positively correlated with the discretionary accruals 
measured by the Jones model and modified Jones model but negatively correlated 
with discretionary accruals in the performance-adjusted Jones model. The sales 
manipulation is positively correlated to corporate reputation, while both 
overproduction and reduction in discretionary expenditures are negatively correlated 
with reputation score. 
JONES MJONES PJONES R_CFO R_PROD R_DISX REM REP SIZE LEV ROA MTB AU_D
JONES 1
MJONES 0.947 1
PJONES 0.7399 0.7084 1
R_CFO 0.2093 0.1635 0.0394 1
R_PROD -0.0385 -0.0186 -0.0229 -0.3487 1
R_DISX -0.0335 -0.005 -0.0859 -0.177 0.7115 1
REM 0.1323 0.076 0.0905 0.4011 0.0668 0.0161 1
REP 0.0122 0.0207 -0.0502 0.1274 -0.1726 -0.0052 -0.0411 1
SIZE 0.0546 0.0486 0.0075 0.3224 -0.309 -0.1018 0.0799 0.5149 1
LEV -0.0726 -0.0823 -0.0028 -0.1597 -0.1096 -0.1293 -0.1239 -0.1807 -0.2925 1
ROA 0.3191 0.3345 0.2302 0.3188 -0.2593 -0.0746 0.0695 0.3378 0.4982 -0.303 1
MTB 0.0566 0.0505 -0.0054 0.1595 -0.1733 -0.0824 0.0649 0.2129 0.2546 -0.0727 0.3066 1
AU_D 0.0376 0.0438 0.0052 0.0258 0.0116 0.0298 0.0267 0.0827 0.0962 0.0077 0.0573 -0.0038 1
Table 4.2 Correlation Matrix
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Considering the control variables, reputation is negatively correlated with 
firm’s leverage level and positively correlated with the firm’s size, return on assets 
and market-to-book ratio. 
4.4 ANALYSIS I: DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS 
4.4.1 Multivariate Regression 
Table 4.3 demonstrates the results for the reputation effects on earnings 
management for three different measures of discretionary accruals. The F-statistics 
for all models are significant at p<0.001, indicating that these models are statistically 
valid. The adjusted R-squared for the Jones, modified Jones and performance-
adjusted Jones models are 13.02%, 14.35% and 9.22% respectively. 
As expected, the REP is significantly and negatively related to the 
discretionary accruals for all models. Reputation has a significant negative impact 
on discretionary accruals at 5% level for the Jones model and modified Jones model 
and at 1% level for the performance-matched Jones model. This suggests that with a 
decrease in reputation score, the managers are more likely to manage discretionary 
accruals upward. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that the managers in 
firms with lower reputation use increasing discretionary accruals more. One of the 
main purposes of earnings management is to mislead stakeholders about a firm’s 
financial status. Graham and Dodd (2008) suggest that investors normally make 
their investment decision upon reputation. When the firm does not have a favourable 
reputation among investors, the manager has an incentive to adjust the investors’ 
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perceptions by increasing earnings. Another explanation might be the reputation 
concern for reputable firms. Cao et al. (2012) suggest that reputable firms 
experience more severe public scrutiny and may wish to maintain higher earnings 
quality to protect their reputation. Due to higher public scrutiny, reputable firms 
experience a higher probability of being caught out in earnings management. Once a 
firm is found to be misleading stakeholders, the reputation will be damaged, and it 
will be difficult and costly to rebuild. Considering the time and monetary cost of 
reputation rebuilding, managers may be motivated to use less discretionary accruals. 
That is, good reputation helps to mitigate the level of discretionary accruals. 
Firm size has significant negative relations with discretionary accruals across 
all models at 1%, 0.1% and 5% levels respectively. This means that managers in 
smaller firms use more increasing discretionary accruals than managers in larger 
firms. This is consistent with the political cost hypothesis, which suggests that larger 
firms are more politically sensitive and managers in larger firms tend to decrease 
discretionary accruals (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  
Prior literature suggests that firms with higher leverage ratio may use 
increasing discretionary accruals to avoid breaking debt covenants. However, I find 
significant impact only when the discretionary accruals are measured by the 
performance-matched Jones model. The impact is insignificant when the 
discretionary accruals are measured by the Jones model and there is no impact when 
measured by the modified Jones model. 
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Return on assets has significant positive associations with discretionary 
accruals at 0.1% level. This significant impact appears in all three measures of 
discretionary accruals, including the performance-matched Jones model in which 
ROA has already been controlled. Bowen et al. (2008) explain this positive 
association as an expectation of future performance rather than opportunism. 
This study does not find evidence that specialist auditors mitigate the 
discretionary accruals more than non-specialist auditors. Krishnan (2003) finds that 
firms audited by Big 6 auditors report lower absolute discretionary accruals than the 
firms audited by non-specialist auditors. He suggests that Big 6 auditors help 
diminish discretionary accruals and therefore influence the earnings quality. Auditor 
is used as a dummy variable to test whether the Big 6 auditors help to reduce 
discretionary accruals. However, the result is not significant, regardless of whether 
testing the impact on discretionary accruals or absolute discretionary accruals.  
Note that there is a significant difference in discretionary accruals between 
year 2010 and the other years. 
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Variable Jones mJones pJones
(1) (2) (3)
Reputation -0.009 -0.007 -0.010
[0.016]** [0.038]** [0.002]***
Size -0.007 -0.008 -0.005
[0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]
Leverage 0.006 0.000 0.038
[0.757] [0.993] [0.164]
ROA 0.598 0.612 0.445
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
MTB -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
[0.315] [0.181] [0.064]*
AU_D 0.039 0.046 0.001
[0.233] [0.148] [0.976]
2007 0.007 0.002 0.017
[0.429] [0.853] [0.096]*
2008 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015
[0.086]* [0.091]* [0.685]
2009 -0.014 -0.015 -0.006
[0.153] [0.093]* [0.063]*
2010 -0.038 -0.039 -0.021
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]***
CONS 0.066 0.064 0.075
[0.089]* [0.083]* [0.317]
N 1299 1299 1299
F 20.43 22.74 14.18
Prob F [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
R-squared 13.69% 15.01% 9.92%
Adj R-squared 13.02% 14.35% 9.22%
Table 4.3 The Results of Multivariate Regression 
for Discretionary Accruals  Models
𝐷𝐴 =  0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑃 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉
   +𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑈 
  +𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌
66 
 
4.4.2 The Diagnostic Tests and Additional Analyses 
This section diagnoses the regression specification by testing the results 
obtained in the primary analysis. The purpose of additional analyses is to provide 
reasonable assurance that the main findings are robust to the specifications of 
various models. 
4.4.2.1 Heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity tests 
In OLS estimation, the variance of the errors is assumed to be constant. 
When the variance of errors is constant, the errors are homoscedastic, otherwise they 
are heteroscedastic. If OLS is used in the presence of heteroscedasticity, the OLS 
estimators will still be unbiased, but they will be inefficient, since there exist other 
unbiased estimators with smaller variances.  
 
Table 4.4 presents the results of the heteroscedasticity tests based on 
different dependent variables. According to the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 
test, all models have a significant p-value, indicating the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. To cure heteroscedasticity, robust regression is applied to each 
dependent variable. White (1980) suggests that the standard errors obtained from 
JONES MJONES PJONES
chi2(1) 22.10 23.98 43.77
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4.4 Heteroscedasticity Test
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of JONES, MJONES, PJONES
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robust regression are asymptotically valid. This method does not need additional 
information and it can be applied to any situation. Simple at the expense of 
efficiency, it is the most widely used method to correct heteroscedasticity in 
empirical research. It obtains the same results as OLS but with different errors. 
Table 4.5 presents the robust regression results of reputation effects on 
earnings management for three different measures of discretionary accruals. 
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Another concern in OLS regression is multicollinearity. Multicollinearity 
happens when two or more independent variables are highly correlated. It does not 
shrink the predictive power and reliability of the model as a whole, but it affects 
Variable Jones mJones pJones
(1) (2) (3)
Reputation -0.009 -0.007 -0.010
[0.009]*** [0.022]** [0.001]***
Size -0.007 -0.008 -0.005
[0.004]*** [0.000]*** [0.035]**
Leverage 0.006 0.000 0.038
[0.750] [0.993] [0.040]**
ROA 0.598 0.612 0.445
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
MTB -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
[0.415] [0.291] [0.080]*
AU_D 0.039 0.046 0.001
[0.057]* [0.034]** [0.943]
2007 0.007 0.002 0.017
[0.490] [0.868] [0.081]*
2008 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015
[0.076]* [0.083]* [0.053]*
2009 -0.014 -0.015 -0.006
[0.103] [0.077]* [0.446]
2010 -0.038 -0.039 -0.021
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.005]***
CONS 0.066 0.064 0.075
[0.028]** [0.033]*** [0.009]***
N 1299 1299 1299
F 15.59 17.85 9.15
Prob F [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
R-squared 13.69% 15.01% 9.92%
Table 4.5 The Results of Robust Regression 
for Discretionary Accruals  Models
𝐷𝐴 =  0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑃 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉
   +𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑈 
  +𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌
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individual predictors. In this research, multicollinearity is tested by variance 
inflation factor (VIF). Table 4.6 presents the result of multicollinearity test. The VIF 
values for all variables are between 1 and 2, which indicates that there is no problem 
of multicollinearity. 
 
4.4.2.2 Endogeneity test 
Another assumption under OLS is exogeneity. That is, the independent 
variable is uncorrelated with the error term in the regression. If the problem of 
endogeneity occurs, the OLS estimation is biased. Sims (1972) points out that a 
necessary condition for X to be exogenous of Y is that X fails to Granger-cause Y. 
Table 4.7 shows the results of Granger-causality test. The H0 is rejected for all three 
discretionary models. That is, reputation is exogenous of discretionary accruals. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Reputation 1.46 0.685196
Size 1.71 0.583324
Leverage 1.15 0.869738
ROA 1.48 0.67545
MTB 1.14 0.876255
AU_D 1.02 0.984567
fyear
2007 1.54 0.648137
2008 1.63 0.613121
2009 1.49 0.671485
2010 1.45 0.688582
Mean VIF 1.41
Table 4.6 Multicollinearity Test
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4.5 ANALYSIS II: REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
4.5.1 Multivariate Regression 
Table 4.8 presents the results for the reputation effects on earnings 
management for real earnings management. The F-statistics for all models are 
significant at p<0.001, suggesting that these models are statistically valid. The 
adjusted R-squared for the R_CFO, R_PROD, R_DISEXP, and REM models are 
15.4%, 17.3%, 4.5% and 6.4% respectively. 
The signs of the reputation impact on real earnings management are mixed. 
Reputation has significant negative impact on sales manipulation at 1% level. The 
negative sign on sales manipulation suggests that less reputable firms have a greater 
tendency to speed up sales by accelerating the timing of sales and/or providing more 
price discounts or more favourable credit terms to customers. Reputation has a 
significant positive impact on the discretion in expenses at 5% level. The positive 
sign on abnormal discretionary expenses indicates that less reputable firms have 
lower abnormal discretionary accruals. One explanation is that less reputable firms 
reduce discretionary expenses more in order to increase earnings. Both impacts are 
consistent with our hypothesis that less reputable firms have more incentives to 
Discretionary Accruals JONES MJONES PJONES
F(  2,   566) = 0.1 0.01 0.36
Prob > F = 0.9053 0.9933 0.6975
Table 4.7 Granger-causality Test for Reputation
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increase reported earnings. However, there is no evidence that less reputable firms 
are likely to lower production cost by overproduction.  
Firm size has significant positive impact on abnormal cash flow and 
significant negative impact on abnormal production cost and abnormal discretionary 
expenditures. That is, larger firms are likely to improve cash flow by accelerating 
sales, reducing production cost by overproduction and reducing discretionary 
expenditures. 
Leverage has significant negative associations with abnormal discretionary 
expenses. That is, firms with higher leverage ratio tend to reduce discretionary 
expenditures more in order to increase earnings. This is consistent with the findings 
in prior research that high leveraged firms have an incentive to increase earnings to 
avoid breaking debt covenants. 
Return on assets has significant positive impact on abnormal discretionary 
expenditures, indicating that less profitable firms reduce discretionary expenditures 
to boost earnings. 
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Variable REM_CFO REM_PROD REM_DISEXP
(1) (2) (3)
Reputation -0.011 0.002 0.022
[0.002]*** [0.769] [0.022]**
Size 0.018 -0.038 -0.028
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Leverage -0.027 -0.324 -0.334
[0.164] [0.000]*** [0.000]***
ROA 0.288 -0.520 -0.259
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.043]**
MTB 0.001 -0.004 -0.004
[0.064]* [0.008]*** [0.063]**
AU_D -0.001 0.121 0.142
[0.976] [0.040]** [0.108]
2007 0.015 0.009 -0.027
[0.096]* [0.568] [0.264]
2008 -0.004 -0.039 -0.038
[0.685] [0.017]** [0.123]
2009 -0.017 -0.017 0.010
[0.063]* [0.322] [0.706]
2010 -0.029 -0.008 -0.015
[0.003]*** [0.648] [0.572]
CONS -0.038 0.324 0.073
[0.317] [0.000]*** [0.488]
N 1299 1299 1299
F 24.64 28.07 7.15
Prob F [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
R-squared 16.06% 17.89% 5.26%
Adj R-squared 15.41% 17.25% 4.52%
Table 4.8 The Results of Multivariate Regression for Real 
Earnings Management Models
𝑅𝐸𝑀 =  0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑃 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑈_𝐷 
+ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌
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4.5.2 The Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests 
4.5.2.1 Heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity tests 
Table 4.9 presents the results of the heteroscedasticity tests based on 
different dependent variables. According the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test, 
all models have a significant p-value, indicating the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
To cure heteroscedasticity, robust regression is applied to each dependent variable. 
As stated above in section 4.4.2.1, White (1980) suggests that the standard errors 
obtained from robust regression are asymptotically valid. This method does not need 
additional information and it can be applied to any situation. Simple at the expense 
of efficiency, it is the most widely used method to correct heteroscedasticity in 
empirical research. It obtains the same results as OLS but with different errors. 
 
Table 4.10 presents the robust regression results of reputation effects on 
earnings management for three different measures of real earnings management. 
R_CFO R_PROD R_DISX
chi2(1) 70.27 56.69 69.30
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4.9 Heteroscedasticity Test
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of R_CFO, R_PROD, R_DISX
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Another concern in OLS regression is multicollinearity. Multicollinearity 
happens when two or more independent variables are highly correlated. It does not 
Variable REM_CFO REM_PROD REM_DISEXP
(1) (2) (3)
Reputation -0.011 0.002 0.022
[0.001]*** [0.764] [0.019]**
Size 0.018 -0.038 -0.028
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Leverage -0.027 -0.324 -0.334
[0.190] [0.000]*** [0.000]***
ROA 0.288 -0.520 -0.259
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.030]**
MTB 0.001 -0.004 -0.004
[0.173] [0.011]** [0.026]**
AU_D -0.001 0.121 0.142
[0.971] [0.000]*** [0.065]*
2007 0.015 0.009 -0.027
[0.172] [0.599] [0.305]
2008 -0.004 -0.039 -0.038
[0.663] [0.011]** [0.105]
2009 -0.017 -0.017 0.010
[0.032]** [0.283] [0.689]
2010 -0.029 -0.008 -0.015
[0.003]*** [0.656] [0.562]
CONS -0.038 0.324 0.073
[0.293] [0.000]*** [0.453]
N 1299 1299 1299
F 24.98 22.57 6.64
Prob F [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
R-squared 16.06% 17.89% 5.26%
Table 4.10 The Results of Multivariate Regression for Real 
Earnings Management Models
𝑅𝐸𝑀 =  0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑃 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑈_𝐷 
+ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌
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shrink the predictive power and reliability of the model as a whole, but it affects 
individual predictors. In this research, multicollinearity is tested by variance 
inflation factor (VIF). Since the independent variables remain the same as in 
multivariate regressions for discretionary accruals, the test is the same and Table 4.6 
presents the result. The VIF values for all variables are between 1 and 2, which 
indicates that there is no problem of multicollinearity. 
4.5.2.2 Endogeneity test 
Another assumption under OLS is exogeneity. That is, the independent 
variable is uncorrelated with the error term in the regression. If the problem of 
endogeneity occurs, the OLS estimation is biased. Sims (1972) points out that a 
necessary condition for X to be exogenous of Y is that X fails to Granger-cause Y. 
Table 4.11 shows the results of Granger-causality test. The H0 is rejected for all 
three real earnings management models. That is, reputation is exogenous of 
discretionary accruals. 
 
4.6 SUMMARY 
The main purpose of this research is to provide empirical evidence regarding 
the implications of corporate reputation on earnings management. This study 
Real Earnings Management R_CFO R_PROD R_DISX
F(  2,   566) = 1.2 3.61 1.8
Prob > F = 0.3026 0.0275 0.1667
Table 4.11 Granger-causality Test for Reputation
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differentiates itself from previous research on corporate reputation and earnings 
management and provides two main contributions to the existing literature. First, 
this research examines whether corporate reputation impacts managers’ earnings 
management behaviour.  
It is argued in this chapter that the managers in firms with worse reputation 
manage earnings upwards more than do managers in firms with better reputation. 
One of the main incentives of earnings management is to mislead stakeholders, 
especially investors. Investors make investment decisions based upon firms’ 
reputation and reported earnings (Graham and Dodd, 2008). Therefore, firms with 
worse reputation may have stronger incentives to inflate earnings. Table 4.3 shows 
that firms with worse reputation do make greater use of increasing accruals than do 
more reputable firms. This result is robust with three different measures of 
discretionary accruals. 
Second, this research empirically examines earnings management according 
to both discretionary accruals and real activities approaches. According to Healy and 
Wahlen (1999), there are two approaches for managers to manage earnings: through 
accounting choice and through structuring real transactions. Recent research provide 
evidence that firms engage in earnings management through real activities (Graham 
et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006 and Zang, 2012), and evidence that firms choose 
between the two approaches (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010 and 
Badertscher, 2011). Current research on corporate reputation and earnings 
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management focuses only on the earnings management through discretionary 
accruals. From Table 4.8, it can be inferred that less reputable firms do manipulate 
sales and discretionary expenditures to increase earnings, while they also use 
discretionary accruals. 
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Chapter 5: Game Models 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Game theory is a bag of analytical tools designed to help us understand the 
phenomena that we observe when decision-makers interact. The basic assumptions 
underlying the theory are that decision-makers pursue well-defined exogenous 
objectives (they are rational) and take into account their knowledge or expectations 
of other decision-makers' behaviour (they reason strategically). 
In the early 19th century, when the French economist Cournot analysed 
duopoly by studying the quantity competition between two firms, he suggested that 
market demand determines the price corresponding to a given level of sum total of 
output. Cournot’s work is considered the first application of game theory to the 
analysis of an economic problem, and what he computed is now called the Nash 
equilibrium of the game. 
Later, with the wish to “find the mathematically complete principles which 
define `rational behaviour' for the participants in a social economy and to derive 
from them the general characteristics of that behaviour”, Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944, p31) introduced two-person zero-sum games and proved that 
there exists an equilibrium in such games. They also described games in extensive 
forms and discussed the cooperation and coalition in these games. 
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Nash (1950a) identified the idea of an n-person finite game and an 
equilibrium point of such a game, where the equilibrium point is a set of strategies 
which contains the best strategy for each player in response to the other players’ 
strategies. He also proved that there is at least one equilibrium point for each n-
person game, by developing the two-person zero-sum game with multiple players 
and arbitrary payoffs. In other related papers, Nash (1950b, 1953) identified the two-
person bargaining problem, delivered a cooperative theory for two-person non-zero-
sum games and offered an axiomatic solution led by this theory. The particular 
axiomatic approach initiated by Nash is frequently used in more applied research 
and is still the main benchmark in this area. 
By the 1960s, many economists and game theorists had realised that most 
economic theory was based on a fantastic assumption of symmetric/complete 
information. Prior to the three seminal papers by Akerlof (1970), Spence (1976) and 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), which try to figure out the asymmetric information 
problem, Harsanyi and Selten had already developed most of the relative game-
theoretic tools.  
Before Harsanyi (1967, 1968a, 1968b), economists worked with models with 
either objective probability distributions describing the commonly shared view of 
the underlying uncertainty, or absolutely no uncertainty. That is to say, researchers 
rarely investigated the situations in which one agent is more informed than others. It 
is not implausible for economists to discover situations where one agent knows 
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something that others do not; however, it is difficult to develop a coherent modelling 
device for such situations (Güth, 1994).  In a sequence of three papers studying the 
model, the equilibrium points and the probability distribution of games with 
incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players, Harsanyi proposed a method 
to specify all layers of consistent information, for example what A knows about 
what B knows, and what A knows about what B knows about what A knows. 
Aumann (1960) introduced the concept of an infinitely repeated game, the 
“supergame”. Selten (1965) analysed the theory of entry deterrence, defining the 
sub-game perfection which indicated the weakness of the then existing views on 
entry deterrence and arguing that the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria are the only 
relevant equilibria for all dynamic games. Sub-game perfection is important for 
understanding credible threat and the dynamic interaction on incentives.  
In recognition of the importance of the contributions of Nash, Harsanyi and 
Selten to non-cooperative game theory in equilibrium, asymmetric information and 
credibility respectively, in 1994 they were awarded the Nobel Prize in economics. 
Game theory remains an active area of research. Gibbons (1997) divides 
games into four categories: static games with complete information, dynamic games 
with complete information, static games with incomplete information and dynamic 
games with incomplete information, and suggests that they can be solved by Nash 
equilibrium (Nash, 1950a), sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (Selten, 1965), 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1967) and perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
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(Kreps and Wilson, 1982a) respectively. Games with incomplete information are 
also known as Bayesian games, and the final category, dynamic Bayesian games, 
has been applied widely in economics, finance, accounting, law, marketing and 
political science. 
Kreps et al. (1982) demonstrate that in a finitely repeated prisoners’ 
dilemma, just a small amount of appropriate private information at the beginning 
could contribute to cooperation in all but the last few periods. Conversely, under 
complete information, backward-induction suggests that as the knowledge that 
cooperation will break down in the last round will lead to breakdown in the 
penultimate round, and so on back to the first round, then, equilibrium cooperation 
cannot occur in any round of a finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma. 
Kreps and Wilson (1982b) re-examine the finitely repeated chain store game 
(Selten, 1978) under imperfect information about players’ payoffs, and find that 
imperfect information brings the reputation effect that players naturally expect. 
Bagnoli and Watts (2000) model earnings management using a game 
theoretic approach. They suggest that firms may manage earnings first of all because 
they wish to obtain competitive relative performance, as the investors and creditors 
often compare the financial performance of competing firms when deciding their 
fund allocation. A second reason to manage earnings is that relative performance 
may influence executive compensation. The authors consider the problem of 
earnings management as a non-cooperative game among a group of rival firms who 
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seek competitive advantages from their accounting numbers. They assume that 
asymmetric information makes the investors and creditors unable to discover 
earnings management; that investors and creditors make inter-firm comparisons 
when they evaluate the firm; and that firms care about both their fundamental value 
and market value. In their model, each player of a group of rival firms chooses a 
level of earnings management in each of a potentially infinite number of periods. 
There is some probability that each player will exit at some point but the final 
ending time is uncertain. Their results imply that firms may manipulate their 
earnings due to the multi-firm-comparison, as they expect other firms to do so. 
Therefore, very little earnings management may be needed to emerge in the Nash 
equilibrium, and the equilibrium amount for earnings management depends on the 
method of earnings management and on the components of stockholders. 
Scott (2009) states that earnings management can also be motivated by 
implicit contracts, which arise from the repeated relationships between a firm and its 
stakeholders (shareholders, lenders, suppliers, customers, employees, etc.) and 
indicate expected actions based on their previous behaviour. For example, firms and 
their managers with better reputation for always meeting formal contract 
commitments will enjoy lower interest rates from lenders, and better terms from 
suppliers. They act as if such favourable contracts exist and must trust each other 
sufficiently to play the cooperative solution (sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium) 
rather than the Nash equilibrium. 
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According to game theory, firms can benefit from good reputation among 
stakeholders. It is argued that stakeholders are likely to use the reported accounting 
numbers to help assess the firm’s reputation to fulfil the implicit contracts. Hence, 
managers have incentives to increase income, and the strength of this incentive 
depends on the intensity of the firm’s need for a favourable reputation (Bowen et al., 
1995). 
 
5.2 MOTIVATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.2.1 Theoretical Literature on Incentives for Earnings Management 
Several theoretical papers examine the managerial incentives for earnings 
management from a game theory perspective. Some studies build models to reveal 
that explicit contract frictions can induce earnings management aimed at impacting 
the opinions of internal and external contract designers. 
Lambert (1983, 1984)2 analyses the connection between moral hazard and 
real earnings smoothing with a principle-agent setting. First, he demonstrates that in 
an optimal long-term incentive contract, although production function and utilities 
functions are separable, the manager’s current compensation would depend on his 
current and prior performance. Further, he uses a two-period model to illustrate that 
the income smoothing behaviour through real transactions is an optimal equilibrium 
                                                 
2 Lambert’s (1983, 1984) studies are based on his PhD thesis. 
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behaviour with the optimal compensation plan, assuming that both the principle and 
the manager are rational. That is, the optimal incentive plan induces the manager’s 
real smoothing as this is the optimal behaviour to maximise his compensation. 
Dye (1988) examines the internal and external demand for earnings 
management using an overlapping generation model. He argues that while the 
principle-agent relationship between the firm’s owners and the managers create 
incentives to manage earnings, the external demand resulting from the valuation 
needs of the capital market generate another such incentive. 
While Lambert (1983, 1984) and Dye (1988) use principle-agent games to 
model earnings management incentives, Trueman and Titman (1988) explain the 
manager’s incentive in a market setting. They describe how a manager’s desire to 
lower borrowing cost by reducing the earnings variability makes him smooth 
earnings. This incentive is not to influence the outcome of existing contract, but to 
influence the design of future contract, which can be referred to implicit contract. 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) demonstrate how implicit contracts affect 
managers’ earnings management decision. They generate a model to illustrate that 
managers obtain “incumbency rents” from their managerial work. However, when 
current earnings performance is bad, they face a risk of being fired. For this reason, 
managers with poor current performance may “borrow” earnings from the future 
period by using accounting techniques and/or operating decisions. In addition, while 
evaluating a manager, the current earnings performance is supposed to be more 
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informative than previous earnings. Correspondingly, tomorrow’s poor performance 
could not be balanced by today’s good performance. Therefore, managers have a 
desire to “save” current earnings for the future when current earnings are relatively 
high and expected future earnings are relatively low. 
Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) investigate the manager’s reporting strategy 
with a market setting with incomplete information. That is, they relax the 
assumption that the manager’s reporting object is known to the market. They suggest 
that the manager may bias the financial reporting to influence the market’s valuation 
of the firm and this bias reduces the value relevance of the financial report. They 
argue that the value relevance of the reports drops when the cost of bias decreases 
and the uncertainty of manager’s utility increases. Moreover, they show that the 
manager will be better off with biased reporting when this bias cannot be perfectly 
adjusted by the market. 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) develop a model with rational expectations 
equilibrium and find that tighter standards help to reduce discretionary accruals. 
However, this advantage is offset by other after effects. For instance, real earnings 
management increases due to the increased managerial benefit brought by the 
reduced discretionary accruals. Additionally, the expected total earnings 
management and the expected total cost of earnings management increases with 
tighter standards. 
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Ronen and Yaari (2008) suggest that the penetration of game-theory tools 
provides new insights into accounting on the theoretical front. 
5.2.2 Theoretical Literature on Reputation Effect from an Economic Theory 
Perspective 
Fama (1980) makes the pioneering suggestion that managers’ incentive 
problems can be solved by competition in the managerial labour market. He proves 
that implicit incentives can work as an incomplete alternative to explicit incentives 
under the complete market mechanism. In the long term, the managers can be 
motivated by the reputation effect even without the explicit incentive contract. They 
will work hard to enhance their reputation, hence increase their future human capital 
in the labour market. 
Holmström (1999) studies how the agent’s future career concern impacts the 
reputation effect, and argues that Fama’s conclusion is correct only under some tight 
assumptions. He assumes the agent’s performance depends on his effort, talent and 
stochastic noise, models the reputation effect on a risk-neutral agent without 
discounting and explicit contracts, and proves that the reputation alone cannot 
provide sufficient incentives to the agent. In addition, he finds that the reputation 
effect diminishes with increase in age and career development. According to 
Holmström (1999), reputation effect cannot provide enough incentives when the 
market is imperfect. 
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Meyer and Vickers (1997) analyse the dynamic effects of comparative 
performance information (CPI) on explicit incentives, implicit incentives and overall 
welfare. They develop a model of implicit rewards based on Holmström (1982). 
They suggest that the manager’s current effort has an impact on the market’s 
estimation of his ability, and hence may impact the future market-based rewards. 
Although neither the manager’s current effort nor his ability can be observed 
directly in the future periods, the market can use the managerial output information 
which reflects his current effort and ability. Therefore, the manager has an incentive 
to increase effort in his early career as this effort may enhance future market 
estimates and, hence, future rewards. They also demonstrate that when there are 
career concerns, CPI may not be desirable. 
Tadelis (2002) regards corporate reputation as a tradable asset. Under the 
assumptions of risk-neutral agent and no discount, he formulates a dynamic general 
equilibrium model considering both moral hazard and adverse selection in a repeated 
game. 
Milbourn (2003) considers CEO reputation as a signal of his ability that is 
observable to shareholders.  He develops an optimal CEO contract model based on 
the stock price and finds a positive relationship between stock-based pay-
sensitivities and CEO reputation. 
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5.2.3 Theoretical Literature on Reputation Effect from a Cheap-Talk Game 
Perspective 
Sobel (1985) analyses the reputation building in information provision. He 
uses a repeated game model to demonstrate that if an information sender (who is 
supposed to be imperfectly credible at the beginning) can establish a reputation for 
some consistent quality, then the information receiver (who is imperfectly informed) 
can make more accurate conclusions about the options available to them from the 
content of a signal whose truthfulness cannot otherwise be easily established. Once 
the sender delivers a message that differs from the receiver’s expectation, he 
discloses his true type. Therefore the sender’s reputation is lost for the remaining 
sub-games and there would be no more communications. 
Benabou and Laroque (1992) extend Sobel's model by assuming the sender 
perceives noisy information of a binary random variable. They study a manager's 
effort to influence the firm's stock price by releasing strategically distorted 
messages. Since the sender observes a noisy signal, he is able to manipulate the 
stock price without revealing his type. The receiver cannot infer whether he is an 
honest sender who always reveals truthful information or a strategic sender who 
distorts private information, as the information the sender observes is noisy. 
Consequently, the strategic sender’s credibility will not diminish and he can send 
information indefinitely although the information is manipulated with some positive 
probability. 
89 
 
Based on Benabou and Laroque’s model, Morris (1998) examines two types 
of senders who distort their information strategically. He assumes that one type of 
sender shares the same preferences with the receiver and the other type expects the 
receiver to take as high an action as possible. He suggests that in an infinite repeated 
game, even if the sender’s discount factor is close to one, telling the truth is not an 
equilibrium. 
Kim (1996) also studies a repeated cheap-talk game. However, different 
from the three studies above, Kim assumes that the sender’s type is not fixed. In his 
game, the sender’s type is a random variable drawn independently in each sub-game. 
The sender’s type can be confirmed by the receiver at some cost to both players. He 
finds that if the game is played only once, no communication occurs, while in a 
repeated setting communication does occur. In general, complete information 
transmission does not occur. However, if the sender has a good reputation, he may 
have concern about the information he delivers, as any benefits from current 
opportunistic behaviour may be exhausted by the future loss from damaged 
reputation. 
Stocken (2000) also models an infinitely repeated stage game between a 
manager and an investor and supposes both of them are long-run, risk-neutral 
players. Similar to Kim, Stocken suggests that no communication occurs in the 
single game. However, when the manager is sufficiently patient, he will report 
90 
 
truthfully in a repeated game; therefore, the information he discloses is useful for the 
evaluators. 
5.2.4 A Simple Game by Scott (2009)  
Scott (2009) gives a simple example of the conflict between managers and 
investors with a single stage non-cooperative game. His game is similar to the 
prisoner's dilemma. The manager can either be honest or can distort in his financial 
reporting. The investor can choose either to buy the stock of the firm the manager 
serves or not to buy. The investor prefers to invest if the manager is honest. But if 
the manager distorts, the investor will refuse to buy. The manager would like the 
investor to invest in his firm and is willing to commit to be honest to induce the 
favourable choice by the investor.  
 
Under Scott’s assumption, each player has complete information about the 
other. That is, the manager knows the investor's payoff of each strategy and the 
investor knows the manager's payoff of each strategy. 
This is a game in which there are gains from cooperation; the best outcome 
for the players is that the manager chooses to be honest and investors buy their 
stocks. In a simultaneous move game, however, the manager’s choice cannot be 
Honest (H) Distort (D)
Buy (B) 60 , 40 20 , 80
Refuse to buy (R) 35 , 20 35 , 30
Figure 5.1 Utility Payoffs between Manager and Investor
 in a Non-Cooperative Game
Manager
Investor
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observed before the investor makes his investment decision. If the investor chooses 
to buy, the manager will choose to distort, since “distort” yields higher payoff. 
Similarly, if the investor refuses to buy, the manager will still choose to distort. That 
is, distort is a dominant strategy for the manager. The other player - the investor - 
prefers to refuse to buy, as no matter what strategy the manager chooses, “buy” will 
be ruled out as it yields lower payoff. Thus, this stage game has a unique Nash 
equilibrium (Distort, Refuse to buy) and this is the predicted outcome of the game. 
In Scott’s game, both players can be better off if the manager chooses to be 
honest and the investor chooses to buy. Let us consider the manager as a long-lived 
player and the investor as a succession of short-lived investors instead of a single 
investor. Suppose the game is played infinitely. The long-lived manager’s payoff is 
the sum of the payoffs in each stage with a discount factor. Each short-lived investor 
plays the game only once and therefore cares only about the payoff of the current 
stage. In other words, the short-lived investors are believed to be myopic. Suppose 
the game is played infinitely with perfect monitoring and the information is 
complete and perfect, that is, each fresh short-lived investor knows the manager’s 
payoff and choices in prior games. Provided that the manager is patient enough and 
he understands that the future investors will refuse to invest if he distorts at the 
current stage, then he will be deterred from taking the immediate payoff. 
Consequently, there is an equilibrium in this repeated game where in each period the 
manager chooses to be honest and the investor chooses to invest. 
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5.3 THE MANAGER-INVESTOR GAME 
To study the game between the manager and investors, a simple game similar 
to Scott’s (2009) game is constructed and is analysed following Mailath and 
Samuelson (2006). 
  
Suppose there are two players (n=2) in the game. Player 1, the manager, is a 
long-lived player and is assumed to be farsighted. Player 2 is a succession of short-
lived investors instead of a single investor and is assumed to be myopic. To avoid 
confusion, suppose the manager is a male and the investor is a female. The manager 
(He) can choose his report strategy from a strategy set 𝐴1 of truthful report or 
misleading report. The manager who reports truthfully is considered as an honest 
type and the manager who provides misleading reports is considered as a dishonest 
type. The investor (She) chooses whether to invest in the shares of the firm from a 
strategy set 𝐴2. Their payoffs are given by Figure 5.2.  
If the game is played only once, the manager will choose to provide a 
misleading report and the investor will refuse to invest since Mr is the Nash 
equilibrium of this game. To find the opportunities of cooperation, first, consider the 
game is repeated infinitely with incomplete information. 
Buy (b ) Refuse to buy (r )
Truthful (T ) 2 , 3 0 , 2
Misleading (M ) 3 , 0 1 , 1
Figure 5.2 Utility Payoffs between Manager and Investor
Investor
Manager
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In the manager-investor game, investors do not always know the manager’s 
payoff. Suppose that the investors are not completely sure about the manager’s type. 
They may assign a high probability to the manager providing a misleading report 
and a small probability to the manager having some characteristics that make him 
report truthfully. Provided that the manager is sufficiently patient, his payoff must 
be arbitrarily close to 2 in any Nash equilibrium of this repeated game. This result 
holds no matter how the investors assign the probability to the manager’s possible 
types, although the dishonest manager requires more patience than the honest 
manager. 
To analyse this result, suppose that there is a candidate equilibrium where the 
dishonest manager receives a payoff less than 2-ε. Then both the dishonest and 
honest managers must consider taking different action in this repeated game, 
because an equilibrium in which they act identically would prompt the investors to 
invest and would yield a payoff of 2. At the moment, one opportunity available for 
the dishonest manager is to mimic the behaviour of the honest type. If the dishonest 
manager behaves like an honest manager over an adequate period of time, then the 
short-lived investors may consider that the manager is the honest type and choose to 
invest, as they expect the dishonest manager to behave differently. Once the investor 
chooses to buy the stocks of the firm, the manager could earn a payoff of 2 
afterwards. It may take a while for the investors to be convinced that the manager is 
honest, and the manager has to sustain lower payoffs during this period, but these 
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initial payoffs are not important if the manager is patient. As long as the manager 
has sufficient patience, he has a strategy available that ensures a payoff arbitrarily 
close to 2. The initial hypothesis, that the manager’s payoff falls below 2-ε, must 
have been mistaken. Any equilibrium must provide the sufficiently patient dishonest 
manager with a payoff above 2-ε. 
 A common explanation for this argument is that the dishonest manager can 
obtain and maintain a reputation for behaving like the honest type. This opportunity 
of reputation building may appear to be a special case, as it rejects many equilibrium 
outcomes of the complete-information game. Next, different results will be 
developed beyond the special structure of this manager-investor game. 
 
5.3.1 Repeated Game with Imperfect Public Monitoring 
In every stage game, the manager observes the true earnings and chooses a 
reporting strategy. Investors cannot observe the true earnings but they can get 
information from the manager’s reported earnings. Let 𝑌 denote the space of public 
signals and 𝑦1 ∈ {𝑦, 𝑦} denote the public signal of the manager’s action. Investors 
interpret 𝑦  as meaning the firm is powerful in generating returns and 𝑦  as 
meaning the firm does not deserve their investments. The actions of the short-lived 
investors are public and the set of public signals is 𝑌 ≡ {𝑦, 𝑦} × 𝐴2. Let 𝑎 denote 
the stage action for pure strategy and 𝑎𝑖 denote the pure strategy profile for player 
i. The distribution of 𝑦1 is given by 
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𝜌1(𝑦|𝑎) = {
𝑝, 𝑖𝑓 𝑎1 = 𝑇
𝑞, 𝑖𝑓 𝑎1 = 𝑀 
 
(5.3.1) 
with 0 < 𝑞 < 𝑝 < 1 . The joint distribution 𝜌  over Y is given by 
𝜌(𝑦1𝑦2|𝑎) = 𝜌1(𝑦1|𝑎) if 𝑦2 = 𝑎2, and 0 otherwise. 
Let   denote the stage action for mixed strategy and  𝑖 denote the mixed 
strategy profile for player i. For a mixed profile   in the stage game, let  𝑇 =
 1(𝑇) and  
𝑏 =  2(𝑏). Denote a mixed action for the manager by  
𝑇 and for the 
investor by  𝑏. Then the profile set of the short-lived investor is  
 𝐁 = {( 𝑇 , 𝑟):  𝑇 ≤ 1
2
} ∪ {( 𝑇 , 𝑏):  𝑇 ≥ 1
2
} ∪ {(
1
2
,  𝑏) :  𝑏 ∈ [0,1]}.  
Let 𝑣 denote the payoff vector; the manager’s payoff is bounded by 𝑣1 and 
𝑣13. That is, interval [1,2] is the set of possible PPE payoffs for the manager. Let 
the manager’s maximum PPE4 payoff be 𝑣∗ ≥ 15. 
First analyse the pure profiles in 𝐁, that is, Tb and Mr. Mr is enforceable 
using a constant continuation 𝛾 since it is the Nash equilibrium of the stage-game. 
Denote the manager’s payoff maximum pure strategy PPE by 𝑣∗𝑝. The manager’s 
payoff must lie in the interval [1, 𝑣∗𝑝], therefore the set of payoffs decomposed by 
Mr on [1, 𝑣∗𝑝], 𝒲𝑀𝑟, is given by 
 𝑣 ∈ 𝒲𝑀𝑟 ⟺ ∃𝛾 ∈ [1, 𝑣∗𝑝] such that 𝑣 = (1 − 𝛿) + 𝛿𝛾.  
where 𝛿 is the common discount factor. 
                                                 
3 The constraints on the manager’s payoff are explained in appendix. 
4 Perfect Public Equilibrium. 
5 Since the manager is the only long-lived player, the subscript on his payoff is dropped. 
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Therefore, 
 𝒲𝑀𝑟 = [1,1 + 𝛿(𝑣∗𝑝 − 1)].  
If 𝑣∗𝑝 > 1, then 𝑣∗𝑝 ∉ 𝒲𝑀𝑟. 
The continuations 𝛾: {𝑦, 𝑦} × 𝐴2 ⟶ [1, 𝑣
∗𝑝] enforce Tb if 
 2(1 − 𝛿) + 𝛿 {𝑝𝛾(𝑦𝑏) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾(𝑦𝑏)} ≥ 3(1 − 𝛿) + 𝛿 {𝑞𝛾(𝑦𝑏) +
(1 − 𝑞)𝛾(𝑦𝑏)}, 
 
That is, 
 
𝛾(𝑦𝑏) ≥  𝛾(𝑦𝑏) +
(1 − 𝛿)
𝛿(𝑝 − 𝑞)
 
(5.3.2) 
Therefore, the payoff with the good signal 𝑦 must surpass the payoff of the 
bad signal 𝑦  by the difference (1 − 𝛿) [𝛿(𝑝 − 𝑞)]⁄ . This payoff difference 
decreases as the discount factor increases, and thus the incentive of a current 
deviation shrinks, and as 𝑝 − 𝑞 increases, the signal is more responsive to the 
manager’s choices. 
Denote 𝒲𝑀𝑟  as the set of payoffs that can be decomposed by Tb on 
[1, 𝑣∗𝑝]. 
Then, 
 𝑣 ∈ 𝒲𝑀𝑟 ⟺ ∃𝛾(𝑦𝑏), (𝑦𝑏) ∈ [1, 𝑣∗𝑝] satisfying (5.3.2) such 
that 
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𝑣 = 𝑉(𝑇𝑏, 𝛾) = (1 − 𝛿)2 + 𝛿 {𝑝𝛾(𝑦𝐵) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾(𝑦𝐵)}. 
By fixing 𝛾(𝑦𝑏) = 𝑣∗𝑝 and having (5.3.2) hold with equality, the maximum 
value of 𝒲𝑀𝑟 can be obtained. Then (if 𝑣∗𝑝 > 1) 
 
𝑣∗𝑝 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝒲𝑀𝑟 = (1 − 𝛿)2 −
(1 − 𝛿)(1 − 𝑝)
(𝑝 − 𝑞)
+ 𝛿𝑣∗𝑝 
 
Solving for 𝑣∗𝑝 gives 
 
𝑣∗𝑝 = 2 −
(1 − 𝑝)
(𝑝 − 𝑞)
< 2 = ?̅? 
 
Now I turn to verify that 𝑣∗𝑝 > 1, that is equivalent to (1 − 𝑝) < (𝑝 − 𝑞), 
which is 2𝑝 − 𝑞 > 1. Otherwise, if 𝑣∗𝑝 ≤ 1, namely 2𝑝 − 𝑞 ≤ 1, then the only 
PPE pure strategy is Mr in every stage game. 
Inefficiency Due to Binding Moral Hazard 
Definition: 
The manager is subject to binding moral hazard if for all 𝑎−𝑖, for all 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖
′, 
supp𝜌(𝑦|(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎−𝑖)) = supp𝜌(𝑦|(𝑎𝑖
′, 𝑎−𝑖)), and for any  ∈ 𝐁 satisfying 𝑢𝑖( ) =
?̅?𝑖,  𝑖 is not a best reply to  −𝑖. 
Proposition: 
Suppose the manager is subject to binding moral hazard, and A is finite. 
Then 𝑘∗(𝑒𝑖) < ?̅?𝑖 . Consequently, there exists 𝜅 > 0 s.t. for all 𝛿  and all 𝑣 ∈
ℇ(𝛿), 𝑣𝑖 ≤ ?̅?𝑖 − 𝜅. 
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If the manager is subject to binding moral hazard, all PPE are inefficient. For 
large 𝛿, all PPE in this game are bounded away from efficiency.  
Intuitively, the imperfection monitoring indicates that the manager must face 
low continuations with positive probability on the equilibrium path. Since the 
investor is short-lived, using inter-temporal transfers of payoffs to maintain 
efficiency is impossible, while still providing incentives. 
The minimum value of 𝒲𝑇𝑏 is acquired by setting γ(𝑦𝑏) = 1 and having 
(5.3.2) hold with equality. Hence  
 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝒲𝑇𝑏 = 1 +
(1 − 𝛿)(2𝑝 − 𝑞)
(𝑝 − 𝑞)
 
 
The set of payoffs [1, 𝑣∗𝑝] is self-generating using pure strategies if 𝒲𝑀𝑟 ∪
𝒲𝑇𝑏 ⊃ [1, 𝑣∗𝑝], which is indicated by 
 min𝒲𝑇𝑏 ≤ max𝒲𝑀𝑟 .  
Replacing and solving for the bound on 𝛿 provides 
 (2𝑝 − 𝑞)
(4𝑝 − 2𝑞 − 1)
≤ 𝛿 
(5.3.3) 
The bound 2𝑝 − 𝑞 > 1 indicates the left side is less than 1. 
When 𝒲𝑀𝑟 ∪𝒲𝑇𝑏 ⊃ [1, 𝑣∗𝑝] , 𝑣∗𝑝  can be realised in a pure strategy 
equilibrium, because the continuation ensures 𝛾(𝑦𝑏)  and 𝛾(𝑦𝑏)  decomposing 
𝑣∗𝑝  using Tb are components of 𝒲𝑀𝑟 ∪𝒲𝑇𝑏 , and the continuation ensures 
supporting 𝛾(𝑦𝑏) and 𝛾(𝑦𝑏) are themselves in 𝒲𝑀𝑟 ∪𝒲𝑇𝑏, and so on. 
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A strategy profile that accomplishes the payoff 𝑣∗𝑝 can be structured as 
follows. First, set 𝛾(𝑣) = (𝑣 − (1 − 𝛿))/𝛿 (the constant continuation decomposing 
𝑣  using 𝑀𝑟 ), and let 𝛾𝑦, 𝛾𝑦: [0, 𝑣∗𝑝] ⟶ ℝ  be the functions solving 𝑣 =
V(𝑇𝑏, (𝛾𝑦(𝑣), 𝛾𝑦(𝑣))) when (5.3.2) holds with equality: 
 
𝛾𝑦 =
𝑣
𝛿
−
2(1 − 𝛿)
𝛿
+
(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝛿)
𝛿(𝑝 − 𝑞)
 
, 
and 
𝛾𝑦 =
𝑣
𝛿
−
2(1 − 𝛿)
𝛿
+
𝑝(1 − 𝛿)
𝛿(𝑝 − 𝑞)
 
. 
Let ℋ be the histories. Define 𝜁:ℋ ⟶ [1, 𝑣∗𝑝] as follows: 𝜁(𝜙) = 𝑣∗𝑝 
and for ℎ𝑡 ∈ ℋ𝑡, 
 𝜁(ℎ𝑡 , 𝑦1𝑎2)
= {
𝛾𝑦(𝜁(ℎ𝑡)), if 𝑦1 = 𝑦 and 𝜁(ℎ
𝑡) ∈ 𝒲𝑇𝑏,
𝛾𝑦(𝜁(ℎ𝑡)), if 𝑦1 = 𝑦 and 𝜁(ℎ
𝑡) ∈ 𝒲𝑇𝑏,
𝛾(𝜁(ℎ𝑡)),           if 𝜁(ℎ𝑡) ∈ 𝒲𝑀𝑟\𝒲𝑇𝑏 .          
 
 
 
 
The strategies are then given by 
 𝜎1(𝜙) = 𝑇, 𝜎2(𝜙) = 𝑏,  
 
𝜎1(ℎ
𝑡) = {
𝑇,         if 𝜁(ℎ𝑡) ∈ 𝒲𝑇𝑏 ,           
𝑀, if 𝜁(ℎ𝑡) ∈ 𝒲𝑀𝑟\𝒲𝑇𝑏 .
 
 
and 
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𝜎2(ℎ
𝑡) = {
𝐵, if 𝜁(ℎ𝑡) ∈ 𝒲𝑇𝑏 ,            
𝑅, if 𝜁(ℎ𝑡) ∈ 𝒲𝑀𝑟\𝒲𝑇𝑏 .
 
 
Therefore, every history of signals ℎ𝑡  is associated with a continuation 
payoff 𝜁(ℎ𝑡). In this continuation payoff, an action is allowed to associate with the 
history, either 𝑇𝑏 or 𝑀𝑟, based on whether the continuation payoff sits in the set 
𝒲𝑇𝑏 or 𝒲𝑀𝑟\𝒲𝑇𝑏. Then, connect the signals continuation payoffs which break 
the current continuation payoff with the currently prescribed action payoff and a 
new continuation payoff. When the currently prescribed action is 𝑀𝑟 , this 
breakdown is unimportant, as the current payoff is 1 and there is no incentive to be 
created. Then the continuation payoff can be simplified as (𝜁(ℎ𝑡) − (1 − 𝛿))/𝛿. If 
the currently prescribed action is 𝑇𝑏 , the continuation payoffs are assigned 
according to the functions 𝛾𝑦 and 𝛾𝑦, which allow the payoffs to be enforced in 
the set 𝒲𝑇𝑏. 
There is still a chance that where the players use mixed strategies the 
manager is able to attain a higher PPE payoff or get additional PPE payoffs for 
lower discount factor δ. In the following, 𝑣∗ is the maximum manager PPE payoff, 
allowing for mixed strategies, and therefore 𝑣∗ ≥ 𝑣∗𝑝. Consider the mixed profile 
 = (
1
2
,  𝑏) for fixed  𝑏 ∈ [0,1]. Since both actions for the manager are played 
with strictly positive probability, the continuations γ must satisfy 
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𝑣 =  𝑏 [(1 − 𝛿)2 + 𝛿 {𝑝𝛾(𝑦𝑏) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾 (𝑦𝑏)}]
+ (1 −  𝑏) [(1 − 𝛿) × 0 + 𝛿 {𝑝𝛾(𝑦𝑟) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾 (𝑦𝑟)}] 
 =  𝑏 [(1 − 𝛿)3 + 𝛿 {𝑞𝛾(𝑦𝑏) + (1 − 𝑞)𝛾 (𝑦𝑏)}] + (1 −  𝑏) [(1 −
𝛿) + 𝛿 {𝑞𝛾(𝑦𝑟) + (1 − 𝑞)𝛾 (𝑦𝑟)}], 
 
where the first expression is the expected payoff from T and the second 
expression is the expected payoff from b. By simplifying, the continuation needs to 
satisfy the following requirement: 
 (1 − 𝛿) =  𝛿(𝑝 − 𝑞)[ 𝑏𝛾(𝑦𝑏) + (1 −  𝑏)𝛾(𝑦𝑟) − { 𝑏𝛾 (𝑦𝑏) +
(1 −  𝑏)𝛾 (𝑦𝑟)}]. 
 
(5.3.4) 
 
Let 𝛾𝑦( 𝑏) =  𝑏𝛾(𝑦𝑏) + (1 −  𝑏)𝛾(𝑦𝑟) 
and 𝛾𝑦( 𝑏) =  𝑏𝛾 (𝑦𝑏) + (1 −  𝑏)𝛾 (𝑦𝑟), 
The requirement (5.3.4) can be rearranged as  
 
𝛾𝑦( 𝑏) = 𝛾𝑦( 𝑏) +
(1 − 𝛿)
𝛿(𝑝 − 𝑞)
 
   (5.3.5) 
If 𝛾(𝑦1𝑦2) ∈ [1, 𝑣
∗] can be selected to satisfy this constraint, then   is 
enforceable on [1, 𝑣∗]. A sufficient condition is  
 (1 − 𝛿)
𝛿(𝑝 − 𝑞)
≤ 𝑣∗𝑝 − 1 
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Since 𝑣∗𝑝 ≤ 𝑣∗, the inequality above is indicated by 
 1
(2𝑝 − 𝑞)
≤ 𝛿 
(5.3.6) 
If α is enforceable on [1, 𝑣∗], the set of payoffs decomposed by  =
(1 2⁄ ,  𝑏) on [1, v∗], 𝒲α, is given by 
𝑣 ∈ 𝒲𝛼 ⟺ ∃𝛾(𝑦1𝑦2) ∈ [1, 𝑣
∗] satisfying (5.3.5) 
s.t. 
𝑣 = V( , 𝛾) 
= 2 𝑏(1 − 𝛿) + 𝛿{𝑝𝛾𝑦( 𝑏) + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾𝑦( 𝑏𝑏)}. 
 
Therefore, 
 𝒲
𝛼 = [2 𝑏(1 − 𝛿) + 𝛿 +
𝑝(1 − 𝛿)
(𝑝 − 𝑞)
, 2 𝑏(1 − 𝛿) + 𝛿𝑣∗
−
(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝛿)
(𝑝 − 𝑞)
] 
 
which is nonempty if (5.3.6) holds. 
Now, 𝑣∗ can be determined: Since 𝑣∗ = sup𝛼max𝒲
𝛼 , and the supremum 
is attained by  𝑏 = 1, it is easy to verify 𝑣∗ = 𝑣∗𝑝. Therefore, under (5.3.6), 
 ∪{𝛼:𝛼𝑏∈[0,1]}𝒲
𝛼 = [1, 𝑣∗] = [1, 𝑣∗𝑝],  
and the payoff set [1, 𝑣∗] and the maximal set of PPE payoffs are self-
generating for all δ satisfying (5.3.6). In addition, this lower bound on δ is lower 
than the bound for self-generating of [1, 𝑣∗] under pure strategy in (5.3.3). 
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5.3.2 Reputation with Short-Lived Players 
5.3.2.1 The Adverse Selection Approach to Reputation 
 Adverse selection is introduced by Akerlof (1970) in his study of the market 
mechanism with reference to the automobile market. He argues that the existence of 
information asymmetry allows sellers to sell low quality products to buyers. In the 
used car market, only the sellers know the actual quality of the cars they sell. 
Therefore, they may sell poor cars at the price of good cars. Although the buyers do 
not know the real quality of the cars, they know the average quality and wish to pay 
only the average price. Hence, the cars with better quality than average exit from the 
market. Then, the buyers lower their expectation on the average car quality. Again, 
the cars with better quality than the buyers’ new expectation exit from the market 
recursively until there are only poor quality cars left in the market. The trading 
volume is smaller than the equilibrium. This problem is called adverse selection and 
it can also be found in the insurance industry. 
The adverse selection approach to reputation begins with the assumption that 
a player is uncertain about key aspects of his opponent. For example, the investor 
may not know the manager’s payoffs or may be uncertain about what constraints the 
manager faces on his ability to choose various actions. This incomplete information 
is a device that introduces an intrinsic connection between past behaviour and 
expectations of future behaviour. Because incomplete information about players’ 
characteristics can have dramatic effects on the set of equilibrium payoffs, 
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reputation in this approach does not describe certain equilibrium but places 
constraints on the set of possible equilibria. 
Consider the manager-investor game in Figure 5.2 is infinitely repeated with 
perfect monitoring. The manager is long-lived and the investor is a succession of 
short-lived players. Every payoff in the interval [1,2] is a sub-game perfect 
equilibrium for a sufficiently patient manager. 
The manager is required to report truthfully (playing T) frequently for the 
high payoffs, thus the investor will play her best response of T. Can the manager 
develop a “reputation” for truthful reporting by doing this persistently? If the 
investor is not convinced immediately that the manager reports truthfully, she will 
refuse to invest and it may be costly for the manager at the start. However, for a 
sufficiently patient manager, it is worthwhile for the subsequent payoff. 
Intuitively, if the manager constantly reports truthfully, the investor will be 
convinced that the manager is the honest type and she will expect the manager to 
report truthfully in the future. However, repeated games do not capture this intuition. 
Repeated games have a recursive structure; the continuation game following any 
history is identical to the original game. In the theory of repeated game with 
complete information, no matter how many times the manager has reported 
truthfully, there is no reason for the investor to trust that the manager reports 
truthfully in the current stage game with more probability than at the beginning of 
the game. 
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The adverse selection approach to reputations allows the investor to entertain 
the possibility that the manager may be committed to reporting truthfully. Suppose 
the investor thinks the manager is most likely to be a dishonest type and assigns 
some (small) probability ?̂? > 0 to the manager being a commitment (honest) type 
who always reports truthfully. The necessary relationship between the manager’s 
previous action and the investor’s expectation of his future action can be introduced 
by a small probability ?̂? of his being a commitment type. Over the repeated game, 
this small probability can have large effect. 
Suppose this manager-investor game is played twice, with the manager’s 
payoffs added over the two periods. In the perfect monitoring game of complete 
information, Mr in both periods is the unique equilibrium outcome. Suppose now the 
investor assigns some (small) probability ?̂? > 0  to the manager being a 
commitment type who always reports truthfully, and assigns probability 1 − ?̂? to 
him being a dishonest type. The game still has perfect monitoring, so period 0 
choices are observed before period 1 choices are made. Consider the profile where 
the normal type of manager plays M in both periods. The investor plays R in period 
0 (because ?̂? is small). In the first period, after observing T, the investor assumes 
that the manager is a commitment type and her best response is b. Conversely, if the 
manager plays M, the investor assumes that the manager is a normal type and her 
best response is r. This profile is not an equilibrium. If the normal type manager 
mimics the commitment type in period 0, he can get 1 in current payoff and increase 
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to 2 in the next period. The two-period game does not have a pure strategy 
equilibrium. 
How to reconcile the finding with the non-trivial bounds on ex ante payoffs, 
bounds that may push the manager outside the set of equilibrium payoffs in the 
complete information game? There may well be a long period of time during which 
the investor is uncertain of the manager’s type and in which play does not resemble 
an equilibrium of the complete information game. The length of this period will 
depend on the discount factor, being longer for larger discount factors, and in 
general being long enough to have a significant effect on the manager’s payoffs. 
Eventually, however, such behaviour must give way to a regime in which the 
investor is (correctly) convinced of the manager’s type. 
Thus there is an order of limits calculation. For any prior probability û that 
the long-run player is the commitment type and for any ε > 0, there is a discount 
factor δ sufficiently large that the manager’s expected payoff is ε-close to the 
commitment type payoff. This holds no matter how small û is. As a result, it is 
tempting to think that even as the game is played and the posterior probability of the 
commitment type falls, there should be a period, think of it as the beginning of the 
game, and apply the standard reputation argument to conclude that uncertainty about 
the manager’s type still has a significant effect. However, for any fixed δ and in 
any equilibrium, there is a time at which the posterior probability attached to the 
commitment type has dropped below the corresponding critical value of û , 
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becoming too small (relative to δ) for reputation effects to operate. The next is to 
revealing the manager’s type. 
Which should command our interest, the ability of reputation to impose 
bounds on ex ante payoffs, or the fact that such effects eventually disappear? These 
results reflect different views of a common model. Their relative importance 
depends on the context in which the model is applied rather than arguments that can 
be made within the model. Sometimes strategic interactions from a well-defined 
beginning, focusing attention on ex ante payoffs is observed. In addition, ongoing 
interactions whose beginnings are difficult to identify, making long-run equilibrium 
properties a potentially useful guide to behaviour are often encountered. If one’s 
primary interest is the long-lived player, then ex ante payoffs may again be 
paramount. One may instead take the view of a social planner who is concerned with 
the continuation payoffs of the long-run player and with the fate of all short-run 
players, even those in the distant future, directing attention to long-run properties. 
Finally, if one is interested in the steady state of a model with incomplete 
information, long-run properties are important. 
The finding is viewed that reputations are temporary as an indication that a 
model of long-run reputations should incorporate some mechanism by which the 
uncertainty about types is continually replenished. For example, Holmström (1999), 
Mailath and Samuelson (2001) assume that the type of the long-lived player is 
governed by a stochastic process rather than being determined once and for all at the 
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beginning of the game. In such a situation, reputations can indeed have long-run 
implications.  
The reputation results in this chapter exploit the sharp asymmetry between 
players, with the manager being long-lived and arbitrarily patient and the investor 
being short-lived and hence myopic. In particular, short-lived investors allow us to 
move directly from the fact that the investor believes the manager is playing like the 
commitment type to the conclusion that the investor plays a best response to the 
commitment type. 
 
5.3.2.2 Commitment Types 
Let’s consider the case of one long-lived manager and one short-lived 
investor, with the latter representing either a succession of investors who live for one 
period or a continuum of small and anonymous infinitely lived investors. The type 
of manager is unknown to investor. A possible type of manager is denoted by ξ ∈ Ξ, 
where Ξ is a finite or countable set. The investor’s prior belief about the manager’s 
type is given by the distribution μ, with support Ξ. 
Divide the set of types into payoff types, Ξ1, and commitment types, Ξ2 ≡
Ξ\Ξ1. Payoff types maximise the average discounted value of payoffs, which depend 
on their type and which may be non-stationary, 
𝑢1: 𝐴1 × 𝐴2 × Ξ1 × ℕ0 → ℝ. 
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Type ξ0 ∈ Ξ1  is the normal type of manager, who happens to have a 
stationary payoff function, given by the stage game in the benchmark game of 
complete information, 
𝑢1(𝑎, 𝜉0, 𝑡) = 𝑢1(𝑎)  ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴, ∀𝑡 ∈ ℕ0. 
It is standard to think of the prior probability μ(𝜉0) as being relatively large, 
so the games of incomplete information are a seemingly small departure from the 
underlying game of complete information, although there is no requirement that this 
be the case. 
Commitment types (also called action types) do not have payoffs and simply 
play a specified repeated game strategy. For any repeated game strategy from the 
complete information game, ?̂?1:ℋ1 → ∆(𝐴1), where ℋ1  is the set of histories 
observed by the manager, denote by 𝜉(?̂?1) the commitment type committed to the 
strategy ?̂?1. In general, a commitment type of manager can be committed to any 
strategy in the repeated game. If the strategy in question plays the same (pure or 
mixed) stage-game action in every period, regardless of history, refer to that type as 
a simple commitment type. For example, one simple commitment type is a manager 
who always reports honestly. Let 𝜉(𝑎1) denote the (simple commitment) type that 
plays the pure action 𝑎1 in every period and 𝜉( 1) denote the type that plays the 
mixed action  1 in every period. Commitment types who randomise are important 
because they can imply a higher lower bound on the manager’s payoff. 
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Other manager commitment types are committed to more complicated 
sequences of actions. For example, the manager can play tit-for-tat, report truthfully 
in every period up to and including t and then mislead, or report honestly in prime-
numbered periods and mislead otherwise. 
(1) Payoff or Commitment Types 
The distinction between payoff and commitment types is not clear-cut. For 
example, pure simple commitment types are easily modelled as payoff types. The 
type 𝜉(𝑎1) for pure stage-game action 𝑎1 can be interpreted as the payoff type for 
whom playing 𝑎1 in every period is strictly dominant in the repeated game by 
specifying 
𝑢1(𝑎, 𝜉(𝑎1
′ ), 𝑡) = {
1, if 𝑎1 = 𝑎1
′ ,
0, otherwise.
 
The commitment type 𝜉′ who plays 𝑎1 in every period up to and including 
t, and then switches to 𝑎1
′′, is the payoff type with payoffs 
𝑢1(𝑎, 𝜉
′, 𝜏) = {
1, if 𝑎1 = 𝑎1
′  and 𝜏 ≤ 𝑡,    
     or 𝑎1 = 𝑎1
′′ and 𝜏 > 𝑡,
0, otherwise.             
 
A payoff type for whom an action 𝑎1 is a dominant action in the stage game 
is typically not equivalent to a commitment type who invariably plays the action 𝑎1. 
To recast the latter as a payoff type, the constant play of the action 𝑎1 is needed to 
be a dominant strategy in the repeated game, a more demanding requirement. For 
example, Mr is a dominant strategy set in the stage game but is not a dominant 
strategy in the repeated game.  
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Fudenberg and Levine (1992) explain mixed commitment types as payoff 
types. However, in addition to associated technical complications, interpreting 
mixed commitment types as payoff types requires an uncountable type space if the 
commitment type’s strategy is to be strictly dominant in the repeated game. 
It is personal preference to choose between payoff and commitment types. 
The theoretical advantage of only considering payoff types is that all types are 
expected to maximize their utility. On the other side, the belief that players may 
uncertain about the other players’ types forms the interest in reputation games. 
Simply considering the player may behave irrational or “abnormal” may be more 
plausible than expecting maximizing utility, and in fact a lot of literature use the 
language of irrational or “abnormal”. Otherwise, understanding that the games are 
models of a more complex strategic interaction, the uncertainty about a player’s type 
may induce the probability that the player models the strategic interaction quite 
differently, leading to payoffs that have no expected utility representation in the 
game in question. Then the player may be completely rational but best represented 
as a commitment type. 
In this study, the commitment type interpretation for 𝜉(𝑎1) is maintained, 
so that by assumption, a commitment type plays the specified strategy. 
The manager’s pure-action Stackelberg payoff is defined as 
 𝑣1
∗ = sup
𝑎1∈𝐴1
max
𝛼2∈𝐵(𝑎1)
𝑢1(𝑎1,  2) (5.3.7) 
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where 𝐵(𝑎1)  is the set of investor myopic best replies to 𝑎1 . If the 
supremum is achieved by some action 𝑎1
∗, that action is an associated Stackelberg 
action, 
𝑎1
∗ ∈ arg max
𝑎1∈𝐴1
min
𝛼2∈𝐵(𝑎1)
𝑢1(𝑎1,  2) 
This is a pure action to which a manager would commit if he had the chance 
to do so (hence the name Stackelberg action), given that such a commitment induces 
a best response from the investor. If there is more than one such action for the 
manager, one arbitrarily can be chosen. The (pure-action) Stackelberg type of 
manager plays 𝑎1
∗ and is denoted by 𝜉(𝑎1
∗) ≡ 𝜉∗. 
When the investor is short-lived, any bound on the manager’s ex ante payoffs 
that can be obtained using commitment types can be obtained using simple 
commitment types only. 
(2) Mixed-action Stackelberg Types 
While studying perfect monitoring, simple commitment types who choose 
pure actions are main discussed. As seen in previous section, commit to a mixed 
action is beneficial for a player in some games. In this manager-investor game, for 
example, a commitment by the manager to mix between reports truthfully and 
misleadingly, with slightly larger probability on reports truthfully, induces the 
investor to choose to buy and gives the manager a larger payoff than a commitment 
to report truthfully. In effect, a manager who always report truthfully spends too 
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much to induce response “buy” from the investor. Accordingly, define the mixed-
action Stackelberg payoff as  
 sup
𝛼1∈∆(𝐴1)
max
𝛼2∈𝐵(𝛼1)
𝑢1( 1,  2) (5.3.8) 
where 𝐵( 1) is the set of investor’s best responses to  1. Typically, the supremum 
is not achieved by any mixed action, so there is no mixed-action Stackelberg type. 
However, there are mixed commitment types which, if the investor is convinced she 
is facing such a type, will yield payoffs arbitrarily close to the mixed-action 
Stackelberg payoff. 
In perfect-monitoring games, it is simpler to verify the lower bound on 
equilibrium payoffs implied by commitments to pure (rather than mixed) actions. In 
the former case, only need analyse the updating of the short-lived players’ beliefs on 
one path of informative actions, the path induced by the Stackelberg commitment 
type. In contrast, commitments to mixed actions require consideration of belief 
evolution on all histories that arise with positive probability. This consideration 
involves the same issues that arise when studying reputations in imperfect 
monitoring games. 
5.3.2.3 Perfect Monitoring Games 
This section examines reputations in repeated games of perfect monitoring. 
Assuming that the action set 𝐴2  is finite, as usual, when any player has a 
continuum action space, only behaviour in which that player is playing a pure 
strategy will be considered. 
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In this manager-investor game, there is equilibria with “high” payoffs for a 
long-lived manager facing short-lived investors. The basic reputation result is a 
lower bound on equilibrium payoffs for the normal long-lived manager, in the game 
of incomplete information in which the short-lived investor is uncertain about the 
type of the long-lived manager. 
The set of histories in the complete information game, ℋ, is the set of public 
histories in the incomplete information game and is also the set of investor histories 
in the incomplete information game. A history for manager in the incomplete 
information game is an element of Ξ ×ℋ, specifying manager’s type as well as the 
public history. A behaviour strategy for manager in the incomplete information 
game, using the notation on commitment types from section 5.3.2.2, is 
𝜎1:ℋ × Ξ ⟶ ∆(𝐴1) 
such that, for all commitment types 𝜉(?̂?1) ∈ Ξ2,  
𝜎1(ℎ
𝑡 , 𝜉(?̂?1)) = ?̂?1(ℎ
𝑡)     ∀ℎ𝑡 ∈ ℋ 
A behaviour strategy for investor is, as in the beginning of 5.3, a map 
𝜎2:ℋ ⟶ ∆(𝐴2). 
Given a strategy profile 𝜎 , 𝑈1(𝜎, 𝜉)  denotes the type 𝜉  long-lived 
manager’s payoff in the repeated game. As is familiar, a Nash equilibrium is a 
collection of mutual best responses:  
A strategy profile (?̃?1, ?̃?2) is a Nash equilibrium of the reputation game 
with perfect monitoring if for all 𝜉 ∈ 1 , ?̃?1  maximises 𝑈1(𝜎1, ?̃?2, 𝜉)  over 
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manager’s repeated game strategies, and if for all t and all ℎ𝑡 ∈ ℋ that have 
positive probability under (?̃?1, ?̃?2) and 𝜇, 
𝐸[𝑢2(?̃?1(ℎ
𝑡 , 𝜉), ?̃?2(ℎ
𝑡)|ℎ𝑡)] = max
𝑎2∈𝐴2
𝐸[𝑢2(?̃?1(ℎ
𝑡 , 𝜉), 𝑎2|ℎ
𝑡)] 
 
Existence of equilibrium: 
The existence of Nash equilibria when Ξ is finite follows by observing that 
every finite-horizon truncation of the game has a Nash equilibrium, and by applying 
standard limiting arguments to obtain an equilibrium of the infinite horizon game 
(see, for example, Fudenberg and Levine 1983). When Ξ is countable infinite, 
existence is again an implication of Fudenberg and Levine (1983) if every finite-
horizon truncation of the game has an ε–Nash equilibrium. To prove that the finite-
horizon truncation of the game has an ε–Nash equilibrium, arbitrarily fix the 
behaviour of all but a finite number of types of manager (because Ξ is countable, 
the set of types whose behaviour is not fixed can be chosen so that its ex ante 
probability is close to 1). Then, in the finite-truncation game, all the short-lived 
investors are maximising while manager is ε–maximising (because he is free to 
choose behaviour for all but a small probability set of types). 
If 𝐴1 is a continuum, these arguments may not yield an equilibrium in pure 
strategies. Concerning with lower bounds on equilibrium payoffs, the existing 
results assure that a nonempty set is bounded. Allowing for mixing by manager 
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when 𝐴1  is a continuum introduces some tedious details to the definition of 
equilibrium, but does not alter the nature of the bounds calculated. 
(1) Sequential Equilibrium  
Because the lower bound on manager’s payoff applies to all Nash equilibria, 
stronger equilibrium concepts are not considered. The counterpart of a sequential 
equilibrium in this context is straightforward. Only manager has private information, 
and therefore sequential rationality for manager is immediate: after all histories, the 
continuation strategy of manager (of any type) should maximise his continuation 
payoffs. For investor, after histories that have zero probability under the equilibrium 
and involve a deviation by manager, her action would simply be required to be 
optimal, given some beliefs over  Ξ, with subsequent investor’s updating the same 
beliefs when possible. 
The consistency condition of sequential equilibrium has a powerful 
implication in the presence of commitment types. Should investor ever see an action 
that is not taken by a commitment type, then investor must thereafter attach 
probability zero to that commitment type, regardless of what she subsequently 
observes. This follows immediately from the fact that no disturbed strategies can 
generate such an outcome from the commitment type. The same is not the case with 
a payoff commitment type. 
Continue with the manager-investor game. The pure Stackelberg type of 
manager chooses T, with Stackelberg payoff 2. Suppose Ξ = {𝜉0, 𝜉
∗, 𝜉(𝑀)}. For 
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𝛿 ≥ 1 2⁄ , the grim trigger strategy profile of always playing Tb, with deviations 
punished by Nash reversion, is a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the complete 
information game. Consider the following adaptation of this profile in the 
incomplete information game: 
𝜎1(ℎ
𝑡 , 𝜉) = {
     𝑇, if 𝜉 = 𝜉∗,                             
  or 𝜉 = 𝜉0 and 𝑎
𝜏 = 𝑇𝑏 for all 𝜏 < 𝑡,
     𝑀, otherwise.                          
 
and 
𝜎2(ℎ
𝑡) = {
𝑏, if 𝑎𝜏 = 𝐻ℎ for all 𝜏 < 𝑡,
𝑟,         otherwise.                        
 
In other words, investor and the normal type of manager follow the strategies 
from the Nash-reversion equilibrium in the complete information game, and the 
commitment types 𝜉∗ and 𝜉(𝑀) play their actions. 
This is a Nash equilibrium for 𝛿 ≥ 1 2⁄  and 𝜇(𝜉(𝑀)) < 1 2⁄ . The 
restriction on 𝜇(𝜉(𝑀)) ensures that investor finds b optimal in period 0. Should 
investor ever observe M, then Bayes’ rule causes her to place probability 1 on type 
𝜉(𝑀) (if M is observed in the first period) or the normal type (if M is first played in 
a subsequent period), making her participation in Nash reversion optimal. The 
restriction on 𝛿 ensures that Nash reversion provides sufficient incentive to make T 
optimal for the normal manager. After observing 𝑎0
1 = 𝑇 in period 0, investor 
assigns zero probability to 𝜉 = 𝜉(𝑀). However, the posterior probability that 2 
assigns to the Stackelberg type does not converge to 1. In period 0, the prior 
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probability is 𝜇(𝜉∗) . After one observation of T, the posterior increases to 
𝜇(𝜉∗)/[𝜇(𝜉∗) + 𝜇(𝜉0)], after which it is constant. 
Of more interest is the possibility of a Nash equilibrium with a low payoff 
for the normal manager. This contrasts with the game of complete information, 
where playing Mr in every period is a sub-game perfect equilibrium with a payoff of 
1 to the normal manager. It is an implication of section 5.3.2.3(3) The Reputation 
Bound that there is no Nash equilibrium of the incomplete information game with a 
payoff to the normal manager near 1. Here it is argued that, if 𝜇(𝜉∗) < 1/3 and 
𝜇(𝜉(𝑀)) < 1/3, the normal manager’s payoff in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
is bounded below by 2𝛿 and above by 2. The bounds on 𝜇(𝜉∗) and 𝜇(𝜉(𝑀)) 
imply that in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome, the normal manager and 
investor choose either Tb or Mr in each period, and so 2 is the upper bound on 1’s 
payoff. Fix a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and let t be the first period in which 
the normal manager chooses M. If 𝑡 = ∞ (i.e., 1 never chooses M in equilibrium), 
then the normal manager’s payoff is 2. Suppose 𝑡 < ∞. If the normal manager 
chooses T in period 𝑡 and every subsequent period, then investor will choose b in 
period 𝑡 + 1 and every subsequent period, having concluded in period 𝑡  that 
manager is the Stackelberg type and then having received no evidence to the 
contrary. Hence, a lower bound on the normal manager’s payoff is 
2(1 − 𝛿𝑡) + 0 × (1 − 𝛿)𝛿𝑡 + 2𝛿𝑡+1 = 2 − 2(1 − 𝛿)𝛿𝑡 ≥ 2 − 2(1 − 𝛿) = 2𝛿 
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Payoff types: 
Continuing with the investment game, now consider the set of types Ξ =
(𝜉0, 𝜉1), where 𝜉1 is the payoff type with payoffs described in the left panel of 
figure 5.3. The lower bound from previous example no longer holds, even though 
investor puts positive probability on manager being a type 𝜉1  for whom the 
Stackelberg action is strictly dominant in the stage game. It is possible, even for 𝛿 
arbitrarily close to 1, to construct sequential equilibria in which both types of 
manager receive a payoff arbitrarily close to their minmax values of 1. For example, 
first consider the profile in which, in the absence of a deviation by manager, both 
types of manager reports misleadingly in even periods and reports truthfully in odd 
periods, and investor refuses to buy in even periods and buy in odd periods. 
Deviations by investor are ignored, and any deviation by manager results in investor 
concluding that manager is the normal type 𝜉0 (and never subsequently revising her 
belief) and refuses to buy in every subsequent period. After any deviation by 
manager, the normal type always plays M (while 𝜉1 plays T), so the profile is 
sequential. Profiles with lower payoffs can be constructed by increasing the 
frequency of Mr on the path of play (the result is still an equilibrium provided δ is 
large enough and the average payoff to manager of both types exceeds 1). Figure 5.3 
Buy (b ) Refuse to buy (r ) Buy (b ) Refuse to buy (r )
Truthful (T ) 3 , 3 1 , 2 Truthful (T ) 3 , 3 3 , 2
Misleading (M ) 2 , 0 0 , 1 Misleading (M ) 2 , 0 0 , 1
Investor
Manager
Investor
Manager
Figure 5.3 A Payoff Type of Manager for whom T is dominant
in the stage game (left panel) and in the repeated game (right panel)
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also presents the payoffs for a payoff type who finds it a dominant strategy to report 
truthfully after every history in the repeated game. This type is equivalent to the 
Stackelberg type. 
 
(2) Building a Reputation 
The first step toward the reputation result is to demonstrate that when 
investor assigns some probability to the simple type 𝜉(𝑎1
′ ) = 𝜉′, if the normal 
manager persistently plays action 𝑎1
′ , then investor must eventually place high 
probability on that action being played. Of course, it may take a while to build such 
a reputation for playing 𝑎1
′ , and doing so may be quite costly in the meantime. 
However, this cost will be negligible if manager is sufficiently patient. If this action 
is the Stackelberg action 𝑎1
∗, when manager is sufficiently patient, the resulting 
lower bound on manager’s payoff is close to his Stackelberg payoff 𝑣1
∗. 
Let Ω = Ξ × (𝐴1 × 𝐴2)
∞ be the space of outcomes. An outcome 𝜔 ∈ Ω 
takes the form 𝜔 = (𝜉, 𝑎1
0𝑎2
0, 𝑎1
1𝑎2
1, 𝑎1
2𝑎2
2, … ), specifying the type of manager and 
the actions chosen in each period. Associated with any outcome 𝜔 is the collection 
of period t public histories, one for each t, with ℎ𝑡 = ℎ𝑡(𝜔) =
(𝑎1
0(𝜔)𝑎2
0(𝜔), 𝑎1
1(𝜔)𝑎2
1(𝜔), … , 𝑎1
𝑡−1(𝜔)𝑎2
𝑡−1(𝜔)) ∈ ℋ𝑡. 
A profile of strategies (𝜎1, 𝜎2), along with the prior probability over types 𝜇 
(with support Ξ), induces a probability measure on the set of outcomes, denoted by 
P ∈ ∆(Ω). Denote by the event that the action a1 is chosen in every period, that is, 
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Ω′ = {𝜔: 𝑎1
𝑡(𝜔) = 𝑎1
′  ∀𝑡} ⊂ Ω = Ξ × (𝐴1 × 𝐴2)
∞ 
The event contains a multitude of outcomes, differing according to the type 
of manager and actions of investor. For example, the action 𝑎1
′  in every period is 
consistent with manager being the simple type 𝜉(𝑎1
′ ), but also with manager being 
the normal type, as well as with a variety of other types and investor behaviour. 
Let q𝑡  be the probability that the action 𝑎1
′  is chosen in period t, 
conditional on the public history ℎ𝑡 ∈ ℋ𝑡; that is, 
 q𝑡 ≡ 𝐏(𝑎1
𝑡 = 𝑎1
′ |ℎ𝑡) (5.3.9) 
Note that q𝑡 is a random variable, being a function of the form q𝑡: Ω →
[0,1] . Specifically, q𝑡(𝜔) = 𝐏(𝑎1
𝑡 = 𝑎1
′ |ℎ𝑡(𝜔)) . Because q𝑡  depends on 𝜔 
through ℎ𝑡(𝜔), q𝑡(ℎ𝑡) will often be written rather than q𝑡(𝜔). Because q𝑡  is 
conditioned on the public history, it provides a description of investor’s beliefs 
about manager’s play, after any history. 
The normal manager receives a payoff of at least min
𝑎2∈𝐵(𝑎1
′ )
𝑢1(𝑎1
′ , 𝑎2) in any 
period t in which 𝑞𝑡 is sufficiently large that investor chooses a best response to 
𝑎1
′ , and manager in fact plays 𝑎1
′ . The normal manager has the option of always 
playing 𝑎1
′ , so his payoff in any Nash equilibrium must be bounded below by the 
payoff generated by always playing 𝑎1
′ . If there is a bound on the number of periods 
in which, after always observing 𝑎1
′ , investor’s period t beliefs assign low 
probability to 𝑎1
′ , then there is a lower bound on the normal manager’s equilibrium 
payoff. 
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Hence, the behaviour of 𝑞𝑡 on the set Ω′ is interested. 
 
𝑞𝑡 may decrease on Ω′ 
Consider the manager-investor game with 𝑎1
′ = 𝑇 (= 𝑎1
∗, the Stackelberg 
action). Let 𝜉𝑡 describe a commitment type who reports truthfully in every period 
𝜏 < 𝑡, and reports misleadingly thereafter, independently of history. In particular, 𝜉0 
is 𝜉(𝑀), the simple commitment type that plays M in every period, and 𝜉𝑡 is a 
nonsimple commitment type for 𝑡 ≥ 1. Let 𝜉 denote the type that reports truthfully 
in period 0 and reports truthfully thereafter if and only if investor buy in period 0; 
and otherwise reports misleadingly. The set of types is given by Ξ =
{𝜉0, 𝜉
∗, 𝜉, 𝜉0, 𝜉1, 𝜉2, … }, with prior 𝜇.  
Consider first the strategy profile in which the normal type manager always 
reports truthfully and investor always choose to buy. Recall that the set Ω′ is the set 
of all outcomes in which manager always reports truthfully. Then, 𝑞0 = 1 − 𝜇(𝜉0) 
because all types except 𝜉0 report truthfully in period 0. There are two period 1 
histories consistent with Ω′, Tb and Tr, but Tr has zero probability under P (because 
investor always choose to buy). Applying Bayes’ rule, 
𝑞1(𝑇𝑏) =
1 − 𝜇(𝜉0) − 𝜇(𝜉1)
1 − 𝜇(𝜉0)
 
Because 𝑞0 < 𝑞1(𝑇𝑏) if and only if 𝜇(𝜉0) (1 − 𝜇(𝜉0)) > 𝜇(𝜉1), 𝑞
𝑡 need 
not be monotonic on Ω′ in t. 
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If the short-run players are playing pure strategies, then the conditional belief 
𝑞𝑡 is constant on a full-measure subset of Ω′ (i.e., 𝑞𝑡(𝜔) = 𝑞𝑡(𝜔′) for all 𝜔, 
𝜔′ ∈ Ω∗ with P(Ω∗) = P(Ω′)), because there is then only one positive probability 
period t history ℎ𝑡 consistent with Ω′. If the short-lived investors are randomising, 
however, then ℎ𝑡 may be a nondegenerate random variable on Ω′ and (because 𝜎1
𝑡 
is a function of the short-lived players’ actions in early periods) so 𝑞𝑡 may also be. 
 
𝑞𝑡 can vary with ℎ𝑡 on Ω′ 
Consider now a profile in which the normal type of manager always reports 
truthfully and investor chooses to buy with probability ½ and refuses to buy with 
probability ½ in the first period, and then always chooses to buy. Although 
calculation of 𝑞0 is unchanged, others are very different in period 1. Now, both 
period 1 histories consistent with Ω′, Tb and Tr, receive positive probability. So, 
𝑞1(𝑇𝑏) =
1 − 𝜇(𝜉0) − 𝜇(𝜉1)
1 − 𝜇(𝜉0)
 
and 
𝑞1(𝑇𝑟) =
1 − 𝜇(𝜉) − 𝜇(𝜉0) − 𝜇(𝜉1)
1 − 𝜇(𝜉0)
 
Consequently, for fixed t, 𝑞𝑡 need not be constant as a function of ℎ𝑡 on a 
full-measure subset of Ω′. 
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Define: 𝑛𝜁: Ω → ℕ0 ∪ {∞}  to be the number of random variables 𝑞
𝑡 
(t=0,1,…) for which 𝑞𝑡 ≤  𝜁. That is, for each 𝜔 ∈ Ω, 𝑛𝜁(𝜔) = |{𝑡: 𝑞
𝑡(𝜔) ≤  𝜁}| 
is the number of terms in the sequence of conditional probabilities {𝑞𝑡(𝜔)}𝑡=1
∞  that 
do not exceed 𝜁. Denote the event that manager is type 𝜉′, {𝜉′} × (𝐴1 × 𝐴2)
∞ 
 
Lemma: Fix 𝜁 ∈ [0,1). Suppose 𝜇(𝜉(𝑎1
′ )) ∈ [𝜇∗, 1) for some 𝜇∗ > 0 and 
𝑎1
′ ∈ 𝐴1. For any profile (𝜎1, 𝜎2), 
𝐏 {𝑛𝜁 >
ln 𝜇∗
ln 𝜁
|Ω′} = 0 
and for any outcome 𝜔 ∈ Ω′  such that all histories {ℎ𝑡(𝜔)}𝑡=1
∞  have 
positive probability under 𝐏, 𝐏(𝜉(𝑎1
′ )|ℎ𝑡(𝜔)) is non-decreasing in t. 
 
Thus, whenever investor observes ever longer strings of action a1
′ , 
eventually she must come to expect action a1
′  to be played with high probability. 
The restriction to histories {ℎ𝑡(𝜔)}𝑡=1
∞  that have positive probability under 
P precludes outcomes 𝜔 that are impossible under strategy profile 𝜎. 
An important feature of this lemma is that the bound on 𝑛𝜁 is independent 
of P, allowing to bound manager’s payoff in any equilibrium. Denote 𝜉(𝑎1
′ ) by 𝜉′. 
This result does not assert 𝑃(𝜉′|ℎ𝑡) → 1 as 𝑡 → ∞, that is, that the posterior 
probability attached to the simple type 𝜉′ converges to unity. Instead, it leaves open 
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the possibility that manager is normal but plays like that simple type, as in the 
equilibrium in section 5.3.2.3(1). 
The key idea behind the proof is the following. Suppose that under some 
history ℎ𝑡, previous play is consistent with the simple type (𝑎1
𝜏 = 𝑎1
′  for all 𝜏 < t) 
and the current expectation is that the action 𝑎1
′  need not appear (𝑞𝑡 < 1). This 
can only happen if some probability is attached to the event that manager is not the 
simple type 𝜉′ and will not play the action 𝑎1
′ . Then, observing the action 𝑎1
′  in 
period t results in a posterior that must put increased weight on 𝜉′ and therefore 
(with all else equal) must increase 𝑞𝑡 in the future. 
 
Proof: 
Let Ω′′ ≡ {𝜔: 𝐏(ℎ𝑡(𝜔)) > 0, 𝑎1
𝑡(𝜔) = 𝑎1
′  ∀𝑡} , that is, Ω′′  is the set of 
outcomes 𝜔  such that all histories ℎ𝑡(𝜔) have positive probability and 𝑎1
′  is 
always played. 
Note that Ω′′ ⊂ Ω′ and 𝐏(Ω′′) =  𝐏(Ω′). 
Step 1. The first step is to show that, for 𝜔 ∈ Ω′′, 
𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ𝑡(𝜔)) =
𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ𝑡−1(𝜔))
𝑞𝑡−1
 
This would be an immediate implication of Bayes’ rule if only manager’s 
behaviour were observed in period t-1. Establishing the result requires confirmation 
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that observing investor’s behaviour as well does not confound the inference. 
Applying Bayes’ rule,  
 
𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ𝑡(𝜔)) =
𝐏(ℎ𝑡(𝜔)|𝜉′, ℎ𝑡−1(𝜔))𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ𝑡−1(𝜔))
𝐏(ℎ𝑡(𝜔)|ℎ𝑡−1(𝜔))
 
(5.3.10) 
Reformulate the denominator by using the independence of any period t 
randomisation of manager and investor to obtain (suppressing 𝜔), 
𝐏(ℎ𝑡|ℎ𝑡−1) = 𝐏(𝑎1
𝑡𝑎2
𝑡 |ℎ𝑡−1) = 𝐏(𝑎1
𝑡|ℎ𝑡−1)𝐏(𝑎2
𝑡 |ℎ𝑡−1)
= 𝐏(ℎ𝑡(1)|ℎ𝑡−1)𝐏(𝑎2
𝑡 |ℎ𝑡−1) 
where ℎ𝑡(𝑖)  is the period t history of i’s actions. Using the three 
observations that investor’s choice at t depends on manager’s play only through 
ℎ𝑡−1, 𝜔 ∈ Ω′′ (so that 𝑎1
𝑡 = 𝑎1
′ ), and 𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ𝑡−1) > 𝟎, 
𝐏(𝑎2
𝑡 |ℎ𝑡−1) = 𝐏(𝑎2
𝑡 |𝜉′, ℎ𝑡−1) = 𝐏(ℎ𝑡(2)|𝜉′, ℎ𝑡−1) 
Turning to the numerator into (5.3.10), using the second observation again, 
𝐏(𝑎1
𝑡|𝜉′, ℎ𝑡−1) = 1, so 
𝐏(ℎ𝑡|𝜉′, ℎ𝑡−1) =  𝐏(ℎ𝑡(2)|𝜉′, ℎ𝑡−1) 
Substituting these calculations into (5.3.10), 
 
𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ𝑡) =
𝐏(ℎ𝑡(2)|𝜉′, ℎ𝑡−1)𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ𝑡−1)
𝐏(ℎ𝑡(1)|ℎ𝑡−1)𝐏(ℎ𝑡(2)|𝜉′, ℎ𝑡−1)
=
𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ𝑡−1)
𝐏(ℎ𝑡(1)|ℎ𝑡−1)
=
𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ𝑡−1)
𝐏(𝑎1
𝑡 = 𝑎1
′ |ℎ𝑡−1)
=
𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ𝑡−1)
𝑞𝑡−1
 
(5.3.11) 
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because 𝑞𝑡 ≤ 1, 𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ𝑡) is non-decreasing. 
Step 2. Next, because 𝜇(𝜉′) ≥ 𝜇∗ > 0, (5.3.11) can be used to calculate that 
for all t, 
0 < 𝜇∗ ≤ 𝐏(𝜉′|∅) = 𝑞0𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ1) = 𝑞0𝑞1𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ2) = ⋯ = (∏𝑞𝜏
𝑡−1
𝜏=0
)𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ𝑡) 
and as 𝐏(𝜉′|ℎ𝑡) ≤ 1 for all t, 
∏𝑞𝜏
𝑡−1
𝜏=0
≥ 𝜇∗ 
Taking limits, 
∏𝑞𝜏
∞
𝜏=0
≥ 𝜇∗ 
That is, for all 𝜔 ∈ Ω′′, 
∏𝑞𝜏(𝜔)
∞
𝜏=0
≥ 𝜇∗ 
and so (using the observation at the beginning of the proof that 𝐏(Ω′′) =
 𝐏(Ω′).), 
𝐏 {𝜔 ∈ Ω′′:∏ 𝑞𝜏
∞
𝜏=0
≥ 𝜇∗} = 𝐏(Ω′′) =  𝐏(Ω′) 
Because 𝐏(Ω′) ≥ 𝐏(𝜉′) ≥ 𝜇∗ > 0 where 𝜔 has again been suppressed), 
 
𝐏{∏ 𝑞𝜏∞𝜏=0 ≥ 𝜇
∗|Ω′} = 1 
But  
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∏𝑞𝜏
∞
𝜏=0
= ∏ 𝑞𝜏
{𝜏:𝑞𝜏≤𝜁}
∏ 𝑞𝜏
{𝜏:𝑞𝜏>𝜁}
< ∏ 𝑞𝜏
{𝜏:𝑞𝜏≤𝜁}
< 𝜁𝑛𝜁 
and so 
𝐏{𝜁𝑛𝜁 ≥ 𝜇∗|Ω′} = 1 
or 
𝐏{𝑛𝜁 ln 𝜁 ≥ ln 𝜇
∗ |Ω′} = 1 
which give the result 
𝐏{𝑛𝜁 ln 𝜁 ≥ ln 𝜇
∗ |Ω′} = 𝐏 {𝑛𝜁 >
ln 𝜇∗
ln 𝜁
|Ω′} = 0 
 
(3) The Reputation Bound 
In the stage (or one-off) game, manager can secure the payoff 
 𝑣1
∗(𝑎1) ≡ min
𝑎2∈𝐵(𝑎1)
𝑢1(𝑎1, 𝑎2) (5.3.12) 
by committing to action 𝑎1. Now refer to 𝑣1
∗(𝑎1) as the one-shot bound 
from 𝑎1. Let 𝑣1(𝜉0, 𝜇, 𝛿) be the infimum over the set of the normal manager’s 
payoff in any (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium, given the distribution 𝜇 over types 
and discount factor 𝛿. The basic reputation result establishes a lower bound on the 
equilibrium payoff of manager. 
 
Proposition: 
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Suppose 𝐴2 is finite and 𝜇(𝜉0) > 0. Suppose 𝑎1
′  is a finite subset of 𝐴1 
with 𝜇(𝜉(𝑎1)) > 0 for all 𝑎1 ∈ 𝐴1
′ . Then there exists k such that 
 𝑣1(𝜉0, 𝜇, 𝛿) ≥ 𝛿
𝑘 max
𝑎1∈𝐴1
′
𝑣1
∗(𝑎1) + (1 − 𝛿
𝑘) min
𝑎∈𝐴
𝑢1(𝑎)  
 
Proof: 
Let 𝑎1
′  be a best type in 𝐴1
′ , that is  
 𝑎1
′ ∈  arg max
𝑎1∈𝐴1
′
min
𝑎2∈𝐵(𝑎1)
𝑢1(𝑎1, 𝑎2)  
By hypothesis, the simple type 𝜉′ = 𝜉(𝑎1
′ ) is assigned positive probability 
by 𝜇. 
Because 𝐴2 is finite, there exists 𝜁 ∈ (0,1) such that if  1(𝑎1
′ ) > 𝜁, 
 𝐵( 1) ⊂ 𝐵(𝑎1
′ )  
In other words, as long as investor attaches sufficiently high probability to 
manager’s action 𝑎1
′ , investor will choose a best response to 𝑎1
′ . 
Fix a Nash equilibrium (𝜎1, 𝜎2) and let P be the distribution on Ω induced 
by (𝜎1, 𝜎2) and 𝜇. Then, for all ℎ
𝑡 such that 𝑞𝑡(ℎ𝑡) > 𝜁, 𝐵(𝐸(𝜎1
𝑡|ℎ𝑡)) ⊂ 𝐵(𝑎1
′ ). 
Letting ℋ̂𝑡 ≡ {ℎ𝑡: 𝑞𝑡(ℎ𝑡) > 𝜁}, just argued that 𝜎2
𝑡(ℎ𝑡) ∈ 𝐵(𝑎1
′ ) for all ℎ𝑡 ∈ ℋ̂𝑡. 
Set 𝑘 = ln 𝜇(𝜉′) ln 𝜁⁄ . From lemma in section 5.3.2.3(2), conditional on Ω′ 
(i.e., conditional on 1 playing 𝑎1
′  in every period), 𝑞𝑡 ≤ 𝜁 for no more than 𝑘 
periods with P probability 1. Suppose now that the normal type plays according to 
the strategy “always play 𝑎1
′ ” (which may not be 𝜎1). This induces a probability 
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measure 𝑃′ on Ω that generates the same distribution over public histories as does 
𝑃  conditional on 𝜉′ , that is, P′(C) = P(C|𝜉′)  for all C ⊂ (𝐴1 × 𝐴2)
∞ . Hence 
𝑞𝑡 ≤ 𝜁  for no more than k periods with P′  probability 1. The inequality for 
𝑣1(𝜉0, 𝜇, 𝛿) now follows from the observation that the normal type’s equilibrium 
payoff must be no less than the payoff from this strategy, which is at least the payoff 
from receiving the worst possible payoff for the first k periods, after which a payoff 
of at least max
𝑎1∈𝐴1
′
𝑣1
∗(𝑎1) is received. 
 
If the set of possible commitment types is sufficiently rich, the lower bound 
on the normal manager’s payoff is the Stackelberg payoff.  
 
Corollary: 
Suppose 𝜇 assigns positive probability to some sequence of simple types 
{𝜉(𝑎1
𝑘)}𝑘=0
∞  with {𝑎1
𝑘}𝑘 satisfying 
𝑣1
∗ = lim
𝑘→∞
𝑣1
∗(𝑎1
𝑘) 
For all 𝜀 > 0, there exists 𝛿′ ∈ (0,1) such that for all 𝛿 ∈ (𝛿′, 1), 
𝑣1(𝜉0, 𝜇, 𝛿) ≥ 𝑣1
∗ − 𝜀 
 
Proof: 
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Fix 𝜀 > 0 and choose 𝑎1
𝑘 such that 𝑣1
∗(𝑎1
𝑘) > 𝑣1
∗ − 𝜀/2. The result now 
follows from proposition 5.3.11, taking 𝐴1
′ = {𝑎1
𝑘}. 
 
(4) Stackelberg Bound 
If there is a Stackelberg action, and the associated Stackelberg type has 
positive probability under 𝜇, then the hypotheses of corollary in section 5.3.2.3(3) 
are trivially satisfied. In that case, the normal manager effectively builds a reputation 
for playing like the Stackelberg type, receiving a payoff (when patient) no less than 
the payoff 𝑣1
∗. Importantly, the normal manager builds this reputation despite the 
fact that there are many other possible commitment types. However, this result tells 
very little about manager’s equilibrium strategy. In particular, it does not imply that 
it is optimal for the normal manager to choose the Stackelberg action in each period, 
which is in general not the case.  
(5) Complete Information Games 
Reputation effects from pure-action commitment types in perfect monitoring 
games yield a lower bound on equilibrium payoffs for manager that can be quite 
high. However, unlike mixed-action commitment types, or more generally imperfect 
monitoring games, they do not introduce the possibility of new payoffs. More 
precisely, for any pure action a 𝑎1
′ ∈ 𝐴1, there exists 𝛿 ∈ (0,1), such that for all 
𝛿 ∈ (𝛿, 1) the complete information game has an equilibrium with manager payoffs 
at least 𝑣1
∗(𝑎1
′ ). This is immediate if there is a stage-game Nash equilibrium with 
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manager payoffs at least 𝑣1
∗(𝑎1
′ ). If not, then Nash reversion can, for patient 
manager, be used to support 1’s choice of 𝑎1
′  in every period. 
 
Diffuse beliefs: 
If 𝐴1 is a continuum, then the hypotheses of corollary in section 5.3.2.3(3) 
are satisfied if 𝐴1 has a countably dense subset {𝑎1
𝑚}𝑚=1
∞  with the property that for 
𝜇(𝜉(𝑎1
𝑚)) > 0 all m. 
 
5.3.2.4 Imperfect Monitoring Games 
This section examines reputations with imperfect monitoring in the manager-
investor game. Again, suppose the manager is long-lived player and the investor is 
short-lived player, focusing on the manager’s payoff. The stage game of the 
benchmark complete information game is the game with private monitoring and with 
finite or continuum action spaces, 𝐴𝑖, and finite signal spaces, 𝑍𝑖. This includes 
public monitoring as a special case, and thus includes stage games with a non-trivial 
extensive form. Although the seminal study of reputations with imperfect 
monitoring (Fudenberg and Levine 1992) restricted attention to public monitoring 
games (section 5.3.2.4(1)), this is unnecessary. 
The distribution over private signals 𝑧 = (𝑧1, 𝑧2) for each action profile 𝑎 
is denoted by 𝜋(𝑧|𝑎), with 𝜋𝑖 being player i’s marginal distribution. As usual, the 
ex post payoffs of the normal type of manager and investor, after the realisation 
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(𝑧, 𝑎), are given by 𝑢𝑖
∗(𝑧𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖) (𝑖 = 1,2). If an action space is a continuum, it is 
assumed that, 𝜋: 𝑍 × 𝐴 → [0,1]  is continuous, and 𝑢𝑖
∗  is continuous in all 
arguments and quasi-concave in 𝑎𝑖 . Ex ante stage game payoffs are given by 
𝑢𝑖(𝑎) ≡ ∑ 𝑢𝑖
∗(𝑧𝑖, 𝑎𝑖)𝜋(𝑧|𝑎)𝑧 . 
The space of types Ξ is as described in section 5.3.2.2, with 𝜉0 being the 
normal type. When 𝐴1 is finite, it is allowed for simple commitment types that are 
committed to a mixed action. 
The set of private histories for manager (excluding his type) is 
ℋ1 ≡∪𝑡=0
∞ (𝐴1 × 𝑍1)
𝑡 
and a behaviour strategy for manager is, using the notation on commitment 
types from section 5.3.2.2, 
𝜎1:ℋ1 × Ξ → ∆(𝐴1) 
Such that, for all 𝜉(?̂?1) ∈ Ξ2, 
 𝜎1(ℎ1
𝑡 , 𝜉(?̂?1)) = ?̂?1(ℎ1
𝑡)     ∀ℎ1
𝑡 ∈ ℋ1  
The set of private histories for the short-lived investors is 
ℋ2 ≡∪𝑡=0
∞ (A2 × 𝑍2)
𝑡 
and a behaviour strategy for the short-lived investors is 
 𝜎2:ℋ2 → ∆(𝐴2) (5.3.13) 
When considering infinite action sets, convention of restricting attention to 
pure strategies is maintained throughout. 
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As before, given a strategy profile 𝜎, U1(𝜎, 𝜉) denotes the type 𝜉 long-
lived manager’s payoff in the repeated game. 
 
Definition (5.3.2.4): 
A strategy profile (?̃?1, ?̃?2) is a Nash equilibrium of the reputation game 
with imperfect monitoring if for all 𝜉 ∈ Ξ1 , ?̃?1  maximises 𝑈1(𝜎1, ?̃?2, 𝜉)  over 
manager’s repeated game strategies, and if for all t and all ℎ2
𝑡 ∈ ℋ2 that have 
positive probability under (?̃?1, ?̃?2) and 𝜇, 
𝐸[𝑢2(?̃?1(ℎ1
𝑡 , 𝜉), ?̃?2(ℎ2
𝑡 ))|ℎ2
𝑡 ] = max
𝑎2∈𝐴2
𝐸[𝑢2(?̃?1(ℎ1
𝑡 , 𝜉), 𝑎2)|ℎ2
𝑡 ] 
 
(1) Public Monitoring 
The analysis requires only minor modifications when the signals are public 
and short-lived investors do not observe the actions of previous short-lived 
investors. It is referred to the game with public signals and short-lived investor’s 
actions not observed by subsequent short-lived investors (i.e., 𝐻2 ≡∪𝑡=0
∞ 𝑌𝑡) as the 
canonical public monitoring game, because it is often the most natural specification. 
This is the game studied in Fudenberg and Levine (1992), and is to be 
distinguished from the case when the signal is public and short-lived investor’s 
actions are observed by subsequent short-lived investors (a special case of the 
private monitoring game). 
135 
 
A special case of the canonical public-monitoring game has public short-
lived investor actions (and finite 𝐴2, so as to preserve our assumption of a finite 
signal space). There is a space of signals 𝑌1 and a public-monitoring distribution 
ρ1, so that the complete space of public signals is 𝑌 = 𝑌1 × 𝑌2 with probability 
distribution given by 
𝜌((𝑦1, 𝑎2
′ )|𝑎) = {
𝜌1(𝑦1|𝑎), if 𝑎2
′ = 𝑎2
0,        otherwise.
 
 
(2) Stackelberg Payoffs 
As in the case of perfect monitoring, the normal manager has an incentive to 
induce particular beliefs in the short-lived investors in order to elicit beneficial best 
replies. However, because monitoring is imperfect, the best responses that can be 
elicited by 𝑎1 are not simply those actions in 𝐵(𝑎1). 
First consider the set of possible investor best responses when manager is 
almost certain to play some mixed action  1. A (potentially mixed) action  2 is an 
𝜀-confirmed best response to  1 if there exists  1
′  such that 
 2(𝑎2) > 0 ⇒ 𝑎2 ∈ arg max
𝑎2
′
𝑢2( 1
′ ,  2
′ ) 
and 
|𝜋2(∙ | 1,  2) − 𝜋2(∙ | 1
′ ,  2)| ≤ 𝜀 
Note that it is possible that a mixed action  2 is an 𝜀-confirmed best 
response to  1, while at the same time no action in the support of  2 is an 𝜀-
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confirmed best response. Denote the set of 𝜀-confirmed best response to  1 by 
𝐵𝜀( 1). Note that if there are different strategies  1 and  1
′  with 𝜋2(∙ | 1,  2) =
𝜋2(∙ | 1
′ ,  2), then 𝐵0( 1) may contain strategies not in 𝐵( 1), the set of best 
replies to  1. 
The private monitoring and the canonical public monitoring game differ in 
the information that short-lived investors have about preceding short-lived investor’s 
choices, leading to different constraints on optimal investor behaviour. 
For the private monitoring game, define 
 𝐵𝜀
∗( ̂1) ≡ { 2: supp( 2) ⊂ 𝐵𝜀( ̂1)} (5.3.14) 
For the canonical public monitoring game, define 𝐵𝜀
∗( ̂1) ≡ 𝐵𝜀( ̂1). 
This section proves that if investor assigns strictly positive probability to a 
simple type 𝜉( 1
′ ) , then a patient normal manager’s payoff in every Nash 
equilibrium can be (up to an 𝜀 > 0 approximation) no lower than 𝑣1( 1
′), where  
 𝑣1( 1
′ ) ≡ min
𝛼2∈𝐵0
∗(𝛼1
′ )
u1( 1
′ ,  2) (5.3.15) 
Taking the supremum over  1
′  yields the payoff 
 𝑣1
∗∗ ≡ sup
𝛼1
′
min
𝛼2∈𝐵0
∗(𝛼1
′ )
u1( 1
′ ,  2) (5.3.16) 
In the manager-investor game, with the ex ante stage game payoffs in figure 
5.2, manager’s action is not public. As in section 5.3, there is a public signal with 
two possible values, y and 𝑦, and distribution 
𝜌(𝑦|𝑎) = {
𝑝, if 𝑎1 = 𝑇,
𝑞, if 𝑎1 = 𝑀,
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where 0 < 𝑞 < 𝑝 < 1 . Investor’s actions are public. Let ?̂?1  denote 
manager’s mixed action which randomises equally between T and M. Then, for all 
𝜀 ≥ 0 , 𝐵𝜀( ̂1)  contains every pure or mixed action for investor, and hence 
min
𝛼2∈𝐵0(𝛼1
′ )
u1( 1
′ ,  2) = 1/2. However, for any mixture  1 under which T is more 
likely than M, for sufficiently small 𝜀, 𝐵0( 1) = {ℎ}. As a result, 𝑣1
∗∗ = 5/2. This 
payoff is the mixed-action Stackelberg payoff, and exceeds the upper bound on 
manager’s payoff in the corresponding public monitoring game of complete 
information, shown in section 5.3 to be 
2 −
1 − 𝑝
𝑝 − 𝑞
< 2 
 
New possibilities even for perfect monitoring: 
As observed in section 5.3.2.3(5) that reputation effects from pure-action 
commitment types in perfect monitoring games cannot introduce new payoff 
possibilities. Taking  ̂1 = 𝐻 in section 5.3.2.4(1) shows that pure commitment 
types in imperfect-monitoring games can introduce new possibilities in terms of 
equilibrium payoffs. Similarly, mixed-action commitment types in perfect 
monitoring games can introduce new possibilities. A game with perfect monitoring 
is a special case of a game with imperfect monitoring, where the set of signals Z is 
the set of pure-action profiles A, and 𝜋(𝑧|𝑎) = 1  if and only if 𝑧 = 𝑎 . 
Consequently, for perfect monitoring games, 𝐵0
∗ = 𝐵0 = 𝐵 and 𝑣1
∗∗ is the mixed-
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action Stackelberg payoff, (section 5.3.2.2(2)). This section thus extends the 
reputation result for perfect monitoring games of section 5.3.2.4(1) to mixed 
commitment types. In the process, a stronger bound on payoffs is obtained, as the 
mixed-action Stackelberg payoff can exceed the pure-action Stackelberg payoff. The 
pure and mixed Stackelberg payoffs for the manager-investor game are given by: 
𝑣1
∗ = max
𝑎1
min
𝛼2∈𝐵(𝑎1)
𝑢1(𝑎1,  2) = 2 
and 
𝑣1
∗∗ = sup
𝛼1
min
𝛼2∈𝐵(𝛼1)
𝑢1( 1,  2) = 2
1
2
 
The lower bound on manager’s payoff can be strictly higher than what 
manager could achieve in the perfect monitoring game of complete information. In 
the beginning of section 5.3, examining games of complete information in which a 
long-lived manager faces short-lived opponents, the upper bound 𝑣1 (cf. (5.3.1)) on 
manager’s payoff is introduced. In the manager-investor game, 
𝑣1 = max
𝛼∈𝐵
min
𝑎1∈supp(𝛼1)
u1(𝑎1,  −1) = 2 
the bound 𝑣1( 1
′ ) differs from min
𝛼2∈𝐵(𝛼1
′ )
𝑢1( 1
′ ,  2) in allowing investor’s 
action to be a minimiser from the set 𝐵0
∗( 1
′) rather than 𝐵( 1
′ ). In general, this 
difference can yield a bound that is even lower than the pure-action Stackelberg 
payoff. 
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5.4 THE FORMAL GAME FOR DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS 
5.4.1 The Cheap-Talk Model of Discretionary Accruals 
 
In this section, the behaviour of the manager who considers whether to make 
up the earnings through accounting choices is studied following Du (2012). 
At the beginning of each stage game, the manager observes the reputation of 
his firm among analysts. Then he observes the real earnings 𝜃 of the current period 
privately. The real earnings can be either high (H) or low (L), i.e., 𝜃𝑡 ∈ {𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝐿} ≡
Θ, for each period t. After observing the real earnings, the manager chooses a level 
𝑎 of earnings management from the strategy set A ⊂ ℝ that is continuous. Then he 
reports the earnings 𝑦𝑡 ∈ {𝜃𝐻, 𝜃𝐿}, which is the sum of real earnings 𝜃 and the 
discretionary accruals 𝑎𝑡 ∈ {𝐴, 0, −𝐴}, where 𝐴 ≡ 𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿. 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑎𝑡  
Usually, investors associate the firm’s current reported earnings with its 
ability to generate future returns. That is, the probability of a firm generating desired 
returns is a function of current earnings:  𝑡+1 = 𝑉(𝑦𝑡). A firm with high earnings 
(𝑦𝐻) is interpreted as a powerful firm with probability  𝐻 of generating desired 
Figure 5.4 Timeline of events in the model
Manager receives the 
signals of investors' 
beliefs
Manager chooses a 
discretionary level and 
reports earnings y_t
Investors update their beliefs 
about the manager and price 
the stock
True state 
is revealed
Investors update their beliefs 
about the manager and report 
to survey
Beginning of t Period t End of t Beginning of t +1
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returns, while a firm with low earnings (𝑦𝐿) is interpreted as a poor firm with 
probability  𝐿  of generating desired returns, where 0 <  𝐿 <  𝐻 < 1. Investors 
are risk neutral and offer a price equal to their willingness to pay. 
The choice of discretionary accruals 𝑎 requires a utility cost 𝐶(𝑎) and 
brings more probability 𝑦𝑎 of cooperation in the following stages if it is not 
revealed. The incentive rate 𝑦 is yielded from perceptions of investors from prior 
stages.  
The accumulated total of discretionary accruals is 
 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑡  
  
Investor expectations: 
Graham and Dodd (2008) suggest that investors evaluate a common stock 
mainly based on the earnings and a quality coefficient of the company. This quality 
coefficient includes, for example, the company size, reputation, financial position, 
and prospects. For simplification, assuming that the investors’ expectation on a 
stock is a function of the company’s reported earnings and reputation. Suppose the 
investor would like to pay a high price 𝑝𝐻 for the stock that generates desired 
return, and a low price 𝑝𝐿 for the stock that does not. (Let 𝑟 be the investors’ 
belief that the reported earnings is reliable.) Then, the stock price which reflects the 
investor’s expectation is set by 
141 
 
 
𝑝𝑡 =
1
1 + 𝛿
𝐸𝑡[𝑝𝑡+1 + 𝜃𝑡+1|𝑦𝑡] 
 
where 𝛿 is investors’ discount rate. 
 
The manager’s optimisation problem: 
 Suppose the manager understands the investor’s utility function, and he 
chooses a discretionary accruals level 𝑎𝑡 to report 𝑦𝑡 which maximises his utility 
 
ℎ𝑡 = max
𝑦𝑡∈{𝜃𝐻,𝜃𝐿}
𝐸𝑡 [∑𝛽
𝑠 ln(𝑝𝑡+𝑠)
∞
𝑠=0
− 𝐶(𝑎𝑡+𝑠)] 
 
where 𝛽 is the manager’s discount rate and 𝑝𝑡 is the stock price at the end of 
period t.  
That is, when the manager chooses the reporting earnings (discretionary 
accruals level), he is concerned about the stock price series from the current period 
and the cost of using discretionary accruals. The earnings management decision in 
the current period has future effect on both the manager’s flexibility in discretionary 
accruals and the investor’s expectations. 
The following section will discuss how the manager’s earnings management 
is affected by the different investor expectations. 
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5.4.2 Investor’s Rational Expectation 
First, suppose the investors have rational expectations on manager’s 
discretionary choice. Under this rational expectation, investors have perfect 
information on manager’s utility function and are able to anticipate manager’s 
reporting strategy. That is, investors can predict the manager’s earnings management 
behaviour through discretionary accruals and update their expectations according to 
their prediction.  
With the investors’ rational expectations, the manager considers the 
reporting strategies on the real earnings 𝜃𝑡 and the accumulated accrual level at the 
end of previous period 𝑥𝑡−1. The space of possible strategies is given by 𝑆 ≡ Θ ×
𝑋 = {𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝐿} × {−𝐴, 0, 𝐴}. Let 𝜆 be a probability measure on 𝑆. With the discrete 
values of earnings and accruals, 𝜆 is a simple 6 × 1 vector corresponding to the 
probabilities of the six possible situations. 
 
Definition 5.4.1. A stationary rational expectation equilibrium is a set of decision 
rules 𝑦(𝜃𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡−1), a price function 𝑝(𝑦𝑡), and a probability measure on the state 
space 𝜆: 𝑆 → 𝑅 such that 
(i) Reporting strategy is a solution to the manager’s optimisation 
problem, i.e., 𝑦(𝜃𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡−1) solves the following problem: 
 v(𝜃𝑡, 𝑥𝑡−1) = max
𝑦𝑡∈{𝜃𝐻,𝜃𝐿}
{𝑙𝑛(𝑝(𝑦𝑡)) − 𝐶(𝑎𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝐸𝑡[𝑣(𝜃𝑡+1, 𝑥𝑡)]} 
(5.4.1) 
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(ii) Investors’ expectations are the same as 𝜆 and 𝑦(∙); stock price 
reflects investors’ expectations. 
(iii) The probability measurement 𝜆 is a stationary, i.e., 
 𝜆′ = 𝜆′𝑃 (5.4.2) 
where P is the 6 × 6 transition matrix implied by the model. 
The discreteness of state variables allows for a reformulation of the Bellman 
equation in terms 𝑣𝑖𝑗  where 𝑖 ∈ {H, L}  and 𝑗 ∈ {−,0, +}  correspond to 𝜃 ∈
{𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝐿} and 𝑥𝑡−1 ∈ {−𝐴, 0, 𝐴}. For example, 𝑣𝐻− is the value function when 𝜃 =
𝜃𝐻  and 𝑥𝑡−1 = −𝐴 . Apply this notation rule to 𝑦𝑖𝑗  and 𝜆𝑖𝑗 . Let 𝑦 =
[𝑦𝐻−, 𝑦𝐿−, 𝑦H0, 𝑦𝐿0, 𝑦𝐻+, 𝑦𝐿+] , and 𝜆 = [𝜆𝐻−, 𝜆𝐿−, 𝜆H0, 𝜆𝐿0, 𝜆𝐻+, 𝜆𝐿+]  denote the 
vectors of decision rules and probability distribution. The Bellman equation (5.4.1) 
can be represented by six equations of 𝑣𝑖𝑗, where 𝑖 ∈ {H, L} and 𝑗 ∈ {−,0, +}, 
𝑣𝐻− = ln(𝑝𝐻) + 𝛽[𝜋𝑣𝐻− + (1 − 𝜋)𝑣𝐿−] 
𝑣𝐿− = max {ln(𝑝𝐻) + 𝛽[(1 − 𝜋)𝑣𝐻0 + 𝜋𝑣𝐿0], ln(𝑝𝐿) + 𝛽[(1 − 𝜋)𝑣𝐻−
+ 𝜋𝑣𝐿−]} 
𝑣H0 = max {ln(𝑝𝐻) + 𝛽[𝜋𝑣𝐻0 + (1 − 𝜋)𝑣𝐿0], ln(𝑝𝐿) + 𝛽[𝜋𝑣𝐻−
+ (1 − 𝜋)𝑣𝐿−]} 
𝑣𝐿0 = max {ln(𝑝𝐻) + 𝛽[(1 − 𝜋)𝑣𝐻+ + 𝜋𝑣𝐿+], ln(𝑝𝐿) + 𝛽[(1 − 𝜋)𝑣𝐻0
+ 𝜋𝑣𝐿0]} 
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𝑣𝐻+ = max {ln(𝑝𝐻) + 𝛽[𝜋𝑣𝐻+ + (1 − 𝜋)𝑣𝐿+], ln(𝑝𝐿) + 𝛽[𝜋𝑣𝐻0
+ (1 − 𝜋)𝑣𝐿0]} 
𝑣𝐿+ = ln(𝑝𝐿) + 𝛽[(1 − 𝜋)𝑣𝐻+ + 𝜋𝑣𝐿+] 
The first equation suggests that when the real earnings are high and the 
accumulated accruals are negative, there is no room for earnings management 
through discretionary accruals, the current choice is 𝑎 = 0, and the value function is 
the utility function from truthful reporting (𝑣𝐻−). Conversely, the last equation 
suggests that when the real earnings are high and the accumulated accruals are 
positive, the manager’s only choice for discretionary accruals is 𝑎 = 0 and the 
value function is the utility function from truthful reporting (𝑣𝐿+ ). In other 
situations, the manager can choose an action from 𝑎 ∈ {−𝐴, 0, 𝐴} to maximise his 
expected utility. 
5.4.3 Solution 
In a stationary rational expectation equilibrium, the investors’ expectations 
do not depend on the manager’s earnings management strategy and the probability 
distribution of the state vector. 
In a stationary rational expectation equilibrium, the price function (investors’ 
expectations) is given by 
 
𝑝(𝑦𝑡) = [(𝐼 −
1
1 + 𝛿
Π)
−1
?̅?]
𝑗
 
5.4.3 
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where Π = [π, 1 − π; 1 − π, π] , 𝜃 = [𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝐿]′ , 𝐼  is a 2 × 2  identity 
matrix, 𝑗 = 1 if 𝑦𝑡 = 𝜃𝐻, and 𝑗 = 2 if 𝑦𝑡 = 𝜃𝐿. 
The stationary expectation equilibria will be solved by a “guess and verify” 
method. First, a possible strategy for discretionary accruals will be stated, then the 
stationary probability distributions associated with this strategy will be derived and 
the situations which are incentive-compatible will be verified. 
 
Proposition 5.4.1: There exist the following stationary rational expectation 
equilibria, where the stock price is given by (5.4.3), 𝑦 =
[𝑦𝐻−, 𝑦𝐿−, 𝑦H0, 𝑦𝐿0, 𝑦𝐻+, 𝑦𝐿+] , and probability distribution 𝜆 =
[𝜆𝐻−, 𝜆𝐿−, 𝜆H0, 𝜆𝐿0, 𝜆𝐻+, 𝜆𝐿+] are given by: 
(i) 𝑦 = [𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃H, 𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝐿, 𝜃𝐿] , and 𝜆 = [0,0,
π
2
,
1−𝜋
2
,
1−𝜋
2
,
π
2
] , for 𝜋 ∈
(𝜋1, 𝜋1); 
(ii) 𝑦 = [𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝐿 , 𝜃H, 𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝐿, 𝜃𝐿] , and 𝜆 = [𝜔,𝜔,
π
2
(1 − 2𝜔),
1−𝜋
2
(1 −
2𝜔),
1−𝜋
2
(1 − 2𝜔),
π
2
(1 − 2𝜔)], where 𝜔 ∈ [0,
1
2
], for 𝜋 ∈ (𝜋2, 1]; 
(iii) 𝑦 = [𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃H, 𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝐿, 𝜃𝐿] , and 𝜆 = [0,0,
π
2
,
1−𝜋
2
,
1−𝜋
2
,
π
2
] , for 𝜋 ∈
(𝜋3, 𝜋3); 
where (𝜋1, 𝜋1, 𝜋2, 𝜋3, 𝜋3) are constants between 0.5 and 1. 
Possible states in the equilibrium are determined by the stationary 
distribution 𝜆. If all possible states with non-zero probabilities are characterised by 
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earnings management, the equilibrium is an earnings management equilibrium. 
Otherwise, it is a truthful reporting equilibrium. In the equilibria above, equilibrium 
(i) and equilibrium (ii) are earnings management equilibria while (iii) is a truthful 
reporting equilibrium. Thus, both reporting strategies are possible in the stationary 
expectations equilibria. The properties of the underlying real earnings process 
determine the selection of equilibrium.  
5.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter begins with a literature review of game theory. Then, the 
theoretical literature on incentives for earnings management is reviewed. 
Next, a simple game is considered to illustrate how reputation appears to 
influence decision makers in repeated games. In this part, the game is analysed 
under different assumptions of the game. 
Finally, a cheap-talk game is proposed to analyse the manager’s decision 
making for the discretionary accruals. It is found that in the equilibrium, when the 
real earnings are low, reporting strategically is the expected outcome for the firms, 
especially for those firms with lower reputation. 
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Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks 
6.1 MAIN FINDINGS OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis provides empirical evidence and theoretical analysis regarding the 
corporate reputation on earnings management. Specifically, it presents not only the 
empirical tests investigating the relationship between the characteristics of the 
corporate reputation and the manager’s earnings management behaviour including 
discretionary accruals and real manipulation, but also the theoretical analysis 
examining how the manager reacts with discretionary accruals to the investors’ 
response. This study differentiates itself from previous ones on corporate reputation 
and earnings management based on three main contributions to the existing 
literature. 
First, this research examines whether corporate reputation impacts managers’ 
earnings management behaviour through discretionary accruals. It is argued that 
managers in firms with worse reputation manipulate more discretionary accruals 
than managers in firms with better reputation. One of the main incentives of 
earnings management is to mislead stakeholders, especially investors. Investors 
make investment decisions based upon firms’ reputation and reported earnings 
(Graham and Dodd, 2008). Bagnoli and Watts (2000) suggest that firms have 
incentives to manage earnings to influence investors' and creditors' perceptions 
about the firm's value. Therefore, firms with worse reputation may have stronger 
incentives to inflate earnings. By using the financial data from WRDS, I estimate the 
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discretionary accruals by Jones model, modified Jones model and performance-
adjusted Jones model. Together with the reputation data from Fortune’s America’s 
Most Admired Companies, I find that firms with worse reputation do make greater 
use of increasing accruals than do more reputable firms. The results are robust with 
three different measures of discretionary accruals. 
Second, in addition to using discretionary accruals, this study also 
investigates the relationship between corporate reputation and earnings management 
using real activities as the approach of how to manage earnings. Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) suggest that there are two approaches for managers to manage earnings: (1) 
accounting choice and (2) structuring real transactions. Graham et al. (2005) suggest 
that managers prefer to engage in real earnings management rather than using 
discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings. Cohen et al. (2008) and Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010) indicate that manipulation through real activities is even more 
common than that through discretionary accurals. However, with regard to the 
relationship between corporate reputation and earnings management, existing studies 
focus only on the earnings management through accounting choice i.e. discretionary 
accruals. I test the real earnings management in sales manipulation, overproduction 
and discretionary expenditures, and find that, compared with reputable firms, firms 
with poor reputation tend to manipulate more sales and discretionary expenditures to 
increase earnings. 
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Third, our theoretical analysis examines a game between the investors and 
the manager based on different situations, which implies that firms with poor 
reputation among investors intend to increase earnings in order to mimic the firm 
with better financial potentials. In the equilibrium, when the real earnings are low, 
reporting strategically is the expected outcome for the firms, especially for those 
firms with lower reputation. That is, managers in less reputable firms do have 
intense incentives to manage earnings upwards compared to the managers in 
reputable firms. The empirical results is consistent with this theoretical prediction. 
 
6.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several potential limitations in this thesis. First the sample for the 
American’s Most Admired Companies is drawn from a selection of the largest U.S. 
firms and the sample for the empirical tests in this study excludes the regulated 
industries. Therefore, the results of the study may not be applicable to smaller firms 
or to regulated firms. However, our findings are generally consistent with previous 
evidence offered by existing literature. Second, some variables may possibility be 
subject to some measurement error. The discretionary accruals measures may be 
criticised due to the potential misclassification of discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals. 
For future research, there are several directions to extend this study. First, 
this study only uses one measure for corporate reputation. Future research may use 
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other reputation measures to test how the corporate reputation affects the manager’s 
decision making. Second, different expectations on investors’ rationality may be 
taken account into the theoretical analysis. With the development of behavioural 
finance, several theoretical research argue that the investors are not fully rational. 
Learning process may be incorporated into the repeated game analysis. As different 
expectations may lead to different equilibrium, future studies may model how the 
managers response to the different investors’ expectations in the repeated games.  
151 
 
Bibliography 
AHARONY, J., LIN, C.-J. & LOEB, M. P. 1993. Initial Public Offerings, 
Accounting Choices, and Earnings Management. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 10, 61-81. 
AKERLOF, G. A. 1970. The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488-500. 
ARMSTRONG, C. S., JAGOLINZER, A. D. & LARCKER, D. F. 2010. Chief 
Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities. Journal of 
accounting research, 48, 225-271. 
AUMANN, R. J. 1960. Acceptable points in games of perfect information. Pacific 
Journal of Mathematics, 10, 381-417. 
AYERS, B. C., JIANG, J. & YEUNG, P. E. 2006. Discretionary Accruals and 
Earnings Management: An Analysis of Pseudo Earnings Targets. The 
Accounting Review, 81, 617-652. 
BADERTSCHER, B. A. 2011. Overvaluation and the Choice of Alternative 
Earnings Management Mechanisms. The Accounting Review, 86, 1491-
1518. 
BAGNOLI, M. & WATTS, S. G. 2000. The effect of relative performance 
evaluation on earnings management: a game-theoretic approach. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 19, 377-397. 
BAGNOLI, M. & WATTS, S. G. 2010. Oligopoly, Disclosure, and Earnings 
152 
 
Management. Accounting Review, 85, 1191-1214. 
BAKER, T., COLLINS, D. & REITENGA, A. 2003. Stock Option Compensation 
and Earnings Management Incentives. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & 
Finance, 18, 557-582. 
BALL, R., BUSHMAN, R. M. & VASVARI, F. P. 2008. The Debt-Contracting 
Value of Accounting Information and Loan Syndicate Structure. Journal of 
accounting research, 46, 247-287. 
BARNETT, M. L., JERMIER, J. M. & LAFFERTY, B. A. 2006. Corporate 
Reputation: The Definitional Landscape. Corporate Reputation Review, 9, 
26-38. 
BEATTY, A. & WEBER, J. 2003. The Effects of Debt Contracting on Voluntary 
Accounting Method Changes. The Accounting Review, 78, 119-142. 
BEATTY, A. & WEBER, J. 2006. Accounting Discretion in Fair Value Estimates: 
An Examination of SFAS 142 Goodwill Impairments. Journal of accounting 
research, 44, 257-288. 
BECKER, C. L., DEFOND, M. L., JIAMBALVO, J. & SUBRAMANYAM, K. R. 
1998. The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 15, 1-24. 
BENABOU, R. & LAROQUE, G. 1992. Using Privileged Information to 
Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 107, 921-958. 
153 
 
BERGSTRESSER, D. & PHILIPPON, T. 2006. CEO incentives and earnings 
management. Journal of Financial Economics, 80, 511-529. 
BHARATH, S. T., SUNDER, J. & SUNDER, S. V. 2008. Accounting Quality and 
Debt Contracting. Accounting Review, 83, 1-28. 
BOWEN, R. M., DUCHARME, L. & SHORES, D. 1995. Stakeholders' implicit 
claims and accounting method choice. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 20, 255-295. 
BOWEN, R. M., NOREEN, E. W. & LACEY, J. M. 1981. Determinants of the 
corporate decision to capitalize interest. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 3, 151-179. 
BURNS, N. & KEDIA, S. 2006. The impact of performance-based compensation on 
misreporting. Journal of Financial Economics, 79, 35-67. 
CABLE, D. M. & GRAHAM, M. E. 2000. The determinants of job seekers' 
reputation perceptions. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 21, 929-947. 
CAHAN, S. F. 1992. The Effect of Antitrust Investigations on Discretionary 
Accruals: A Refined Test of the Political-Cost Hypothesis. Accounting 
Review, 67, 77-95. 
CAHAN, S. F., CHAVIS, B. M. & ELMENDORF, R. G. 1997. Earnings 
Management of Chemical Firms in Response to Political Costs from 
Environmental Legislation. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 12, 
37-65. 
154 
 
CAO, Y., MYERS, L. A. & OMER, T. C. 2012. Does Company Reputation Matter 
for Financial Reporting Quality? Evidence from Restatements. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 29, 956-990. 
CARTER, R. & MANASTER, S. 1990. Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter 
Reputation. The Journal of Finance, 45, 1045-1067. 
CHANG, S.-C., CHUNG, T.-Y. & LIN, W.-C. 2010. Underwriter reputation, 
earnings management and the long-run performance of initial public 
offerings. Accounting & Finance, 50, 53-78. 
CHEN, C., SHI, H. & XU, H. 2013. Underwriter Reputation, Issuer Ownership, and 
Pre-IPO Earnings Management: Evidence from China. Financial 
Management, 42, 647-677. 
COHEN, D. A., DEY, A. & LYS, T. Z. 2008. Real and Accrual-Based Earnings 
Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods. Accounting 
Review, 83, 757-787. 
COHEN, D. A. & ZAROWIN, P. 2010. Accrual-based and real earnings 
management activities around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 50, 2-19. 
COLES, J. L., HERTZEL, M. & KALPATHY, S. 2006. Earnings management 
around employee stock option reissues. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 41, 173-200. 
DEANGELO, H., DEANGELO, L. & SKINNER, D. J. 1994. Accounting choice in 
155 
 
troubled companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, 113-143. 
DEANGELO, L. E. 1986. Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A 
Study of Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders. Accounting Review, 
61, 400. 
DECHOW, P., GE, W. & SCHRAND, C. 2010. Understanding earnings quality: A 
review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 50, 344-401. 
DECHOW, P., RICHARDSON, S. & TUNA, I. 2003. Why Are Earnings Kinky? 
An Examination of the Earnings Management Explanation. Review of 
Accounting Studies, 8, 355-384. 
DECHOW, P. M., RICHARDSON, S. A. & SLOAN, R. G. 2008. The Persistence 
and Pricing of the Cash Component of Earnings. Journal of accounting 
research, 46, 537-566. 
DECHOW, P. M. & SKINNER, D. J. 2000. Earnings Management: Reconciling the 
Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators. Accounting 
Horizons, 14, 235-250. 
DECHOW, P. M., SLOAN, R. G. & SWEENEY, A. P. 1995. Detecting Earnings 
Management. The Accounting Review, 70, 193-225. 
DECHOW, P. M., SLOAN, R. G. & SWEENEY, A. P. 1996. Causes and 
Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to 
Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13, 
156 
 
1-36. 
DEEPHOUSE, D. L. 2000. Media Reputation as a Strategic Resource: An 
Integration of Mass Communication and Resource-Based Theories. Journal 
of Management, 26, 1091. 
DEEPHOUSE, D. L. & CARTER, S. M. 2005. An Examination of Differences 
Between Organizational Legitimacy and Organizational Reputation*. Journal 
of Management Studies, 42, 329-360. 
DEFOND, M. L. & JIAMBALVO, J. 1994. Debt covenant violation and 
manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, 145-
176. 
DEMERJIAN, P. R., LEV, B., LEWIS, M. F. & MCVAY, S. E. 2013. Managerial 
Ability and Earnings Quality. Accounting Review, 88, 463-498. 
DEMSKI, J. S. 1998. Performance Measure Manipulation*. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 15, 261-285. 
DESAI, H., HOGAN, C. E. & WILKINS, M. S. 2006. The Reputational Penalty for 
Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover. 
The Accounting Review, 81, 83-112. 
DIAMOND, D. W. 1989. Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets. Journal of 
Political Economy, 97, 828-862. 
DICHEV, I. D. & SKINNER, D. J. 2002. Large–Sample Evidence on the Debt 
Covenant Hypothesis. Journal of accounting research, 40, 1091-1123. 
157 
 
DIETRICH, R. J., HARRIS, M. S. & MULLER III, K. A. 2000. The reliability of 
investment property fair value estimates. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 30, 125-158. 
DOWLING, G. 2006. Communicating Corporate Reputation through Stories. 
California Management Review, 49, 82-100. 
DU, K. 2012. Essays in Accounting Theory: Corporate Earnings Management in a 
Dynamic Setting and Public Disclosure in the Financial Services Industry. 
Ph.D, Yale University. 
DYE, R. A. 1988. Earnings Management in an Overlapping Generations Model. 
Journal of accounting research, 26, 195-235. 
EFENDI, J., SRIVASTAVA, A. & SWANSON, E. P. 2007. Why do corporate 
managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and 
other factors. Journal of Financial Economics, 85, 667-708. 
ERICKSON, M., HANLON, M. & MAYDEW, E. L. 2006. Is There a Link between 
Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud? Journal of accounting 
research, 44, 113-143. 
EWERT, R. & WAGENHOFER, A. 2005. Economic Effects of Tightening 
Accounting Standards to Restrict Earnings Management. The Accounting 
Review, 80, 1101-1124. 
FAMA, E. F. 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of 
Political Economy, 88, 288-307. 
158 
 
FANG, L. H. 2005. Investment Bank Reputation and the Price and Quality of 
Underwriting Services. The Journal of Finance, 60, 2729-2761. 
FEARNLEY, M. 1993. Corporate Reputation: The Wasted Asset. Marketing 
Intelligence & Planning, 11, 4-8. 
FIELDS, T. D., LYS, T. Z. & VINCENT, L. 2001. Empirical research on accounting 
choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31, 255-307. 
FISCHER, P. E. & VERRECCHIA, R. E. 2000. Reporting Bias. The Accounting 
Review, 75, 229-245. 
FOMBRUN, C. & SHANLEY, M. 1990. What's in a Name? Reputation Building 
and Corporate Strategy. The Academy of Management Journal, 33, 233-258. 
FOMBRUN, C. J. 1996. Reputation: Realizing value from the corporate image, 
Harvard Business Press. 
FRANCIS, J., HUANG, A. H., RAJGOPAL, S. & ZANG, A. Y. 2008. CEO 
Reputation and Earnings Quality. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25, 
109-147. 
FRIEDLAN, J. M. 1994. Accounting Choices of Issuers of Initial Public Offerings. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 11, 1-31. 
FUDENBERG, D. & LEVINE, D. K. 1992. Maintaining a Reputation when 
Strategies are Imperfectly Observed. The Review of Economic Studies, 59, 
561-579. 
FUDENBERG, D. & TIROLE, J. 1995. A Theory of Income and Dividend 
159 
 
Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents. The Journal of Political Economy, 
103, 75-93. 
GAVER, J. J., GAVER, K. M. & AUSTIN, J. R. 1995. Additional evidence on 
bonus plans and income management. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 19, 3-28. 
GIBBONS, R. 1997. An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory. National Bureau 
of Economic Research Technical Working Paper Series, No. 199. 
GRAHAM, B. & DODD, D. L. 2008. Security analysis : principles and technique, 
New York ; London, McGraw-Hill. 
GRAHAM, J. R., HARVEY, C. R. & RAJGOPAL, S. 2005. The economic 
implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 40, 3-73. 
GUAY, W. R., KOTHARI, S. P. & WATTS, R. L. 1996. A Market-Based 
Evaluation of Discretionary Accrual Models. Journal of accounting research, 
34, 83-105. 
GUIDRY, F., J. LEONE, A. & ROCK, S. 1999. Earnings-based bonus plans and 
earnings management by business-unit managers. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 26, 113-142. 
GUNNY, K. A. 2010. The Relation Between Earnings Management Using Real 
Activities Manipulation and Future Performance: Evidence from Meeting 
Earnings Benchmarks. Contemporary Accounting Research, 27, 855-888. 
160 
 
GÜTH, W. 1994. On the Scientific Work of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash, and 
Reinhard Selten. 
HABIB, A. & HANSEN, J. 2008. Target shooting: Review of earnings management 
around earnings benchmarks. Journal of Accounting Literature, 27, 25-70. 
HAGERMAN, R. L. & ZMIJEWSKI, M. E. 1979. Some economic determinants of 
accounting policy choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1, 141-161. 
HALL, R. 1993. A framework linking intangible resources and capabiliites to 
sustainable competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 14, 607-
618. 
HALL, S. C. & STAMMERJOHAN, W. W. 1997. Damage Awards and Earnings 
Management in the Oil Industry. The Accounting Review, 72, 47-65. 
HAN, J. C. Y. & SHIING-WU, W. 1998. Political Costs and Earnings Management 
of Oil Companies During the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis. Accounting Review, 
73, 103. 
HANNINGTON, T. 2004. How to measure and manage your corporate reputation, 
Aldershot, Hants, Gower. 
HANSEN, J. C. 2010. The effect of alternative goals on earnings management 
studies: An earnings benchmark examination. Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy, 29, 459-480. 
HARSANYI, J. C. 1968. Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ 
Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game. 
161 
 
Management Science, 14, 486-502. 
HARSANYI, J. C. 1968. Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” 
Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points. Management Science, 14, 320-
334. 
HARSANYI, J. C. 2004. Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” 
Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model&. Management Science, 50, 1804-
1817. 
HEALY, P. M. 1985. THE EFFECT OF BONUS SCHEMES ON ACCOUNTING 
DECISIONS. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 7, 85-107. 
HEALY, P. M. & PALEPU, K. G. 1990. Effectiveness of accounting-based 
dividend covenants. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12, 97-123. 
HEALY, P. M. & WAHLEN, J. M. 1999. A Review of the Earnings Management 
Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting. Accounting Horizons, 
13, 365-383. 
HOLMSTRÖM, B. 1999. Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective. 
The Review of Economic Studies, 66, 169-182. 
HOLTHAUSEN, R. W. 1981. Evidence on the effect of bond covenants and 
management compensation contracts on the choice of accounting techniques: 
The case of the depreciation switch-back. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 3, 73-109. 
HOLTHAUSEN, R. W., LARCKER, D. F. & SLOAN, R. G. 1995. Annual bonus 
162 
 
schemes and the manipulation of earnings. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 19, 29-74. 
HRIBAR, P. & COLLINS, D. W. 2002. Errors in Estimating Accruals: Implications 
for Empirical Research. Journal of accounting research, 40, 105-134. 
JELINEK, K. 2007. The Effect of Leverage Increases on Earnings Management. 
Journal of Business & Economic Studies, 13, 24-46. 
JIANG, J. 2008. Beating Earnings Benchmarks and the Cost of Debt. Accounting 
Review, 83, 377-416. 
JOHNSON, S. A., RYAN, H. E. & TIAN, Y. S. 2009. Managerial Incentives and 
Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter*. Review of Finance, 13, 
115-145. 
JONES, J. J. 1991. Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 29, 193-228. 
KAPLAN, S., MCELROY, J., RAVENSCROFT, S. & SHRADER, C. 2007. Moral 
Judgment and Causal Attributions: Consequences of Engaging in Earnings 
Management. Journal of Business Ethics, 74, 149-164. 
KAPLAN, S. E. & RAVENSCROFT, S. P. 2004. The Reputation Effects of 
Earnings Management in the Internal Labor Market. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 14, 453-478. 
KARPOFF, J. M. & LOTT JR, J. R. 1993. THE REPUTATIONAL PENALTY 
FIRMS BEAR FROM COMMITTING CRIMINAL FRAUD. Journal of 
163 
 
Law & Economics, 36, 757-802. 
KEY, K. G. 1997. Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable 
television industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23, 309-337. 
KIM, J.-Y. 1996. Cheap Talk and Reputation in Repeated Pretrial Negotiation. The 
RAND Journal of Economics, 27, 787-802. 
KOTHARI, S. P., LEONE, A. J. & WASLEY, C. E. 2005. Performance matched 
discretionary accrual measures. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 39, 
163-197. 
KREPS, D. M. 1990. Game theory and economic modelling, Clarendon Press. 
KREPS, D. M., MILGROM, P., ROBERTS, J. & WILSON, R. 1982. Rational 
cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 27, 245-252. 
KREPS, D. M. & WILSON, R. 1982. Reputation and imperfect information. Journal 
of Economic Theory, 27, 253-279. 
KREPS, D. M. & WILSON, R. 1982. Sequential Equilibria. Econometrica, 50, 863-
894. 
KRISHNAN, G. V. 2003. Does Big 6 Auditor Industry Expertise Constrain 
Earnings Management? Accounting Horizons, 17, 1-16. 
LAFOND, R. 2008. Discussion of "CEO Reputation and Earnings Quality". 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 25, 149-156. 
LAMBERT, R. A. 1983. Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard. The Bell Journal 
164 
 
of Economics, 14, 441-452. 
LAMBERT, R. A. 1984. Income Smoothing as Rational Equilibrium Behavior. The 
Accounting Review, 59, 604-618. 
LEVITT JR, A. 1998. The 'Numbers Game'. CPA Journal, 68, 14. 
LUCHS, C., STUEBS, M. & LI, S. 2009. Corporate Reputation And Earnings 
Quality. Journal of Applied Business Research, 25, 47-54. 
MAILATH, G. 2007. Reputation effects. PIER Working Paper No. 07-034. 
MAILATH, G. J. & SAMUELSON, L. 2001. Who Wants a Good Reputation? The 
Review of Economic Studies, 68, 415-441. 
MAILATH, G. J. & SAMUELSON, L. 2006. Repeated games and reputations : 
long-run relationships, Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press. 
MARGARET A. MEYER & JOHN VICKERS 1997. Performance Comparisons 
and Dynamic Incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 105, 547-581. 
MCANALLY, M. L., SRIVASTAVA, A. & WEAVER, C. D. 2008. Executive 
Stock Options, Missed Earnings Targets, and Earnings Management. 
Accounting Review, 83, 185-216. 
MILBOURN, T. T. 2003. CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 68, 233-262. 
MONEM, R. M. 2003. Earnings Management in Response to the Introduction of the 
Australian Gold Tax. Contemporary Accounting Research, 20, 747-774. 
MORRIS, S. 2001. Political Correctness. Journal of Political Economy, 109, 231-
165 
 
265. 
MORRIS, S. E. 1998. An instrumental theory of political correctness, Citeseer. 
MYERSON, R. B. 1991. Game theory : analysis of conflict, Cambridge, Mass. ; 
London, Harvard University Press. 
NASH, J. 1953. Two-Person Cooperative Games. Econometrica, 21, 128-140. 
NASH, J. F., JR. 1950. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 18, 155-162. 
NASH, J. F. 1950. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 36, 48-49. 
NIKOLAEV, V. V. 2010. Debt Covenants and Accounting Conservatism. Journal of 
accounting research, 48, 51-89. 
OLAGBEMI, F. O. 2011. The Effectiveness Of Federal Regulations And Corporate 
Reputation In Mitigating Corporate Accounting Fraud, Xlibris, Corp. 
PATTEN, D. M. & TROMPETER, G. 2003. Corporate responses to political costs: 
an examination of the relation between environmental disclosure and 
earnings management. Journal of Accounting & Public Policy, 22, 83-94. 
PRESTON, L. E. 2004. Reputation as a source of corporate social capital. Journal of 
General Management, 30, 43-49. 
RANGAN, S. 1998. Earnings management and the performance of seasoned equity 
offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50, 101-122. 
RAO, H. 1994. The Social Construction of Reputation: Certification Contests, 
Legitimation, and the Survival of Organizations in the American Automobile 
166 
 
Industry: 1895–1912. Strategic Management Journal, 15, 29-44. 
RIAHI-BELKAOUI, A. 2001. The role of corporate reputation for multinational 
firms : accounting, organizational, and market considerations, Westport, 
Conn. ; London, Quorum Books. 
RINDOVA, V. P., WILLIAMSON, I. O., PETKOVA, A. P. & SEVER, J. M. 2005. 
Being Good or Being Known: An Empirical Examination of the Dimensions, 
Antecedents, and Consequences of Organizational Reputation. The Academy 
of Management Journal, 48, 1033-1049. 
RITTER, J. R. & WELCH, I. 2002. A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and 
Allocations. The Journal of Finance, 57, 1795-1828. 
RONEN, J. & YAARI, V. 2008. Earnings management : emerging insights in 
theory, practice, and research, New York, Springer. 
ROTHSCHILD, M. & STIGLITZ, J. 1976. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 629-649. 
ROYCHOWDHURY, S. 2006. Earnings management through real activities 
manipulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42, 335-370. 
SANKAR, M. R. & SUBRAMANYAM, K. R. 2001. Reporting Discretion and 
Private Information Communication through Earnings. Journal of accounting 
research, 39, 365-386. 
SCHIPPER, K. 1989. COMMENTARY on Earnings Management. Accounting 
167 
 
Horizons, 3, 91-102. 
SCHWAIGER, M. 2004. COMPONENTS AND PARAMETERS OF 
CORPORATE REPUTATION -- AN EMPIRICAL STUDY. Schmalenbach 
Business Review (SBR), 56, 46-71. 
SCOTT, W. R. 2009. Financial accounting theory, Toronto, Ont., Pearson Prentice 
Hall. 
SELTEN, R. 1965. SPIELTHEORETISCHE BEHANDLUNG EINES 
OLIGOPOLMODELLS MIT NACHFRAGETRÄGHEIT: TEIL I: 
BESTIMMUNG DES DYNAMISCHEN PREISGLEICHGEWICHTS. 
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft / Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, 121, 301-324. 
SELTEN, R. 1978. The chain store paradox. Theory and Decision, 9, 127-159. 
SHAUB, M. K., COLLINS, F., HOLZMANN, O. & LOWENSOHN, S. H. 2005. 
Self-Interest VS. Concern for Others. Strategic Finance, 86, 41-45. 
SHIVAKUMAR, L. 2000. Do firms mislead investors by overstating earnings 
before seasoned equity offerings? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29, 
339-371. 
SIMS, C. A. 1972. Money, Income, and Causality. The American Economic 
Review, 62, 540-552. 
SKINNER, D. J. 1993. The investment opportunity set and accounting procedure 
choice: Preliminary evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16, 
168 
 
407-445. 
SMITH, C. W., JR. 1993. A Perspective on Accounting-Based Debt Covenant 
Violations. The Accounting Review, 68, 289-303. 
SOBEL, J. 1985. A Theory of Credibility. The Review of Economic Studies, 52, 
557-573. 
SPENCE, M. 1976. Product Differentiation and Welfare. The American Economic 
Review, 66, 407-414. 
SRIVASTAVA, R. K., MCINISH, T. H., WOOD, R. A. & CAPRARO, A. J. 1997. 
Part IV: How Do Reputations Affect Corporate Performance?: The Value of 
Corporate Reputation: Evidence from the Equity Markets. Corporate 
Reputation Review, 1, 61-68. 
STOCKEN, P. C. 2000. Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure. The RAND Journal of 
Economics, 31, 359-374. 
SUBRAMANYAM, K. R. 1996. The pricing of discretionary accruals. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 22, 249-281. 
SUH, T. & AMINE, L. S. 2007. Defining and Managing Reputational Capital in 
Global Markets. Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 15, 205-217. 
SUN, Y., LEE, K. J., LI, D. & JIN, J. J. 2010. THE EFFECTS OF UNDERWRITER 
REPUTATION ON PRE-IPO EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND POST-
IPO OPERATING PERFORMANCE. Academy of Accounting & Financial 
Studies Journal, 14, 1-18. 
169 
 
SWEENEY, A. P. 1994. Debt-covenant violations and managers' accounting 
responses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, 281-308. 
TADELIS, S. 1999. What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset. The 
American Economic Review, 89, 548-563. 
TADELIS, S. 2002. The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism. Journal 
of Political Economy, 110, 854-882. 
TADELIS, S. 2003. Firm Reputation with Hidden Information. Economic Theory, 
21, 635-651. 
TAN, H. 2007. Does the Reputation Matter? Corporate Reputation and Earnings 
Quality. SSRN eLibrary. 
TEOH, S. H., WELCH, I. & WONG, T. J. 1998. Earnings Management and the 
Long-Run Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings. The Journal of 
Finance, 53, 1935-1974. 
TEOH, S. H., WELCH, I. & WONG, T. J. 1998. Earnings management and the 
underperformance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 50, 63-99. 
TITMAN, S. & TRUEMAN, B. 1986. Information quality and the valuation of new 
issues. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8, 159-172. 
TRUEMAN, B. & TITMAN, S. 1988. An Explanation for Accounting Income 
Smoothing. Journal of accounting research, 26, 127-139. 
VON NEUMANN, J. & MORGENSTERN, O. 1944. Theory of games and 
170 
 
economic behaviour, [S.l.], Princeton U. P. 
WALKER, K. 2010. A Systematic Review of the Corporate Reputation Literature: 
Definition, Measurement, and Theory. Corporate Reputation Review, 12, 
357-387. 
WARTICK, S. L. 2002. Measuring Corporate Reputation: Definition and Data. 
Business & Society, 41, 371-392. 
WATTS, R. L. & ZIMMERMAN, J. L. 1978. Towards a Positive Theory of the 
Determination of Accounting Standards. The Accounting Review, 53, 112-
134. 
WATTS, R. L. & ZIMMERMAN, J. L. 1986. Positive accounting theory, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J :, Prentice-Hall. 
WEIGELT, K. & CAMERER, C. 1988. Reputation and Corporate Strategy: A 
Review of Recent Theory and Applications. Strategic Management Journal, 
9, 443-454. 
WHITE, H. 1980. A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and 
a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 48, 817-838. 
WONG, J. 1988. Political costs and an intraperiod accounting choice for export tax 
credits. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 10, 37-51. 
XIE, B., DAVIDSON III, W. N. & DADALT, P. J. 2003. Earnings management and 
corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal 
of Corporate Finance, 9, 295-316. 
171 
 
ZANG, A. Y. 2012. Evidence on the Trade-Off between Real Activities 
Manipulation and Accrual-Based Earnings Management. Accounting 
Review, 87, 675-703. 
ZHANG, J. 2008. The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders 
and borrowers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 45, 27-54. 
